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Introduction 
 
 
1. Beyond the Economic Schizophrenia 
 
The immediate motive for writing the dissertation is to reflect upon the 
economic and social consequences of the 1997 financial crisis in South Korea 
from the perspective of the Christian faith. As we will try to show, the 
consequences of this crisis for Korean society have been grave, and command 
an analysis of economic thinking from a theological point of view in order to 
overcome the gap between Christian principles and the practice and theory of 
current economy as it appears in recent Korean history. The present writer, 
however, carries out this research not as an economist, but as a theologian. He is 
limited to using and evaluating the existing economic theories rather than 
creating new economic theories. 
Although economics is involved in most areas of our daily lives, it has not 
been a major area of theological reflection. The Christian‟s principles of life for 
Monday are entirely different from those for Sunday. Helmut Thielicke 
expresses it as „schizophrenia.‟1 While there are some Christians who „succeed‟ 
in both church and society, there seem to be few Christians who do not give up 
the principles of Sunday on Monday, particularly in economic life. It seems to 
be nearly impossible for Christians to adopt a Christian mindset in a world that 
is ruled by the logic of capitalism. Rather, the principles of Monday tend to 
undermine those of Sunday. We take this situation very seriously because in 
contemporary Korean society it is causing Christian workers to lose their faith. 
Not surprisingly, the percentage of working people between the ages of 20 and 
50 in South Korean churches is very low. This dissertation is driven by the 
desire to lead workers to Christ in the context of the South Korean church, and 
to establish a Christian culture in their work places. 
 
2. The 1997 Korean Financial Crisis and the Economic Unsoundness 
 
2.1. The Development of the 1997 Korean Crisis 
 
South Korea has experienced industrialization since the 1960s. Despite poor 
natural resource endowment, the country has successfully developed its 
economy thanks to skilled manpower and purposeful effective governmental 
                                                          
1 
Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics, vol. I: Foundations, trans. J.W. Doberstein 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), xiv, and see 5.3.2. „A Critique of Value-free 
Economics regarding the Dichotomy between Economics and Christian Faith‟ for a 
more detailed discussion of „economic schizophrenia.‟ 
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policies.
2
 It achieved a high annual growth averaging 8.7% during the 
implementation of the seven economic development plans from 1962 to 1997. 
Its national income doubled every decade, and a tenfold increase was recorded. 
In 1996 its GNP per capita reached over 10,000 US$, achieving a ranking of 
28th out of 132 nations. The world praised the rapid economic growth of South 
Korea by calling it „A Miracle of Han River.‟3 
In stark contrast to this remarkable achievement, the country was 
challenged in the late 1990s when it suddenly faced a financial crisis and its 
economy crashed. Without appropriate regulatory, supervisory and legal 
provision, South Korea hastily introduced financial liberalization in order to 
acquire membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). Taking advantage of the liberalization and deregulation, 
financial institutions, especially the newly established secondary (non-bank) 
financial institutions, competitively borrowed short-term loans from 
international financial institutions. The result was the rapid growth in the 
national debt: the external debt increased from 127.5 billion US$ in 1995 to 
163.5 billion US$ (approximately 32% of GNP) in 1996.
4
 
To make matters worse, the ratio of short-term borrowing had increased up 
to 59% of the total foreign debt at the end of 1997. Business accounts of major 
firms and banks were also deteriorating due to both the bankruptcies of some 
big companies and the foreign exchange crises in Southeast Asian countries. 
Foreign creditors, now suspicious of the timeliness of their investment returns, 
refused to roll over loans. The won value slumped and the country‟s foreign 
currency reserves dropped from 22.5 billion US$ in October to 3.9 billion 
US$ in December 1997. The South Korean government, apprehensive of the 
moratorium, requested relief loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and in return agreed on 3 December 1997 to the effective control of the IMF 
over South Korean economic policy.
5
 
The crisis led to a sharp contraction of economic activity in 1998 - a 
negative 6.7% growth, the worst in modern Korean history. Many South 
Koreans considered the 1997 crisis to be the most critical national crisis since 
the Korean War in the early 1950s, and the worst national disgrace since the 
1910 Japanese Annexation.
6
 
                                                          
2
 Sang Hwa Chung, “Political economy of the Korean economic crisis in the late 1990s,” 
Korea Observer 32 (Winter 2001): 501. 
3
 Jong Ho Kim, “A study on the foreign exchange reserve crisis and the process of 
overcoming it in Korea relating to the characteristics of Korean economic 
development,” Korean Education of Fundamental School 44 (April 2001): 189-90. 
4
 Sang Hwa Chung, “Political economy of the Korean economic crisis in the late 
1990s”: 512-3. 
5
 Sang Hwa Chung, “Political economy of the Korean economic crisis in the late 
1990s”: 513. 
6
 David T. Coe and Se Jik Kim, eds, Korean Crisis and Recovery (Washington D. C.: 
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2.2. The Social Consequences of the 1997 Korean Crisis 
 
After the crisis, while the exchange rate rapidly increased to nearly double 
(from 844.20 won to the US dollar on December 31, 1996 to 1415.20 won on 
December 31 1997)
7
, the Gross National Product (GNP) per capita rapidly 
decreased by nearly half (from 9,511 US$ in 1997 to 6,321 US$ in 1998).
8
 The 
unprecedented sudden changes in the financial and economic situations 
developed into the social crisis. Rising unemployment has been the most serious 
problem of Korean society. At the direction of the IMF, the Korean government 
carried out a series of so-called „structural adjustments.‟ This made about 
24,600 companies go bankrupt by 1998 and also produced mass lay-offs of 
employees. The unemployment rate changed radically from 2.6% in 1997 to 6.8% 
in 1998 and peaked in early 1999 at 8.7%.  
It is estimated that this higher unemployment rate had a serious effect on 
Korean society because it had experienced a low unemployment rate of 2-3% 
until the crisis. It is also serious because Korea, unlike Western countries, 
lacked sufficient social safety nets.
9
 In the face of rapidly rising unemployment, 
real wages fell by 10% in 1998. The poverty rate (based on 5 US$ per day) 
increased from 8.6% in 1997 to 19.2% in 1998.
10
 
The increasing gap between the rich and the poor is another serious 
problem. The Gini coefficient, which equaled 0.28 in 1997, reached 0.32 in 
1999. The ratio of the income of the highest quintile of households to that of the 
lowest quintile rose by 16% from 1997 to 2000. Real income for the top 20% of 
urban households, after remaining stable in 1998, increased substantially in 
1999 and 2000, ending up 12.5% above its pre-crisis level. Conversely, the 
poorest fifth suffered income loss of 5.1% over the same period.
11
 
Not all population groups experienced loss from the crises. While the 
poorest fifth, mainly relying on wage income, could not but experience a 
                                                                                                                                              
IMF and Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 2002), 1. 
7
 Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper (Jan. 1, 1998). 
8
 Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper (Dec. 31, 1998). 
9
 Chae Kyu Park, “Economic crisis and the quality of life in Korea,” Development and 
Society 28 (Dec. 1999): 241. The public social expenditure in percentage of GDP 
as of 1997 is 3.9 in South Korea while 30.7 in Sweden, 26.4 in Germany, 21.2 in 
the Netherlands, 19.2 in UK, 14.9 in US. See OECD, Social Expenditure Database 
(Paris, 2006). 
10
 World Bank, “The influence of the foreign exchange crisis on the poverty rates of the 
East-Asian countries,” Trends in Poverty (July 1999), qtd. in Chon Ik Park, “The 
problem and policy of poverty in Korea since the economic crisis,” Journal of 
Social Science Research 9 (2001): 129. 
11
 James Crotty and Kang Kook Lee, “Economic performance in post-crisis Korea: a 
critical perspective on neo-liberal restructuring,” Seoul Journal of Economics 14 
(Sum. 2001): 196-7. 
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decrease in their income, the richest fifth might raise their income for the 
following reasons: (1) The rich tend to have access to income-protecting 
mechanisms such as shifting of asset portfolio, including capital flight; (2) 
increase in real interest rates redistributes income from borrowers to lenders, 
which is likely to render relative gain for the households in the richest quintile, 
considering their interest-bearing asset holdings; and finally (3) real 
depreciation of exchange rates causes a relative increase in the price of traded 
goods, leading to increase in the incomes of those engaged in the export 
sector.
12
 
The problem of unearned income and the subsequent unhealthy view of 
labor and economics are also serious. Since the 1997 Financial Crisis the 
recognition that the center of the economy has changed from production to 
finance became widespread in the society. In fact, the volume of daily 
transactions at international foreign exchange markets increased about 83 times 
(from about 18 billion US$ in the early 1970‟s to about 1,500 billion US$ in 
1997). Just 3% of the latter is similar to the volume of spot transactions of 
goods and services.
13
  
With the recognition of this change, the people‟s concern about stock-
jobbery, exchange speculation, horse racing, cycling races, casinos, and so on, 
has increased sharply. The concern about real estate speculation has also 
increased (the entire land price of South Korea in 1995 was about 5.4 times its 
GNP in 1994, compared to 0.6 in the US, 2.0 in the UK and 3.4 in Japan).
14
 
Along with this increase of unearned income, our concept of labor and 
economics has been changing from contributing to a meaningful life to 
accumulating money.  
The Korean crisis brought about various other consequences to dismantle 
not only the economy but also society itself.
15
 The rapid change caused by the 
crisis accelerated the individual‟s deregulation and isolation from society. 
Deregulation and isolation accelerate the individual‟s deviation behavior and the 
                                                          
12
 Na Hee Kang, “The effects of Asian financial crisis on income distribution and 
poverty: an analysis of the South Korean case,” Thesis, Ewha Womans University 
(2000): 30-31. 
13
 Institute of Democratic Trade Union Movement in memory of Tae Il Jon, ed. and 
trans, Neo-liberalism and the World People‟s Movement (Seoul: Hanul, 1998), 191. 
14
 Sang Whan Jang, “Why did Korean Capitalism meet IMF?” Criticism of History (Spr. 
1998): 107.  
15
 Martin Hart-Landsberg, “The Asian crisis: causes and consequences,” Against the 
Currents 73 (March & April, 1998), http://www.solidarity-us.org/site/node/1837 
(accesed July 30, 2012); cf. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political 
and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 73: “To allow 
the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their 
natural environment ... would result in the demolition of society.” 
14 
 
disorganization of the family and community, resulting in diverse social 
problems. 
According to the statistics for 1998, respondents‟ psychological health 
worsened since the crisis. That is, 46.3% stated that their current psychological 
health is worse, compared with responses of the previous year, while only 7.1% 
considered their psychological condition healthier than before. And 46.6% 
maintained the same psychological health that they had in 1997.
16
 
The total number of divorces rose from about 93,000 in 1997 to about 
124,000 in 1998, while crime incidents increased from 1,588,613 to 1,765,887 
for the same period, with property crime showing the highest increase.
17  
The 
number of suicides also jumped from 9,190 in 1997 to 12,458 in 1998.
18
 The 
number of homeless persons sleeping in the railroad depos or public parks rose 
significantly from about 400 in 1997 to about 4,500 in 1998. The number of 
children committed to orphanages increased by 60% for the same year.
19
  
 
3. The Research Project and Structure 
 
This thesis starts with a historical account of the 1997 Korean Crisis at a 
particular time and space, and then traces what brought about the crisis and 
unsound situations which have resulted since the crisis. We show that neo-
liberalism is its cause, and examine how neo-liberal mechanisms, principles, 
practices and methodology have operated in and since the crisis, and evaluate 
them from a Christian perspective. 
In Chapter 1 we describe both the content and the background of the 
financial crisis of South Korea in 1997. We clarify the link between the crisis 
and the ideology of neo-liberalism. We then explain the definition and 
mechanisms of neo-liberalism and how they have been applied in the Korean 
economy since the crisis. 
In Chapter 2 we deal with the neo-liberal principles under the title 
„principles of global capitalism behind the Korean crisis.‟ This presents us with 
comprehensive understanding and critiques neo-liberalism by discussing the 
basic system and core concepts of global capitalism and the Austrian School 
from which neo-liberalism stems.  
In Chapter 3 we do case studies to illustrate how the neo-liberal principles 
discussed above have worked in practice since the crisis. We select three 
research areas – tax havens, labor-management relations and real estate. We 
                                                          
16
 Chae Kyu Park, “Economic crisis and the quality of life in Korea”: 246. 
17
 Yong Hak Kim, “Shock of the economic crisis and crisis of confidence,” Research of 
Social Development 5 (Dec. 1999): 135-137. 
18
 Jin Tak O, Suicide, the Most Unfortunate Death in the World (Seoul: Sejong Book), 
2008, 20. 
19
 Un Jong No and Hyon Hui Park, “The change of Korean family since the IMF 
situation,” Songsim Sociology (July 2000): 210-1. 
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highlight that the primary principle of „self-regulating market‟ has operated 
through the process of „commodification of production factors‟ – capital, labor 
and land - and produced unhealthy developments in those areas since the crisis. 
In Chapter 4 we discuss the general methodology of modern economics 
including neo-liberal economics. Modern economics has oriented itself toward 
value-free [positive] methodology. It distinguishes between the positive and the 
normative and tends to disregard the latter. We find its origin in Enlightenment 
philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and David Hume. The value-free 
methodology has led to the denial of social justice and ethics of neo-liberalism 
and the subsequent criticism of government‟s control over market and social 
expenditure. We also introduce the opinions of the well-known opponents 
against the mainstream value-free methodology such as Gunnar Myrdal and 
Amartya Sen. 
In Chapter 5 we ponder how Christians could respond to the neo-liberal 
principles, practices and methodology which were discussed in the previous 
chapters. First, we contrast a series of main neo-liberal concepts of economy – 
market, economics and globalization - which are composed of the principles of 
global capitalism in Chapter 2, with a set of Christian concepts of the same. 
Second, we evaluate in Chapter 3 the previous case studies – tax havens, labor-
management relations and real estate – and propose the Christian alternative 
ideas and practices of them. Lastly, we criticize the neo-liberal value-free 
economic methodology in Chapter 4 from the perspective of a Christian 
epistemology, and also talk about the dichotomy between economics and the 
Christian faith, which is accompanied by the value-free economic methodology. 
In conclusion, we summarize the results of the research and check whether 
they answer to its research questions. The research questions are as follows: 
 
- What happened in the 1997 Korean Crisis and what negative 
developments have Korean society and people experienced so that we 
need to reflect ethically on them? 
- What was the cause of the crisis? 
- If neo-liberalism was the cause of the crisis, what is the definition of 
neo-liberalism and what explains the neo-liberal mechanisms, principles, 
practices and methodology? 
- How do we evaluate the neo-liberal principles, practices and 
methodology from a Christian perspective, and what are the Christian 
alternative economic thoughts and practices? 
  
16 
 
Chapter 1 
The 1997 Korean Financial Crisis and Neo-liberalism 
 
 
First, we reveal that there are mechanisms of neo-liberalism behind the crisis. 
Second, we explain the definition and mechanisms of neo-liberalism. Third, we 
examine how the mechanisms of neo-liberalism have become deeply implanted 
in the Korean economy through the so-called „structural adjustments‟ of the 
IMF since the crisis. 
 
1.1. The Nature of the Crisis and its Relationship to Neo-liberalism 
 
The Korean crisis in 1997 defies easy explanation by existing crisis theories, 
which tend to focus on macroeconomic performance. At the onset of the crisis 
in late 1997, Korea‟s macro-economic indicators gave little cause for alarm. On 
the contrary, the IMF and World Bank continuously praised Korea through their 
reports as a model country of sound macroeconomic management and of 
liberalization and deregulation. Fiscal spending was balanced and 
unemployment and inflation were also at reasonable levels. In late 1997, 
unemployment was 2.2%; CPI (Consumer Price Indexes) inflation, 4.5%; 
economic growth, 7%; and the utilization rate of manufacturing facilities, over 
90%. The only signs of the impending currency crisis were the trade balance, 
which had marked monthly deficits of 2 billion US$ since August, and the 
exchange rate, which had jumped from a stable 880 won to the US dollar to over 
900.
20
 
It was an investment-induced crisis, not a crisis traditionally caused by 
macroeconomic instability.
21
 Korea‟s crisis was not a unique, local 
phenomenon. Mexico in 1995, Southeast Asia in early 1997, and Brazil and 
Russia in 1998 all experienced foreign exchange crises. Thanks to innovations 
in finance that started in the 1970s and accelerated in the 1980s, the Western 
economies had accumulated excess liquidity for some time.
22
 The owners of 
financial assets and their agencies, the banks, could not find sufficiently 
profitable opportunities for investment. So a portion of these assets sought 
suitable opportunities on the transnational financial markets. The banks found 
ruling classes in the developing countries, who took out loans with the aim not 
                                                          
20
 Un Chan Chung, “The Korean economic crisis: what is and what ought to be done,” 
in Richard Hooley and Jang Hee Yoo, eds, The Post-Financial Crisis Challenges 
for Asian Industrialization (Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd., 2002), 94,115. 
21
 Sang Hwa Chung, “Political economy of the Korean economic crisis in the late 
1990s”: 515. 
22
 Un Chan Chung, “The Korean economic crisis: what is and what ought to be done”: 
101, 108-9. 
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only of „modernizing‟ their countries, but also so that they themselves could 
enjoy the benefits of mass-produced consumer goods.
23
  
The payment of interest to owners of financial assets is an integral feature 
of the global credit market. Such interest payments to the global money market 
force all the different nations of the world to adapt to one and the same 
system.
24
 Its ideological expression is neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism insists on 
deregulation in national economies and free trade in the world market. The 
dismantling of national barriers to capital flows allowed capital flight to take 
place for short-term speculative motives at any time and any place.
25
 
 
1.2. Neo-liberalism and its Mechanisms 
 
What is neo-liberalism from an economic viewpoint? „Liberalism‟ became 
famous in Europe when Adam Smith, an English economist, published a book 
in 1776 entitled „The Wealth of Nations.‟ He advocated the abolition of 
government intervention in economic matters. No restrictions on manufacturing, 
no barriers to commerce, no tariffs, he said; free trade was the best way for a 
nation‟s economy to develop. Such ideas were „liberal‟ in the sense of no 
controls. Liberalism prevailed in the United States through the 1800s and early 
1900s.
26
 
Then the Great Depression of the 1930s led an economist named John 
Maynard Keynes to develop a theory that challenged liberalism as the best 
policy for capitalists. He said, in essence, that full employment is necessary for 
capitalism to grow and it can be achieved only if governments and central banks 
intervene to increase employment. These ideas had much influence on President 
Roosevelt‟s New Deal - that did improve life for many people. The belief that 
government should advance the common good became widely accepted.
27
 
But the capitalist crisis since the 1970s, with its shrinking profit rates, 
inspired the corporate elite to revive liberalism. This is what makes it „neo‟ or 
new.
28
 Friedrich von Hayek, the father of neo-liberalism, providing continuity 
to the liberal tradition initiated by Adam Smith, advocated „a spontaneous order‟ 
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of the market. However, his special contribution refers to the radical criticism to 
the idea of „social justice.‟29 
Neo-liberalism took its concrete form during Margaret Thatcher‟s rule in 
the UK and Ronald Reagan‟s in the US.30 They put Hayek‟s theory into practice 
to legitimate the neo-liberal attack on „big government‟ and the bureaucratic 
welfare state with a policy mix based on „free‟ trade and the establishment of the 
„open‟ economy: economic liberalization or rationalization characterized by the 
abolition of subsidies and tariffs, floating the exchange rate, the freeing up of 
controls on foreign investment; the restructuring of the state sector, including 
corporatization and privatization of state trading departments and other assets, 
„downsizing,‟ „contracting out,‟ the attack on unions and abolition of wage 
bargaining in favor of employment contracts; and, finally, the dismantling of the 
welfare state through commercialization, „contracting out,‟ „targeting‟ of 
services, and individual „responsibilization‟ for health, welfare and education. 
On this view there is nothing distinctive or special about education or health: 
they are services and products like any other, to be traded in the marketplace.
31
 
Now we will look further into the mechanisms of neo-liberalism at the 
international level that is directly related to the Korean financial crisis. The 
essence of the change since the neo-liberal regime is that production, trading 
and monetary capital can be transnationalized, while the political instruments of 
regulation remain either national or international. In addition, finance capital 
was assigned a preeminent role.
32
 If Adam Smith could return and see this 
extreme aspect of neo-liberalism, he would probably find it bizarre. The belief 
in the market, in market forces, is separated from the factual production of 
goods and services. It has become an end in itself, and this is one reason to 
speak of neo-liberalism and not of liberalism.
33
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The main actors on the transnational markets are the transnational 
companies and the commercial banks.
34
 The watchword of the emerging 
transnational corporations (TNCs) is global sourcing, meaning scouring the 
globe for the most cost-effective location of production factors. Apart from 
profiting from transfer-price manipulation, in which the corporations fix an 
arbitrary price in order to disguise their profits and reap tax advantages, they 
also profit from the creation of so-called free trade zones. Using these methods, 
prices can be readjusted via spurious companies, without the goods ever having 
been in that place. In other areas the large corporations control trade by 
calculating higher freight costs for the raw materials from the developing 
countries than for finished products from the industrialized countries.
35
 
More serious and with more far-reaching consequences, indeed 
revolutionary for the methods of accumulation and regulation in the capitalist 
market, was the transnationalization of the financial markets. The process of 
transnationalization of production and trade led to an increase in the money 
requirement for international payments and interest-earning loans. The 
procedure that was actually planned for this dealing in money was that the 
commercial banks of the different countries would handle international transfers 
under the surveillance, guidance and control of their national banks, using US 
dollars as a common currency. However, as early as 1957, when the British 
government introduced foreign currency restrictions, some British banks began 
to trade in dollars themselves, i.e. to provide loans in dollars without converting 
to pounds at all. This has led to the creation of so-called „free-banking zone,‟ 
also called „off-shore‟ banking. This should not be understood as meaning a 
particular geographical location. In practical terms it means that a bank, say, in 
London or Frankfurt, will divide its book-keeping into two sections. One section 
concerns transactions subject to national control, while the other deals with 
transnational transactions that are not subject to controls. Of course, banks then 
set up subsidiaries in so-called tax havens such as Luxembourg or the Bahamas, 
to avoid incurring national taxes on the deposits they hold on account.
36
 
The consequence of the expansion of the „free‟ banking markets was a 
rapid increase in the volume of money on the now transnational financial 
markets - money not subject to political control and generally not taxed, which 
sought only one thing: a way of earning the greatest return on investment in the 
shortest possible time.
37
 However, depending on the year, two-thirds to three-
quarters of all the money labeled „Foreign Direct Investment‟ is not devoted to 
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new, job-creating investment but to Mergers and Acquisitions that almost 
invariably result in job losses.
38
 
A Keynesian approach gave priority to full employment and maintaining a 
balance of payments equilibrium, in order to achieve the demand for the 
„appropriately‟ growing mass production and a balanced global economy. 
However, this presupposes that in an emergency, economic policy decisions can 
keep interest rates down anti-cyclically. In contrast, in the neo-liberal monetarist 
approach, top priority is awarded to the stability of monetary value. The central 
banks keep a tight hold on the money supply, and the deregulated transnational 
markets can push interest rates up as a first move. This regulates full 
employment and equilibrium of the trade balance to secondary importance. The 
owners of financial assets and the countries with strong currencies profit, and 
the workers and the countries with weak currencies lose out, because individual 
states are powerless against the monetary restrictions imposed by the world 
market.
39
 
 
1.3. The South Korean Economy under Neo-liberalism 
 
The 1990s saw rising external pressure in support of liberalization from the 
IMF, G7 governments and multinational firms and banks, who wanted their 
piece of the Korean „miracle,‟ and rising internal pressure from the powerful 
enterprise groups known as chaebol and from wealthy Korean families, who 
wanted to pursue their self-interest free of government restraint. There was also 
a gradual ideological shift towards neo-liberalism among key government 
bureaucrats. In the decade preceding the crisis, this coalition induced the 
government to abandon or weaken economic control mechanisms that were 
central to the efficiency of the Korean state-led growth model.
40
 Chang and 
Evans argued that “the dismantling of the development state was effectively 
finished ... in 1995.”41 
In the period of liberalization from the late 1980s through the mid-1990s, 
the state ended its control of chaebol investment decisions, substantially 
reduced the regulation of domestic financial markets, and liberalized short-term 
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capital flows, eliminating three major tools of state economic regulation. Ill-
advised liberalization was a precondition for the rapid inflow of short-term 
foreign loans from 1994-1997 that financed excessive investment, and for the 
mass capital flight of late 1997 and 1998 that brought Korea to its knees.
42
  
Neo-liberalism took over the Korean economy in 1997-1998. The crisis put 
the neo-liberal IMF in charge of economic policy. The core of the IMF program 
for Korea was the immediate implementation of severely restrictive macro 
policy, followed quickly by the radical transformation of Korea‟s traditional 
industrial, labor-relations, and financial structures into a neo-liberal form. The 
sharp rise in unemployment in 1998-1999 was created by austerity 
macroeconomic policies in late 1997 and early 1998 to sweep away domestic 
political barriers to the radical restructuring efforts of the IMF and the Korean 
government. If the neo-liberal powers had tried to impose their free-market 
revolution in more normal times, they would have met determined political 
resistance from labor, large segments of the Korean people, and even some 
sectors of the business community.
43
 
Prior to the outbreak of the crisis, Korea had low inflation and its budget 
was in surplus. Nevertheless, upon taking control in December 1997, the IMF 
demanded that the government immediately implement severely restrictive 
macro policy, including cutbacks in government spending, and increase in taxes, 
and a substantial rise in interest rates. The interest rate on three-month corporate 
bonds, which was 12% in November 1997, rose to 30% in early January in the 
wake of the IMF agreement. Initial reductions of investment and government 
spending created increased unemployment and fear of job loss. These 
developments induced falling real wages and a collapse in consumer confidence 
that caused a rapid decline in consumption demand. Falling demand, rising 
uncertainty and high interest rates further reduced investment. Collapsing 
business conditions led to ever-higher loan defaults, which led to a contraction 
of the credit supply.
44
 
Given the depressed state of domestic demand brought on by austerity 
macro policies and the havoc caused by the radical restructuring of financial 
markets and the industrial sector, Korean enterprises could meet this demand 
only through the extensive sale of real assets and the large-scale issuance of new 
stock. Since domestic firms were broken, foreign firms and banks were the only 
possible large-scale buyers. This forced Korean economic assets to be put up for 
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an international auction in which all bargaining power lay with the buyers. The 
policies implemented by the government and the IMF were therefore guaranteed 
to dramatically increase foreign control of Korea‟s economy, provided that 
Korea‟s remaining laws restricting the inflow of foreign capital and its law 
protecting labor were overturned. To close the circle, the crisis-induced collapse 
of the won - it was 844 per dollar in 1996, 1,415 in 1997, 1,207 in 1998, 1,145 
in 1999, 1,259 in 2000, and near 1,300 in mid-2001 - made Korean assets 
extraordinarily cheap in US dollars and other dominant currencies.
45
 As of mid-
January, domestic enterprises could be purchased by American or European 
firms in their own currencies for about 30% of what they would have cost just 
six months earlier.
46
 
The liberalization of cross-border financial flows accelerated dramatically 
after the IMF agreement. The remaining restrictions on capital inflows were 
quickly removed. The government raised the number of business categories 
open to foreign ownership in 1998, including security trading, investment 
companies and real estate. In a crucial move resisted by the chaebol, hostile 
foreign M&As (mergers and acquisitions) were permitted for the first time. The 
Foreign Investment Promotion Law was enacted in November 1998, providing 
10-year central government tax exemptions for high tech and related industries, 
and for investment projects in Foreign Investment Zones. The government also 
agreed to eliminate all restrictions on the foreign ownership of Korean banks 
and security companies. Portfolio investment was, for the first time, fully 
liberalized. By May 1998, the government had removed all remaining curbs on 
foreign participation in Korea‟s stock and bond markets. It abolished the 
Foreign Exchange Management Act in 1999, eliminating most remaining 
restrictions on foreign exchange transactions. This frenetic pace of cross-border 
capital deregulation was much more rapid than the one demanded by the OECD 
as a condition for Korea‟s entrance to that organization in 1995.47 
Foreign capital inflow increased from around 1 billion US$ to as much as 7 
or 8 billion US$ a year from 1992 through 1997. But the crisis and restructuring 
accelerated it dramatically. A total of 62 billion US$ entered Korea from 1998 
through 2000.
48
 Foreign ownership in the stock market rose from 2.7% in 1992 
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to 12.3% in 1997, and then leaped to 32.4% in May 2001 as the liberalization 
accelerated. In 29 of Korea‟s most important firms, total foreign ownership 
exceeded that of the dominant domestic shareholders as of February 2001. 
Foreigners owned 56% of the shares in Samsung Electronics, the number one 
firm, while the controlling domestic owners‟ share was just 11.7%. They owned 
42.2% of the listed shares of the top 10 chaebol.
49
 Korea‟s best economic assets, 
built over decades by the Korean working class, was traded for money to pay 
back foreign bank loans that never should have been permitted in the first place. 
By 2000, foreign financial institutions controlled 41.7%, 10.6% and 8.2% of 
Korea‟s banks, securities companies and insurance companies respectively.50 
The dramatic rise in foreign ownership of the listed stocks of many of the 
most important Korean firms raises the question as to whether domestic control 
of the large chaebol, a key goal of the Korean people, has been broken. The 
answer is „No.‟ Only about a quarter of chaebol firms are listed on the stock 
exchange; the rest are privately held. However, listed firms own about 60% of 
the top 30 chaebol assets. Owner-family and sister-firms together held about 65% 
of shares in these unlisted firms in late 2000 and about 30% for listed chaebol 
firms. So the total domestic holdings rose from about 44% of total share in 
1996-8 to 51% in 1999. Although some chaebol owners have been removed 
from power through bankruptcy or equity dilution, locals remain in control of 
most of the larger chaebol.
51
 Rather, the top 5 chaebol enlarged their power in 
non-banking financial institutions after the crisis. Their share in trust bonds, life 
insurance premium and deposits in non-banking financial institutions increased 
from 6.2%, 30.5%, and 18.6% in March 1997 to 31.6%, 36.4% and 34.0% 
respectively in March 1999.
52
 The top 5 chaebol share in the total assets of the 
top 30 chaebol increased from 62.7% in 1997 to 65.8% in 1998.
53
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Chapter 2 
The Principles of Global Capitalism  
behind the Korean Crisis 
 
 
In this chapter we make a social philosophical analysis of neo-liberalism behind 
the Korean crisis. First we look at the basic system and reality of global 
capitalism
54
. Second we appraise the core concepts of neo-liberalism – fictitious 
economy, equilibrium, and social evolutionism - respectively. Third we discuss 
the methodology and historical setting of the Austrian school, which is the 
originator of neo-liberalism. 
 
2.1. The Washington Consensus: Satanic Mills 
 
The „Washington Consensus‟ is a phrase initially coined in 1989 by John 
Williamson to describe specific policies that developing countries in Latin 
America applied in order to overcome economic crisis. A package of reform 
prescriptions were consented to by Washington, DC-based institutions such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and U.S. Treasury 
Department. The term has since acquired a general connotation associated with 
expanding the role of market forces and constraining the role of the state, 
sometimes also named as neo-liberalism or market fundamentalism.
55
 Even 
though Williamson himself objects to this second usage
56
, it is difficult for us to 
find a better expression to describe the present U.S-hegemonic neo-liberal 
regime as a whole.  
    The Washington Consensus denies the state an active role in the economy. 
It is asserted that state enterprises, protection, subsidies, etc. actually harm the 
economy and distort the process of economic growth. The state should confine 
itself to doing these tasks - (1) economic liberalization, (2) privatization of 
public enterprises and (3) macro stability.
57
 We may call these tasks the three 
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kernel elements of the Washington Consensus advice. In Williamson‟s original 
text, the Washington Consensus consists of the following ten points: (1) fiscal 
discipline (protecting balance of payments crises and high inflation); (2) 
changing the existing priorities of public expenditure (by drastically phasing out 
subsidies and terminating as early as possible all poverty alleviation programs); 
(3) the taxation reforms (leading to the broadening of taxation base and 
reduction in the maximum rates); (4) financial liberalization (determination of 
interest rates by market forces); (5) reforming the fixation of exchange rate; (6) 
trade liberalization; (7) unrestricted inflow of foreign direct investment and no 
discrimination against it; (8) privatization; (9) removal of regulations to 
facilitate the new indigenous and foreign firms into economic activities; and (10) 
reform of property laws so that there is no difficulty in acquisition, use and 
transfer of assets.
58
       
    A number of developing countries were compelled to embark on economic 
reforms, based on this Washington Consensus. None of them were consulted, 
not to speak of involving them, in evolving this consensus even though it was 
meant to be adopted and implemented by them. „One size fits all‟ was the 
mantra informing this prescription.
59
 What are the pillars to support the 
consensus? We can chiefly mention „dollar seigniorage‟ and „American military 
power.‟     
    Under the post-Bretton Woods system since the 1970s, dollar seigniorage 
provides the American government with an immensely potent political 
instrument in the form of the new regime. The dollar becomes the main 
international currency and the US does not need to earn dollars abroad: it prints 
them at home! The US does not face the same balance of payments constraints 
that other countries face. It can spend far more abroad than it earns there.
60
  
    Thus it can set up expensive military bases without a foreign exchange 
constraint. Its transnational corporations can buy up other companies abroad or 
engage in other forms of foreign direct investment without a payments 
constraint. Its money-capitalists can send out large flows of funds into portfolio 
investments buying securities similarly. American companies importing or 
exporting are far less affected by changes in the dollar exchange rate than is the 
case in other countries. If the dollar exchange rate rises massively against other 
currencies, US exporters are far less seriously affected than they would 
otherwise be. And if the high dollar produces a flood of imports into the United 
States, generating a very big, long-term deficit on the current account of its 
balance of payments, the deficit can be funded in dollars. Seigniorage gives the 
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US government the ability to swing the price of the dollar internationally this 
way and that, having great economic consequences for the rest of the world 
while the US remains cushioned from the consequences that would apply to 
other states.
61
  
On the other hand, the enterprise of spreading the gospel of free markets 
relies on the iron fist of overwhelming American military power. As Thomas 
Friedman, the top foreign affairs columnist for the New York Times, admits, 
“The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist – 
McDonald‟s cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the builder of the F-
15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley‟s 
technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine 
Corps.”62  
    Ulrich Duchrow and Franz Hinkelammert reveal that there is the 
Washington Consensus in the background of the situation which happened on 
September 11, 2001:  
 
The attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon occurred on September 11, 
2001. But the first 11 September was that of 1973. Supported by the US government, 
the Chilean air force bombarded the Moneda, the seat of the Chilean government, and 
destroyed it. Salvador Allende, the elected president, was murdered in the presidential 
palace. The purpose was to prevent the democratic introduction of socialism and to 
introduce a pure form of neo-liberalism for the first time. To this end Pinochet famously 
called on Milton Friedman of the Chicago School of Economics.
63
   
 
 John McMurtry also exposes the tyrannical traits of the Washington 
Consensus by taking the examples of the occupation of Iraq and the 
dismantlement of the Yugoslavian Federation.
64
 Before its massive bombing, 
Iraq as a society had achieved levels of social development near the highest in 
the Middle East and the Arab world. Its per capita income was 3,510 US$ (now 
collapsed to 450). Its healthcare training and infrastructure reached 97 percent 
of the urban and 77 per cent of the rural population (decisively higher figures 
than the US‟s private health system). Infant mortality had been reduced to 
almost a third of former rates over 25 years, and under-five mortality more than 
halved. This was the rapidly evolving civil commonwealth based on society‟s 
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shared natural wealth that was not mentioned in media reports of Iraq for ten 
years. 
    Yugoslavian society had also developed and flourished as a socialized 
economy for decades, overcoming its age-old „balkanization‟ of ethnic groups 
by the shared social supports of developed civil commonwealth, federally 
supported social programs, and rich-to-poor transfer payments across its Serbian, 
Croatian, Macedonian, Slovenian, Kosavar and other provinces, and labor-
managed firms and publicly owned enterprises – all in a „market socialism‟ that 
was long thought to be „the third way‟ between Soviet and American economic 
paradigms. Under a planned market economy with social ownership, available 
low-interest public bank credit, and universal life security programs, its 
economy performed spectacularly well in development. By 1986, its per capita 
GDP had increased to 6,262 US$, almost six times its 1947 figure when it was 
the poorest major region in Europe. 
    The Yugoslavian Federation, however, was compelled to adopt IMF 
„Structural Adjustment Programs‟ in several stages since 1980, in order to 
receive the loans required to pay off its escalated compound-interest debt 
charges. These IMF „austerity measures‟ terminated the government‟s access to 
credit from its own Central Bank, and triggered liquidation of socially owned 
Associated Banks, deregulated and privatized the economy, bankrupted social 
programs, liquidated worker-managed public enterprises, abolished the federal 
equalization programs to the regions, disemployed over 20 per cent of the 
workforce in months, collapsed wages by 40 per cent in six months, and forced 
repeated devaluations of the domestic currency, while opening the door to 
lower-priced imports. The results included a –10 percent industrial growth rate 
by 1990, and collapse of the gross domestic product by 50 per cent in three 
years.  
    Because the socialist federation had few resources left to sustain the shared 
life goods of their federal social infrastructure which had integrated the 
ethnically-riven Balkans to begin with, threshold numbers of desperate peoples 
led by unemployed males reverted to the ethnic hatred of their ancestors and its 
primeval bearings – endless revenge cycles of murderous attacks on out-groups. 
At the same time, external diplomatic maneuvers by Germany and the US, and 
foreign aid to recognize separatist movements propelled by the leadership of the 
former Axis Ustasa in Croatia and the drug-funded Kosovo Liberation Army 
Movement in Kosovo, sustained the declared moral diversion on the ground. 
Campaigns of armed „ethnic cleansing‟ moved the Yugoslavian federation into a 
chaos of atavistic ethnic war. 
To analyze this political economy of the Washington Consensus, we will 
be able to turn to Karl Polanyi, who represents a counterpoint to neo-liberal 
thinkers like Hayek.
65
 Jan Drahokoupil writes, “The Great Transformation 
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[Polanyi‟s main book published first in 1944] was hence dusted off and was 
used as an analytical tool for grasping the global economy at the beginning of 
the 21
st
 century and as an ideological weapon in the fight against global neo-
liberalism.”66 A large number of critics of neo-liberalism have been inspired by 
him. Typically John Gray names the first chapter of his book False Dawn as 
“From the Great Transformation to the Global Free Market” after Polanyi‟s 
work and quotes him many times.
67
 George Soros observes in his 
acknowledgments of The Crisis of Global Capitalism his thanks to “John Gray 
[who] made me re-read Karl Polanyi‟s Great Transformation.”68 Susan George 
begins to criticize neo-liberalism with referring to Polanyi in her paper, “A short 
history of neo-liberalism.”69 Christian scholars such as Ulrich Duchrow, Franz 
Hikelammert and Gregory Baum are also influenced by Polanyi.
70
  
In order to describe market economy, Karl Polanyi borrows the metaphor 
of „Satanic Mill‟ from William Blake‟s poem, „Milton: a Poem‟71. In the poem, 
the „Satanic Mill‟ is contrasted with „Jerusalem‟ as a metaphor of Heaven in 
Christianity. Polanyi uses the term to contrast a miraculous improvement in the 
tools of production with a catastrophic dislocation of the lives of the common 
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people in the Industrial Revolution
72. He says, “The laboring people had been 
crowded together in new places of desolation, the so-called industrial towns of 
England; the country folk had been dehumanized into slum dwellers; the family 
was on the road to perdition; and large parts of the country were rapidly 
disappearing under the slack and scrap heaps vomited forth from the „satanic 
mills.‟ Writers of all views and parties, conservatives and liberals, capitalists 
and socialists invariably referred to social conditions under the Industrial 
Revolution as a veritable abyss of human degradation.”73  
As for him, market economy means a self-regulating system of markets; it 
is an economy unconstrained by society, and operating simply according to its 
own law of supply-demand-pricing. Polanyi explains the first point: “A self-
regulating market demands nothing less than the institutional separation of 
society into an economy and political sphere … True; no society can exist 
without a system of some kind which ensures order in the production and 
distribution of goods. But that does not imply the existence of separate 
economic institutions; normally, the economic order is merely a function of the 
social, in which it is contained … Neither under tribal, nor feudal, nor 
mercantile conditions was there a separate economic system in society.”74  
The second point follows as: “A market economy is an economic system 
controlled, regulated, and directed by markets alone; order in the production and 
distribution of goods is entrusted to this self-regulating mechanism. An 
economy of this kind derives from the expectation that human beings behave in 
such a way as to achieve maximum money gains. It assumes markets in which 
the supply of goods (including services) available at a definite price will equal 
the demand at that price.”75 The symbol of a mill adequately represents this 
automatic operation of market economy.  
The adjective „Satanic‟ probably implies the socially devastating effect as 
well as fetishistic nature of market economy.
76
 Polanyi warned, “To allow the 
market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their 
environment, indeed even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would 
result in the demolition of society.”77 But the Washington Consensus tries to 
unify the entire world in the single market system. It has turned both man and 
nature into fodder for the satanic mill of the self-regulating market system. It 
“creates profound inequality, poverty and ecological degradation. The emphasis 
                                                          
72
 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 33. 
73
 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 39. 
74
 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 71. 
75
 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 68. 
76
 Polanyi compares the market mechanism to a religious phenomenon: “The 
mechanism which the motive of gain set in motion was comparable in effectiveness 
only to the most violent outburst of religious fervor in history.” Karl Polanyi, The 
Great Transformation, 30. 
77
 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 73. 
30 
 
on deregulation leads to social exclusion, while its thrust on classical growth 
affects negatively the ecumenical quest for sustaining earth and communities. 
Profits are calculated based on short-term transactions, disregarding the long-
term effect the productive processes have on earth and bio-sphere.”78 
Also the president of the World Bank noted that there is something wrong 
with the system:  
 
We live in a world scarred by inequality. Something is wrong when the richest 20 
percent of the global population receives more than 80 percent of the global income. 
Something is wrong when 10 percent of a global population receives half of the national 
income as happens in far too many countries today. Something is wrong when the 
average income for the richest 20 countries is 37 times the average of the poor countries. 
Something is wrong when 1.2 billion people live on less than a dollar a day and 2.8 
billion still live on less than 2 dollars a day. With all the forces making the world smaller, 
it is time to change our way of thinking… Growth is not enough. We must confront 
deep-seated inequalities.
79
  
 
The world trade system is unjust particularly to developing countries. 
Statistics on trade have shown that liberalized trade continues to favor the 
industrial countries and their corporations. The Economist quoted the following 
figures from the IMF: In 1993, the United States benefited from world exports 
by 15.7 percent, the European Union by 34.7 percent and the rest of the world 
49.6 percent. In 1999, the United States benefited by 17.7 percent, EU by 38.0 
percent and the rest of the world by 44.3. It is estimated that between 1980 and 
1991, terms of trade losses to all developing countries amounted to 290 billion 
US$.
80
  
    In the face of the inability to pay escalating debts, creditors have required 
the poor nations to structurally adjust their economics. The effects of „structural 
adjustment programs‟ have sometimes been catastrophic. Frequently they entail 
lowering wages and decreasing by as much as one-third expenditures in so-
called soft, nonexport-related areas, such as health and education. Since 1990 
the debt burden has required African countries south of the Sahara to reduce by 
one-third their expenditures on health and education. Often, such as in Brazil 
and the Philippines, structural adjustment programs require the promotion of 
large-scale, export-oriented agriculture at the expense of local culture and 
appropriate-scale farming, farming that feeds the local population. This 
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transforms small farmers into environmental refugees who have no place to live 
and no ability to care for their children.
81
  
„Ecological debt‟ is defined as “the debt accumulated by Northern, 
industrial countries toward Third-World countries on account of resource 
plundering, environmental damage, and the free occupation of environmental 
space to deposit wastes, such as greenhouse gases, from the industrial 
countries”.82 Using this definition, the poor people of the Third-World are the 
principal creditors of ecological debt. The debtors are the wealthy of this planet. 
According to the 1998 UNDP report the 20 percent of the world population 
living in the highest-income countries make 86 percent of all consumer 
purchases, while the poorest fifth make a minuscule 1.3 percent. The richest 
fifth consume 58 percent of the energy used by humans, while the poorest 20 
percent use less than 4 percent. The high-income fifth account for 53 percent of 
carbon dioxide emissions, the poorest just 3 percent.
83
 
  The scale of social devastation that free markets have contributed to the 
United States herself is more shocking.
84
 America is no longer a bourgeois 
society. It has become a divided society, in which an anxious majority is 
wedged between an underclass that has no hope and an overclass that denies any 
civic obligations. American middle classes resemble the classical proletariat of 
nineteenth-century Europe. They are experiencing economic difficulties similar 
to those which confront workers who have lost the protective support of welfare 
provisions and labor unions.  
The United States is the only advanced society in which productivity has 
been steadily rising over the past two decades while the incomes of the majority 
– eight out of ten – has stagnated or fallen. The average weekly earnings of the 
80 per cent of rank-and-file working Americans, adjusted for inflation, fell by 
18 percent between 1973 and 1995, from $315 a week to $258 per week. At the 
same time, between 1979 and 1989 the real annual pay of American corporate 
chief executives (CEOs) increased by two-thirds in post-tax terms. Levels of 
inequality in the United States resemble those of Latin American countries more 
than those of any European society. The social condition of equality that 
observers from de Tocqueville onwards have seen as one of America‟s central 
achievements has deconstructed. 
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  Another endemic risk is family breakdown. American families are more 
fragile and exhibit more comprehensive fractures than in almost any other 
country. In 1987 the average duration of American marriages was seven years. 
How many American households eat together as families? How many children 
live in the same neighborhood or cities as their parents? If an American 
becomes unemployed, can he or she find support from an extended family as 
Spaniards and Italians in European countries do? 
At the end of 1994, just over 5 million Americans were under some form 
of legal restraints. According to Department of Justice figures, a million and a 
half of them were in jail. That means one in 193 adult Americans is a prisoner, 
or 373 out of every 100,000 Americans. That compares with 103 per 100,000 
when Ronald Reagan became President in 1980. Three and a half million 
Americans were on probation or parole. By the start of 1997 around one in fifty 
adult American males was behind bars and about one in twenty was on parole or 
probation. This is ten times the rate in European countries.  
America‟s incarceration rates run parallel with its rates of violent crime. As 
of 1993, the male homicide rate was 12.4 per 100,000, compared with 1.6 for 
the European Union. In 1995 around 7 percent of America‟s black population 
spent some time in jail. Blacks are approximately seven times likelier than 
Whites to be imprisoned. Such figures suggest that race and class inequalities 
are now intertwined in the United States. The combination of high-tech prisons, 
walled-off proprietary communities and virtual corporations may come to be 
recognized as an emblem of early twenty-first century America. 
 
2.2. The Fictitious Economy  
 
In this section we deal with the distorted definition of economy in neo-
liberalism. We rely again upon Karl Polanyi. According to him, a self-
regulating market requires „commodity fiction‟. Not only goods or services but 
also labor, land, and money are commodified and priced, as being called 
respectively commodity prices, wages, rent, and interest.
85
 He comments on it: 
“But labor, land, and money are obviously not commodities; the postulate that 
anything that is bought and sold must have been produced for sale is 
emphatically untrue in regard to them …… Labor is only another name for a 
human activity which goes with life itself, which in its turn is not produced for 
sale but for entirely different reasons, nor can that activity be detached from the 
rest of life, be stored or mobilized; land is only another name for nature, which 
is not produced by man; actual money, finally, is merely a token of purchasing 
power which, as a rule, is not produced at all, but comes into being through the 
mechanism of banking or state finance.”86 Then this commodity fiction supplies 
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a vital organizing principle according to which no arrangement or behavior 
should be allowed to exist that might prevent the actual functioning of the 
market mechanism.
87
    
    In the global capitalism the commodity fiction has reached its peak through 
the rapid expansion of commodifying money. Under the new standards of the 
global free trade and deregulation, there are few controls upon massive 
movements of funds crossing borders. With financial innovations and 
technologies of global communication networks, currency speculators are able 
to move unimaginably huge amounts of money, instantaneously and invisibly, 
from one part of the globe to another by a mere touch of a key.
88
 The volume of 
financial transactions – just think of bank transfers and the buying and selling of 
shares, bonds, and derivatives (such as futures, options and swaps) – now 
outnumbers the volume of real transfers (where goods and services are 
exchanged) by a ratio of 30 to 1.
89
 Financial transactions are disassociated from 
genuine production. „The kingdom of monetary signs‟ is constructed. 
    Polanyi distinguishes between the „formal economy‟ and the „substantive 
economy,‟ and regards the latter as the real definition of economy.90 The former 
is the economic activity that is carried out for profit making in the market, and 
is recorded and constitutes the gross national product. The latter means all the 
economic activities – whether part of the „formal‟ economy or the „informal‟ 
one – resulting in the production and distribution of material goods. It includes 
traditional economic activities: forms of redistribution, customs of reciprocity, 
householding
91
, forums of non-profit exchange as well as unrecorded, small-
scale production.
92
 The commodity fiction of money under the neo-liberal 
regime carries the disunity between the two definitions to extremes. We may 
name its economy even as „fictitious economy.‟ 
    For example, one hedge fund speculator takes out huge forward contracts 
to sell Korean won for Japanese yens at 9.50 to the won in one month‟s time: 
say forward contracts totaling 10 billion won. For these he must pay a fee to a 
bank. Then he waits until the month is nearly up. Then suddenly he starts 
borrowing won again in very large volumes and throws them against the 
exchange rate through selling them. So big is his first sale of won that the 
currency falls, say 3 per cent against the yen. At this point other, smaller players 
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see the won going down and join the trend he has started, driving it down 
another 3 per cent. Overnight he borrows another vast chunk of won and sells 
into yens again, and meanwhile the word is going around the market that none 
other than the master speculator is in action, so everyone joins the trend and the 
won drops another 10 per cent. And on the day when the forward contract falls 
due for him to sell won for yen at 9.50 the won in the spot market is down at 5 
yen. He takes up his forward contract and makes a huge profit. Meanwhile there 
is a won crisis, etc.
93
 Even though the speculator‟s activity brings a huge 
change in formal economy, it has no relation to real production and makes no 
contribution to our lives.   
The fictitious economy of self-regulating market system fatefully warps 
man‟s understanding of himself and his society.94 As regards man, „homo 
economicus‟ is the core term describing the nature of the neo-liberal human 
being. It assumes the enlightened self-interest of the individual to maximize his 
material gain and disqualifies any social control of the market.
95
 But it 
overlooks the fact that man is „homo socialis‟ and „homo moralis‟ at the same 
time.
96
 He is also motivated by desire to help and co-operate with one another, 
and is often prepared to put the common good above their own immediate self-
interest. In the real world, the self-contained „Robinson Crusoe‟ does not exist. 
In order to live, an infant needs not only goods and services, but also love. Even 
most individualistic adults need minimum social involvement. We must 
recognize the dual – selfish and altruistic – nature of human beings.           
    As regards society, „economic determinism‟ is the key concept. It 
propounds that society‟s institutions are determined by the economic system. 
Under a market economy, the working of the economic system not only 
„influences‟ the rest of society but actually „determines‟ it. In the stratification 
of classes, supply and demand in the labor market are identical with the classes 
of workers and employers, respectively. The social class of capitalist, 
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landowners, tenants, brokers, merchants, professionals, and so on was delimited 
by the respective markets for land, money, and capital and their uses, or for 
various services. The income of these social classes was fixed by the market, 
their rank and position by their income.
97
  
    While social classes are directly determined, other institutions are 
indirectly affected by the market mechanism. State and government, marriage 
and the rearing of children, the organization of science and education or religion 
and the arts, the choice of profession, the forms of habitation, the shape of 
settlements, the very esthetics of private life – everything had either to comply 
with the utilitarian pattern or at least not interfere with the working of the 
market mechanism. It was almost impossible to avoid the erroneous conclusion 
that, as „economic‟ man is a „real‟ man, so the economic system is „really‟ 
society.
98
  
 
2.3. The Full Faith in Free Markets     
 
In spite of continuing financial and economic crises across the world
99
, neo-
liberals hold fast to the belief of free market economics. Margaret Thatcher‟s 
notorious slogan, „There Is No Alternative [TINA],‟ resonates as an 
unquestionable truth after the demolition of the Soviet Union. In this section we 
look into the origin of this blind faith in free market. 
Adam Smith, the father of liberalism, advocates a harmonious providence 
of the „invisible hand‟: a self-interested individual who seeks only his own gain 
is led by an invisible hand to promote an unintended public good. The well-
known passages in „the Wealth of Nations‟ are:  
 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their 
humanity but their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their 
advantages.
100
 
 
He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an 
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention … By pursuing his 
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own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he 
really intends to promote it [emphasis added].
101
 
 
    Smith‟s concept of an „invisible hand‟ is in keeping with the „unintended 
or spontaneous order‟ of the Scottish Enlightenment. Ronald Hamowy considers 
this notion „the single most significant sociological contribution‟ of the Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers
102
 among whom would be included Bernard Mandeville, 
David Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Lord Kames, Gilbert Stuart, 
Thomas Reid, John Millar, and Dugald Stewart.
103
 Mandeville expresses their 
core thesis most extremely but most clearly in his poem The Fable of the Bees, 
subtitled Private Vices, Publick Benefits: the paradox that what are private vices 
are often public benefits. In his own words: 
 
Millions endeavouring to supply    Each other‟s Lust and Vanity; 
Whilst other Millions were employ‟d    To see their Handy-works destroy‟d; 
… there was not a Bee, but would    Get more, I won‟t say, than he should. 
… Thus every Part was full of Vice,    Yet the whole Mass a Paradise; 
The Worst of all the Multitude    Did something for the common Good.
104
 
 
At a certain point the fable presents the bees as becoming profoundly 
conscious of their own wickedness. Thus they decide to change their lives. Soon 
the disasters in the beehive heap up. The locksmiths walk out because a hive 
without thieves has no need for locks. They are followed by thousands of others 
who have lost their livelihood because such things as jewelry and fancy clothes 
are no longer coveted products. In the end life in this rich and bustling beehive 
turns to dust. For the few remaining bees nothing remains but to fly to a hollow 
tree in the surroundings, to rest content with their newly gained honesty
105
:   
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Their Courage and Integrity     At last were crown'd with Victory.  
They triumph'd not without their Cost;    For many Thousand Bees were lost.  
Hard'ned with Toils, and Exercise    They counted Ease it self a Vice;  
Which so improved their Temperance;    That, to avoid Extravagance,  
They flew into a hollow Tree,    Blest with Content and Honesty.
106
 
 
Franz Hinkelammert criticized this kind of thought: “Mandeville declared 
private vices were public virtues. Adam Smith transformed this into the 
invisible hand of the market: evil is good. Evil, exploitation is only seemingly 
evil. The invisible hand of the market changed it into a contribution to the 
general interest so it became the good.”107   
    Bob Goudzwaard points out that Adam Smith‟s „invisible hand‟ is the 
deistic version of the role of God‟s providence.108 In the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, Smith states, “by acting according to the dictates of our moral 
faculties, we necessarily pursue the most effectual means of promoting the 
happiness of mankind, and may therefore be said in some sense to co-operate 
with the Deity and to advance, as far as in our power, the Plan of 
Providence.”109 He elsewhere writes, “The rest he [the proprietor] is obliged to 
distribute … among those … which are employed in the economy of greatness; 
all of whom thus derive from his luxury and caprice, that share of the 
necessaries of life, which they would in vain have expected from his humanity 
or his justice … they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. 
They are led by an „invisible hand‟ to, … without intending it, without knowing 
it, advance the interests of the society.”110 Throughout the same book he cites 
Deity as the Author of Nature, Engineer, Great Architecture, Creator, the great 
Judge of hearts, and the all-seeing Judge of the world.
111
 
His deistic thought is clear from another mention of „invisible hand‟ in his 
article of natural science, „History of Astronomy‟: “Among savages, as well as 
in the early ages of Heathen antiquity, it is the irregular events of nature only 
that are ascribed to the agency and power of their gods. Fire burns, and waters 
refreshes; heavy bodies descend and lighter substances fly upwards, by their 
own nature; nor was the invisible hand of Jupiter ever apprehended to be 
employed in those matters.” 112  The God of deism has been often been 
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compared with a clockmaker, a superior technician and mathematician, who is 
capable of making such a perfect timepiece that once it is set in motion, it no 
longer needs his further attention. We can speak of God‟s providence only 
insofar as it refers to God‟s acts before the beginning of world history. It 
excludes all activities on God‟s part during the unfolding of world history.113 
Alan Storkey considers that in that mechanical view economic developments are 
also beyond the control of people. They become onlookers to economic 
autonomy and are acquitted of their responsibility.
114
  
    It would be helpful to discuss Frederic Bastiat, one of representatives of 
French laissez faire school, on which the libertarian group of neo-liberals 
depend. He states the deistic view explicitly: 
 
For certainly, if humanity is inevitably impelled toward injustice by the laws of value, 
toward inequality by the laws of rent, toward poverty by the laws of population, and 
toward sterilization by the laws of heredity, we cannot say that God‟s handiwork is 
harmonious in the social order, as it is in the physical universe; we must instead admit, 
with heads bowed in grief, that He has seen fit to establish His social order on revolting 
and irremediable discord.
115
 
 
And, amid the tumult, the cries of anguish and distress, the appeals to revolt or to the 
resignation of despair, I raise my voice to make men hear these words, which, if true, 
must silence all protesting voices: It is not true that the great laws of Providence are 
hastening society along the road to disaster.
116
 
 
I believe that He who designed the physical world has not seen fit to remain a stranger 
to the social world. I believe that His wisdom extends to human agents possessed of free 
will, that He has been able to bring them together and cause them to move in harmony, 
even as He has done with inert moles.
117
 
 
Bastiat insists that the „laissez faire‟ is built on faith in God, while socialism 
offers its own social plan as superior to God‟s providence.118 This perspective 
is contrasted with Henry George‟s view. Whereas he also recognizes the 
usefulness of the „laissez faire,‟119 George warns that such a religious sanction 
of its „status quo‟ might be a hypocrisy and blasphemy: 
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Shall we ward the stroke with liturgies and prayers? Shall we avert the decrees of 
immutable law by raising churches when hungry infants moan and weary mothers weep? 
…… Though it may take the language of prayer, it is blasphemy that attributes to the 
inscrutable decrees of Providence the suffering and brutishness that come of poverty; 
that turns with folded hands to the All-Father and lays on Him the responsibility for the 
want and crime of our great cities. We degrade the Everlasting. We slander the Just One. 
A merciful man would have better ordered the world; a just man would crush with his 
foot such an ulcerous ant-hill! It is not the Almighty, but we who are responsible for the 
vice and misery that fester amid our civilization. The Creator showers upon us his gifts-
more than enough for all. But like swine scrambling for food, we tread them in the mire-
tread them in the mire, while we tear and rend each other!
120
          
 
Another passage by George shows the same opinion: “It is impossible to 
reconcile the idea of an intelligent and beneficent Creator with the belief that the 
wretchedness and degradation which are the lot of such a large proportion of 
human kind result from his enactments.”121 George thinks that true liberty 
should accompany justice and we ourselves should bear the responsibility for 
solving social problems with an intentional will.
122
           
More than one hundred years after Adam Smith, neo-classical economists 
developed his notion of „invisible hand‟ into the „equilibrium theory‟ in some 
sophisticated formats: under conditions of perfect competition, the market in 
and of itself will spontaneously get to a Walrasian general equilibrium state or a 
Pareto optimal situation. Walrasian general equilibrium has no room for the 
conflict between capital and labor; Pareto optimal situation is blind to social 
justice. The underlying picture of this theorizing is a world of harmony, order 
and tranquility; a self-regulation and self-optimization economic system - a 
view that undoubtedly matched quite well the pomposity of the pax Britannica. 
Neo-liberals succeeded in forming the foundational idea of the neo-classical 
equilibrium theory, and applied it concretely in political struggle and 
engagement.
123
 Their main goal was to minimize the State‟s intervention in 
market and to maximize market‟s autonomy. 
Hayek, the father of neo-liberalism, radicalized the liberal tradition of the 
„minimal State.‟ His program is presented in The Constitution of Liberty: to 
eliminate ruling, to privatize, to decrease the amount of programs to fight 
unemployment, to eliminate subsidies to housing and the control of rents, to 
reduce the expenditures in social security and education, and finally to limit 
                                                          
120
 Henry George, Progress and Poverty, 549-50. 
121
 Henry George, Progress and Poverty, 558. 
122
 Henry George, Progress and Poverty, 546, 561. 
123
 Veronica Perera, “Neo-liberalism as Pensamiento Unico - How did it happen?”, 
Janey Program, New School for Social Research (2006): 15-17, 
http://blogs.newschool.edu/janey-
program/files/2011/10/Veronica_Perera_050404.pdf (accessed July 30, 2012).  
40 
 
trade-union power. He even suggested the elimination of the nationalization of 
the currency, that is to say, the privatization of national central banks to submit 
the monetary production to world markets.
124
 The most extreme libertarians, 
such as Murray Rothbard, propose further the replacement of government by 
private protection agencies
125
. 
 
2.4. The Social Evolutionism 
 
In his 1999 Kuyper Lecture, Bob Goudzwaard refers to Abraham Kuyper‟s 
diagnosis of evolution in order to explain the nature of economic competition. 
Kuyper stated that: “Our nineteenth century is dying away under the hypnosis of 
the dogma of Evolution.”126 Goudzwaard explains our age‟s structural and 
cultural dimensions mainly with the concept of „competition‟ of evolutionism. 
Competition has always been considered as one of the characteristics of modern 
capitalism. But he gives attention to its growing influence today:              
     
[T]he formula of competition is now advocated in fields far outside the practice of 
business. There is increasing competition among schools, universities, sports 
organizations, orchestras, and even clinics and hospitals. Information and 
communication, once the heart of culture, have become important economic battlefields. 
Governments … have also been forced to compete …… the risks involved in continuing 
on our present course are far greater–for the poor nations, for the world‟s entire 
ecosystem, and for our own spiritual and mental health …… The 1999 World 
Development Report from the World Bank says that in the year 2000, 1.5 million people 
will live below the poverty level of $1.00 income per day. (In 1987, it was 1.2 million.) 
… Our energy-intensive patterns of production and consumption appear to be causing 
serious climate change, leading to more soil erosion, more floods, and even more locusts 
… The soft voices of commercials assure us that it is good to have more and more, for 
only in that way can the economy and finance keep on expanding. A collective hypnosis 
sets in.
127
 
 
With this lecture, Goudzwaard indicates the crucial importance of „social 
evolutionism‟ to understand the background of current economic thinking. 
Social evolutionism is a hypothesis saying that competition among all 
individuals, groups, nations or ideas drives social evolution in human societies. 
The term is an extension of Charles Darwin‟s theory of evolution, where 
competition between individual organisms drives biological evolutionary 
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change through „the survival of the fittest.‟128 Herbert Spencer is the key person 
in its development. In Social Statistics he drew the conclusion that the law of 
„the struggle for life‟ applies equally to the competition between industrial 
enterprises, and that the principle of charity should under no circumstances be 
the starting point for the development of socioeconomic life. The ascending 
process of „natural selection‟ requires the sacrifice of the weak to increase the 
chances of life for the strong.
129
 But one of the most closely related to social 
evolutionism is the influential neo-liberal thinker Friedrich Hayek. Even though 
he emphasizes the difference of his position from it, he doesn‟t conceal the 
respect of it: 
 
My argument, that in a process of cultural selection we have built better than we 
understood, and that what we call our intelligence has been shaped concurrently with 
our institutions by a process of trial and error, is certain to be met by an outcry of „social 
Darwinism‟. But such a cheap way of disposing of my argument by labeling it would 
rest on an error. It is true that during the latter part of the last century some social 
scientists, under the influence of Darwin, placed an excessive stress on the importance 
of natural selection of the most able individuals in free competition, but it is not the 
main benefit we derive from competitive selection. This is the competitive selection of 
cultural institutions … My problem is not genetic evolution of innate qualities, but 
cultural evolution through learning – which indeed leads sometimes to conflicts with 
near-animal natural instincts. Nevertheless, it is still true that civilization grew not by 
the prevailing of that which man thought would be most successful, but by the growth of 
that which turned out to be so, and which, precisely because he did not understand it, led 
man beyond what he could ever have conceived [emphasis added].
130
 
 
Hayek‟s evolutionary reasoning is apparent also in his statement on 
progress. He not only believes in the progress of human civilization based on 
material progress, but also asserts the necessity of the progress: “The aspirations 
of the great mass of the world‟s population can today be satisfied only by rapid 
material progress …… The peace of the world and, with it, civilization itself 
thus depend on continued progress at a fast rate. At this juncture we are 
therefore not only the creatures but the captives of progress …… when it has 
just been touched by the expanding wave of modern technology after centuries 
or millennia of relative stability …, even a small decline in our rate of advance 
might be fatal to us.” 131  Here Hayek‟s account accords entirely with 
Goudzwaard‟s assessment of the doctrine of progress through competition: 
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“Instead of being the subject of progress, in evolutionary thought man has 
become first of all an object of progress.”132  
    In the previous quotation of New Studies, Hayek says that his concept of 
evolution „leads sometimes to conflicts with near-animal natural instincts.‟ 
However, we meet „an animalistic view of life‟ so often in the present neo-
liberal society. According to Goudzwaard, “It is a view of which tries to 
convince us that ultimately politics is nothing but a power struggle, that 
ultimately the wife-husband relationship is purely a matter of sex, and that 
ultimately work is only a means of making money. In such a vision the trade 
union as a mere power machine fits very well.” Goudzwaard understands this 
view as „animalistic,‟ which he explains by saying that “Because all norms for 
human relationships have been ignored and eliminated. We are confronted here 
with a view in which human personality is truncated, cut down to its barest 
animal-like interests.”133 
Adolfo Garcia‟s comment on the so-called „evolutionary economics‟ 
indicates a similar assessment: “This theory tries to explain economic change by 
means of biological analogies such as genetic variation (technological 
innovation) and natural selection (market selection). The intent is to understand 
the economy as something determined by the survival of the fittest, the fittest 
being those firms that are able to choose successful routines (technologies, 
marketing and managerial procedures, and so forth). There is indeed much 
about current economic life that gives it the appearance of a merciless struggle 
for survival.”134 But neo-liberals hide their animalistic view with the very 
pedantic terms such as „comparative advantage‟, „trickle-down effect‟, and 
„zero-sum game‟. Let‟s look at these terms a bit closer. 
    The theory of „comparative advantage‟ is the centerpiece of the ideology of 
globalization.
135
 It supposes that trade liberalization will enhance a country‟s 
income by forcing resources to move from less productive uses to more 
productive uses. But moving resources from low-productivity to zero-
productivity does not enrich a country, and this is what happened all too often 
under IMF programs. It only destroys jobs, as inefficient industries close down 
under pressure from international competition. In this case, free trade destroys 
incomes that are greater than the advantages derived from buying cheap.
136
 
    Ha-Joon Chang, who is the Korean economist teaching in Cambridge 
University, reveals well the paradox of the propagandists of free trade in the so-
called developed countries: “When they were developing countries themselves, 
                                                          
132
 Goudzwaard, Capitalism and Progress, 85. 
133
 Bob Goudzwaard, Aid for the Overdeveloped West (Toronto: Wedge Publishing 
Foundations, 1975), 69. 
134
 Goudzwaard, Globalization and the Kingdom of God, 84.  
135
 Duchrow and Hinkelammert, Property for People Not for Profit, 147. 
136
 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York [etc.]: W.W.Norton & 
Company, 2002), 59. 
43 
 
virtually all of today‟s developed countries did not practice free trade. Rather, 
they promoted their national industries through tariffs, subsidies, and other 
measures. Particularly notable is the fact that … Britain and the United States, 
which are conventionally believed to have reached the top of the world‟s 
economic hierarchy by adopting free trade …… These two countries were in 
fact often the pioneers and frequently the most ardent users of Interventionist 
trade and industrial policy measures in their early stages of development.”137 In 
discussing Britain, Chang uses Friedrich List‟s powerful metaphor of „kicking 
away of the ladder‟ against the big lie of free trade: 
     
It is a very common clever device that when anyone has attained the summit of 
greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to deprive 
others of the means of climbing up after him. In this lies the secret of the cosmopolitan 
doctrine of Adam Smith, and of the cosmopolitan tendencies of his great contemporary 
William Pitt, and of all his successors in the British Government administrations. Any 
nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions on navigations has raised her 
manufacturing power and her navigation to such a degree of development that no other 
nation can sustain free competition with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away 
these ladders of her greatness, to preach to other nations the benefits of free trade, and 
to declare in penitent tones that she has hitherto wandered in the paths of error, and has 
now for the first time succeeded in discovering the truth.
138
 
 
Britain didn‟t make the shift to free trade until she achieved a technological 
lead. This lesson suggests that the logic of „absolute advantage‟ rather than that 
of „comparative advantage‟ might work in international trade between hi-
technology countries and low-technology countries. Next, however, is the very 
popular phrase of the „trickle-down effect.‟ It is used to command the overall 
benefits of economic growth. We often hear, “Make a bigger pie first, and then 
divide it.” The idea is that the best way to help the poor is to make the economy 
grow; the benefits of that growth trickle down even to the poor. But it was never 
much more than just a belief. Growth in America in the 1980s provided the 
most recent dramatic example: while the economy grew, those at the bottom 
saw their real incomes decline. If this had not worked in the United States, why 
would it work in developing countries? While it is true that sustained reductions 
in poverty cannot be attained without robust economic growth, the converse is 
not true: growth need not benefit all. It is not true that “a rising tide lifts all 
boats.” Sometimes, a quickly rising tide, especially when accompanied by a 
storm, dashes weaker boats against the shore, smashing them to smithereens.
139
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„Zero-sum game‟ is another popular term to be employed for advocating 
the priority of growth over distribution. Milton Friedman, another great theorist 
of neo-liberalism, states, “… if an exchange between two parties is voluntary, it 
will not take place unless both believe they will benefit from it. Most economic 
fallacies derive from the neglect of this simple insight [Adam Smith‟s], from the 
tendency to assume that there is a fixed pie that one party can gain only at the 
expense of another.”140 Accordingly, „zero-sum game‟ and „zero-sum society‟ 
are terms used to characterize the critics of neo-liberal capitalism. They assume 
that a distributive economy can work without prioritizing growth. Michael 
Novak, the theological representative of free enterprise, insists that socialist 
polices seeking for security and equality lead to a zero-sum society. He 
criticizes socialist countries with all kinds of rhetoric: being “self-protective and 
inward-turning,” being “aversive to risk and creativity”, “paralyzing investment, 
research, experimental probes, advances in productivity, and progress itself”, 
while heightening „sullenness and resentment.‟ It fails in „dynamism,‟ and does 
not offer „opportunities, liberties, and mobilities,‟ being „bureaucratic, legal,‟ 
being a „no-growth society,‟ and „withdrawing to the present.‟141 All of these 
characteristics are in Novak‟s view proven true by the gap of material prosperity 
between socialist and capitalist countries.  
However, if we give attention to the so-called „external effects‟ the 
conventional measures of economic growth miss, the material growth the 
capitalist countries have achieved is grossly overestimated. According to the 
„Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare‟ of Herman Daly and John Cobb, Jr. 
that takes account of social cost (such as education and health, distributional 
inequality, etc.) and environmental cost, economic prosperity per capita of the 
United States‟ population has declined since the beginning of the 1970s.142 The 
United States, which Novak lifts up as the model of democratic capitalism, has 
never been the so-called „win-win society,‟ as an alternative to the zero-sum 
society. Rather, it turns out to be a „negative-sum society‟ for the low-class and 
also the society as a whole, but a „winner-take-all society‟ for the upper class, as 
we have already examined in section one.   
Furthermore, we can also adduce the neo-Austrians‟ preference for 
oligopolies as evidence of neo-liberalism as a branch of evolutionary thought. 
They support „imperfect competition‟ despite their faith in free market. For in 
their views oligopolies, though they are expressions of imperfect competition, 
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further technological progress directly, and moreover guarantee the „survival of 
the fittest‟ in economic life. This typical evolutionary thought is broadly spread 
by Joseph Schumpeter‟s famous theory of „Creative Destruction‟: 
 
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from 
new consumer‟s goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new 
markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates …… 
The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational 
development from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U. S. Steel illustrates 
the same process of industrial mutation – if I may use that biological term – that 
incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly creating a 
new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.
143
 
 
Schumpeter argues that the fundamental cause of capitalist development is 
never „price competition‟ but „innovation competition,‟ and implies that the 
main actors of the latter are large-scale companies:   
 
But in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not that kind of 
competition which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new 
technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization (the largest-scale 
unit of control for instance) – competition which commands a decisive cost or quality 
advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the 
existing firms but at their foundations and their lives…it becomes a matter of 
comparative indifference whether competition in the ordinary sense functions more or 
less promptly; the powerful lever that in the long run expands output and brings down 
prices is in any case made of other stuff.
144
 
 
Consequently, Schumpeter praises big business as the most powerful engine of 
economic progress, for it has superiority in efficiency:  
 
On the other hand, working in the conditions of capitalist evolution, the perfectly 
competitive arrangement displays wastes of its own. The firm of the type that is 
compatible with perfect competition is in many cases inferior in internal, especially 
technological, efficiency…Thus it is not sufficient to argue that because perfect 
competition is impossible under modern industrial conditions…the large-scale 
establishment or unit of control must be accepted as a necessary evil inseparable from 
the economic progress…What we have got to accept is that it has come to be the most 
powerful engine of that progress and in particular of the long-run expansion of total 
output…
145
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Similarly, Ludwig von Mises defends monopolistic practices of big businesses, 
but he is also keen to safeguard that other liberal principle, namely to avoid a 
monopoly in pricing goods: 
 
What those who blame the economies of big-scale production for the spread of 
monopoly prices are trying to say is that the higher efficiency of big-scale production 
makes it difficult or even impossible for small-scale plants to compete successfully. A 
big-scale plant could, they believe, resort to monopoly prices with impunity because 
small business is not in a position to challenge its monopoly. Now, it is certainly true 
that in many branches of the processing industries it would be foolish to enter the 
market with the high-cost products of small, inadequate plants. A modern cotton mill 
does not need to fear the competition of old-fashioned distaffs; its rivals are other more 
or less adequately equipped mills. But this does not mean that it enjoys the opportunity 
of selling at monopoly prices. There is competition between big business too…One 
must not confuse the notions of monopoly and of monopoly prices.
146
 
 
In true neo-liberal fashion Von Mises asserts that the real source of monopoly 
problem is government: “The important place that cartels occupy in our time is 
an outcome of the interventionist policies adopted by the governments of all 
countries. The monopoly problem mankind has to face today is not an 
outgrowth of the operation of the market economy. It is a product of purposive 
action on the part of governments. It is not one of the evils inherent in 
capitalism as the demagogues trumpet. It is, on the contrary, the fruit of policies 
hostile to capitalism and intent upon sabotaging and destroying its operation.”147  
 
Similarly, Hayek highlights the advantage of capitalist competition 
accompanying monopoly, but he also cautions against the danger of government 
policy based on perfect competition:  
 
A person who possesses the exclusive knowledge or skill which enables him to reduce 
the cost of production of a commodity by 50 percent still renders an enormous service to 
society if he enters its production and reduces its price by only 25 percent-not only 
through that price reduction but also through his additional savings of cost. But it is only 
through competition that we can assume that these possible savings of cost will be 
achieved. Even if in each instance prices were only just low enough to keep out 
producers which do not enjoy these or other equivalent advantages, so that each 
commodity were produced as cheaply as possible, though many may be sold at prices 
considerably above costs, this would probably be a result which could not be achieved 
by any other method than that of letting competition operate …… the long-term 
equilibrium price with which a theory discussing „perfect‟ competition must be 
concerned is not only not relevant; the conclusions concerning policy to which 
preoccupation with this model leads are highly misleading and even dangerous. The 
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idea that under „perfect‟ competition prices should be equal to long-run costs often leads 
to the approval of such antisocial practices as the demand for an „orderly competition‟ 
which will secure a fair return on capital and for the destruction of excess capacity.
148
     
 
In view of these comments, the proponents of neo-liberal economics 
appear to have been very influential in advocating their theoretical views. The 
world economy today is an „oligopoly‟ situation, which is dominated by a few 
transnational corporations. The top five car and truck manufacturers are 
responsible for nearly 60 per cent of worldwide sales of motor vehicles. The 
five leading oil majors account for over 40 per cent of that industry‟s global 
market share. For the chemicals sector, the comparable percentage is 35 per cent, 
and for both electrics and steel it is over 50 per cent.
149
 They often have 
revenues far exceeding the total GDP of the countries where they do business. 
Fifty-one of the world‟s 100 largest economic entities are transnational 
corporations. Of the world‟s 50 largest economies, 14 are corporations (28%). 
Combined sales of the world‟s top 500 corporations in 2002 were equivalent to 
43% of the world‟s GDP. Those of the top 200 accounted for 29% of world 
economic activity.
150
    
In contrast, the top 500 multinational firms employed 1.6% of the world‟s 
workforce, and the top 200 only 0.9%.
151
 Since the beginnings of the 80‟s, the 
top 200 have had an uninterrupted expansion through mergers and „rescue‟ buy-
outs of companies. Their part of transnational capital in the global GNP has 
gone from 17% in the middle of the 60‟s to 24% in 1982 and more than 30% in 
1995. But unemployment in the OECD countries went from 3.8% in 1966 to 6.3% 
in 1990. In Europe alone it went from 2.2% in 1966 to 6.4% in 1990. The 
intensification of oligopoly has weakened small and medium-size businesses, 
which take charge of the larger part of general employment. Upon the 
disappearance of local and regional markets, the small and medium-size 
producers see themselves without protection and without any possibility of 
competing against gigantic transnational corporations. The absurdity of neo-
liberalism repeats itself: growth in production does not generate employment; 
on the contrary, it destroys it. The UN calls this stage „Growth without 
employment.‟152 
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Moreover, skeptics concerning the superiority of big business in innovation 
note that many firms with low market shares have substantial and successful 
R&D programs. According to the research of John Jewkes and his colleagues, 
only less than half of the most important inventions of 20
th
 century came from 
the laboratories of large corporations. The importance of small inventors has 
been confirmed as major new products seem to arise from nowhere – as 
occurred when Apple Computers launched the microcomputer revolution.
153
 
To round up what we learned in this section, we will discuss the „faith in 
progress,‟ that is part of social evolutionism. With regard to this notion 
Goudzwaard argues that “the evolution motif lodged itself ever deeper into the 
western faith in progress. Around the turn of the century it had, in fact, become 
almost universally accepted. It was then believed that progress was based on the 
unavoidable process of natural evolution. This … was the decisive factor which 
established the reign of the idea of progress at the end of the nineteenth century 
and the beginning of the twentieth.”154 He points to the remarkable fact that 
both neo-liberalism and Marxism hold „the faith in progress‟ in common. In 
reality, the emphasis on the significance of a rapid economic and technological 
growth has been nowhere more pervasive than in the countries behind the iron 
curtain.
155
 That Marx asked Darwin‟s permission to dedicate the first volume of 
Capital to him
156
 confirms a strong influence of the evolution theory upon the 
idea of progress.     
Under the influence of evolutionism the faith in progress changed into 
fatalism beyond human control, as Goudzwaard points out. He points to Karl 
Loewith who described this situation impressively in his article entitled „the fate 
of progress‟: “An uncanny coincidence of fatalism and a will of progress 
presently characterizes all contemporary thinking about the future course of 
history. Progress now threatens us; it has become our fate …… [We are] set free 
and yet imprisoned by our own power …… Progress itself goes on progressing; 
we can no longer stop it or turn it around.”157 Goudzwaard witnesses that the 
Chief Executive Officers [CEO], the icons of the neo-liberal era, hold to an 
unshaken faith in the need to grow, and consistently maintain that growth in 
production is a condition of solving the main economic problems such as 
poverty, the environment, and unemployment.
158
 The coincidence Loewith 
pointed to still holds true for current government. It is generally claimed that 
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government cannot realize the goals of its own policies without economic 
growth. Both of them – both politics and economics – are ever more geared to 
guaranteed progress.
159
 Goudzwaard illustrates the fate of this logic by 
comparing it to cycling: as long as the cyclist maintains the speed, she remains 
balanced on her seat, but she tries to stop, she loses her balance. Western 
economies can remain in balance only as long as economic growth persists.  
But we know that the unquestioned faith in economic growth is wrong, for 
which we only have to look at the example of shifting industrial production 
overseas for maximum economic efficiency. It frequently brings about structural 
unemployment and environmental damage. Obsessed by rising material 
prosperity, we are disregarding our responsibility, and allow untrammeled 
economic expansion to become a god who dictates its will to us.
160
 Accordingly, 
Goudzwaard has presented „the economics of enough‟161 as the alternative to 
this „evolutionary economics‟. The latter promotes the unlimited growth and the 
animalistic competition of „the survival of the fittest‟. In contrast, the former 
stresses on „restraint‟ and „cooperation.‟ Goudzwaard offers the Dutch polder 
model as an illustration: “The model is built on two foundations, both of which 
stem from the Christian social movements in Europe. The first is the long-
standing cooperation between employers and employees undertaking joint 
efforts for the common good. The second is voluntary wage restraint on the part 
of labor unions in order to serve broader, labor-related purposes.”162 In his view, 
these restraints and the cooperation they enable, will allow enough room to 
guarantee even „the survival of the weakest.‟ 
 
2.5. The Subjectivism and Utilitarianism of the Austrian School  
 
Neo-liberalism first made its appearance in the form of political economy as a 
critique of Keynesianism. The spearhead of this school of thought was the 
doctrine of monetarism associated with the Chicago school of economics, but 
behind it was a wider critique of state involvement in the economy associated 
with the Austrian school.
163
 In the preface of his masterpiece „The constitution 
of Liberty,‟ the main representative of this school, Friedrich von Hayek, reveals 
his Austrian background:  
     
Perhaps the reader should also know that, although I am writing in the United States and 
have been a resident of this country for nearly ten years, I cannot claim to write as an 
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American. My mind has been shaped by a youth spent in my native Austria and by two 
decades of middle life in Great Britain, of which country I have become and remain a 
citizen. To know this fact about myself may be of some help to the reader, for the book 
is to a great extent the product of this background.
164
     
     
The so-called Austrian or Vienna school was established by Carl Menger, 
Eugen Boehm-Bawerk and Friedrich von Wieser. What distinguished the 
Austrian school from the classical school of political economy by thinkers like 
Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx was their „subjective‟ theory of 
value [marginal utility theory of value], as opposed to the objective theory of 
value [labor theory of value]. Menger argued that „value is entirely subjective in 
nature…Goods always have value to certain economizing individuals and this 
value is also determined only by these individuals.‟165 Menger showed that the 
value of goods is determined by their marginal utility rather than by their total 
utility. It gave a definitive answer to the diamond-water paradox that the value 
of a diamond is so high while water is essential to life. Diamonds are more 
expensive than water because, given their relatively scarcity, an extra diamond 
generally has far greater utility that an extra bottle of water. With this more 
sophisticated utility theory of value, the first generation Austrian school 
replaced the labor theory of value calculating objectively the value of goods and 
services based on the labor used in the production.
166
 
For its next generations, the subjectivism starting from the discussion of 
the economic theory of value has been applied to the general science of human 
action (to use Mises‟s term, „praxeology‟).167 Hayek has given it as his opinion 
that „it is probably no exaggeration to say that every important advance in 
economic theory during the last hundred years was a further step in the 
consistent application of subjectivism.‟ 168  Raimondo Cubeddu names the 
discovery of the subjective theory of value as the „Copernican revolution‟ in the 
social sciences
169
 and explains the change of the socio-scientific methodology 
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quoting Von Mises: “it is not mankind, the state or the corporative unit that acts, 
but individual men and groups, and their valuations and their actions are 
decisive, not those of abstract collectivities.”170 
In this connection our aim is to focus upon the „political subjectivism 
[individualism
171]‟ that characterizes so-called neo-Austrian economists like 
Von Mises and his favorite student, Von Hayek. The anti-interventionist, anti-
socialist libertarian version of the Austrian school that came to be known in the 
Anglo-American world was in fact the work of the neo-Austrians. The singular 
contribution of Ludwig von Mises was above all the attainment and 
maintenance of individual freedom. This was not so in the case of the earlier 
generation Austrian economists.
172
  
Menger was in favor of social reform (Kathedersozialismus). He had an 
outspoken resemblance to the welfare economists of today. He was not a 
consistent defender of free competition, and he was not a socialist, although his 
brother, the famous socialist Anton Menger, had some influence on him.
173
 
Boehm-Bawerk was a true liberal and his private seminar (Privatseminar) was 
enriched by important controversy with Marxist thought.
174
 It was told that 
Boehm-Bawerk refused uncompromisingly to change his opinion in the 
question of the sugar subsidy, when he encountered the opposition of the 
owners of sugar factories.
175
 Wieser was an interventionist liberal, building on a 
strong Catholic and conservative foundation. He was an admirer of the state as 
guided by the supreme wisdom of his own bureaucratic class.
176
 
    John Gray points out the antinomian traits of neo-liberal society: “The 
tendency of market liberal policy is significantly to reinforce subjectivist and 
even antinomian tendencies which are already very powerful in modernist 
societies and thereby to render surviving enclaves and remnants of traditional 
life powerless before them.”177 Behind these tendencies is the subjectivist 
world-view of the Austrian school. A further aspect of the antinomian tendency 
of neo-liberal thought is its utilitarianism of the Austrian school. Utilitarianism 
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is a consequentialist theory that evaluates the moral qualities of human action 
not in terms of its motive, or intention, but solely in terms of its effects. Good or 
bad motives in fact do not even exist. What counts in the evaluation of human 
action is its effect in terms of overall utility.
178
 So utilitarianism as a moral 
theory denies absolute or objective standards. 
Gunnar Myrdal comments on the relations between utilitarianism and 
economics: “The doctrines of economics themselves became the most consistent 
formulation and application of utilitarianism as a system of positive social ethics. 
They gave it concrete meaning and content.”179 On the marginal utility theory 
of value he argues: “Utilitarian influence reached its peak with the introduction 
of the theory of marginal utility”180 and “the theory of marginal utility was from 
its inception purely psychological. It is really just an elaboration of Bentham‟s 
hedonistic pleasure-pain calculus.”181  
Tom Beauchamp classifies utilitarianism into hedonistic, pluralistic, and 
preference utilitarianism. Pluralistic utilitarianism argues that not only pleasure 
or happiness but also various goods such as knowledge, love, and beauty have 
intrinsic value. However it is difficult and perhaps impossible to determine 
objectively what is intrinsically good on any given occasion, whether it is 
monistic or plural, and this problem leads many utilitarians to interpret the good 
as that which is subjectively desired or wanted.
182
 This change is similar to the 
change of „utility‟ in the marginal utility theory of value. Today most 
economists deny the cardinal measurability of utility, but accept only ordinal 
measurability according to the Austrian interpretation and particularly to 
Morgenstern
183
. He thinks that utility is just an indicator of preferences. These 
separate utilities may be numbered in the order of the corresponding 
preferences.
184
                 
    Throughout his writings, Von Mises forthrightly called himself a utilitarian. 
Although ordinarily shunning that label, Von Hayek is also a utilitarian.
185
 
Mises‟ praxeological method does not judge the ultimate ends of human actions. 
The science of human action „is indifferent to the conflicts of all schools of 
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dogmatism and ethical doctrine.‟186 Von Mises writes approvingly of Bentham: 
“he does not care about preconceived ideas concerning God‟s or nature‟s plans 
and intentions forever hidden to mortal men; he is intent upon discovering what 
best serves the promotion of human welfare and happiness.”187 In contrast Von 
Mises criticizes sharply Immanuel Kant and his ethics of duty: “His desperate 
attempt to uproot Eudaemonism has failed. In ethics, Bentham, Mill and 
Feuerbach triumph over Kant. The social philosophy of his contemporaries, 
Ferguson and Adam Smith, left him untouched. Economics remained foreign to 
him. All his perception of social problems suffers from these deficiencies.”188 
For Von Hayek, rules have emerged spontaneously by a process akin to natural 
selection. However, this does not mean that all such phenomena must be 
approved of: “the obligation … to follow certain rules derives from the benefits 
we owe to the order in which we live.”189 It is in this sense that Von Hayek is 
utilitarian.
190
        
    The doctrine that the pursuit of self-interest will work to produce the 
greatest amount of welfare can be justified on utilitarian grounds; it is a 
consequentialist social theory.
191
 Von Hayek quotes Josiah Tucker: “the 
universal mover in human nature, self-love, may receive such a direction in this 
case (as in all others) as to promote the public interest by those efforts it shall 
make towards pursuing its own.”192 Von Mises‟ view stems from his concept 
that the ultimate goal of human action is always the satisfaction of the acting 
man‟s desires. He sees the age-old quests of philosophers seeking laws to 
explain man‟s destiny and evolution as doomed to failure until the phenomenon 
of market interdependence was fully grasped. The mistake they had been 
making was that of misplaced holism; they were setting up quite arbitrary 
concepts of social wholes like „nation‟, „race‟, or „church‟. In order to explain 
the way in which individuals behaved so as to ensure the achievement of the 
ends of some social whole, various forces, at different times, called on stage, 
such as „nature‟ or „the will of God‟. Von Mises dismisses all such speculation 
as fruitless because it fails to examine the „molecules‟ of societies or nations – 
the acting individuals.
193
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2.6. The Anachronism of Neo-liberalism: a Gap between Austria (West) 
and Korea 
 
To comprehend the virulent individualism and anti-socialism of Von Mises and 
Von Hayek, we have to consider the historical circumstances of Austria.
194
 
Both thinkers grew up in the Austrian era of the liberal constitutional order 
established in the 1860s – which privileged the rising class of bankers, 
manufactures, and merchants and found its social support base among middle-
class urban Germans and German speaking Jews – that was challenged by anti-
capitalist populist movement of the Right and the Left.  
In 1893 Karl Lueger, anti-capitalist and anti-Semitic leader of the Christian 
Social Party was elected Mayor of Vienna. The target of Lueger‟s Christian 
Socials was the “free thinking, highly educated and often Jewish capitalists and 
their somewhat strong belief in „Manchester Liberalism,‟ materialism and 
positivism.” The Austrian Social Democratic Party was founded by Victor 
Adler in 1889, which united moderate and radical groupings into one party. Its 
political base was principally among the urban working class. 
    The long-awaited collapse of the Habsburg dynasty preceded the 
establishment of the First Republic in November 1918. In October 1916 Fritz 
Adler, son of Victor Adler and passionate opponent of the First World War, 
became an instant hero when he assassinated the Prime Minister of Austria. He 
was lionized by the population of Vienna, profoundly disillusioned with the 
War and angry at those who profited by it while death stalked the battlefronts. 
    The 1917 Russian October Revolution put socialism on the agenda in 
Central Europe. The Austrian Socialist Party had abandoned its ambiguous 
position concerning the war and in January 1918 organized a number of general 
strikes. The Imperial authorities were no longer able to supply the soldiers at the 
front and industrial workers in the cities with food and clothing. The Socialists 
had organized Austria‟s soldiers and industrial workers into soldiers‟ and 
workers‟ councils that soon became the only functioning administration in the 
land able to deal with increasingly severe shortages of food and fuel. In October 
1918 the First Austrian Republic was proclaimed and Karl Renner was named 
the first Chancellor of the provisional government. The sister republic of 
Hungary was established in October 1918 with Count Karolyi as its first 
president. The Habsburg era came to an end. 
The Socialists emerged from the election of 1919 as the strongest single 
party with 48 percent of the votes, and entered in a coalition with the Christian 
Social conservatives. Otto Bauer became foreign minister and first head of the 
Socialization Commission. In the spring of 1919, Bauer introduced his 
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socialization program calling for the gradual public administration of large coal, 
iron, and steel plants and the eventual control of all sectors of the economy.  
The coalition broke down, and the socialization programs were effectively 
suspended after Ignaz Seipel became Chancellor in May 1922. He stabilized the 
currency at one new schilling = 10,000 Kronen with the assistance of a League 
of Nations program not dissimilar to the conditionalities of I.M.F. adjustment 
programs. Thousands of public servants were fired; remaining subsidies were 
removed, new taxes imposed, and the proposal for capital taxation suspended. A 
League of Nations supervisor was installed to oversee the implementation of the 
stabilization program, which corresponded to the thought dominant in 
contemporary academic economics. This theory pronounced that an economy 
weakened by the disease of inflation can be restored to health only by severe 
fiscal and monetary discipline. This was the context in which Von Mises 
expounded his views at the University of Vienna which were, as Machlup 
recalls, unpopular with the majority considered as the intelligentsia: 
 
Mises fought interventionism while almost everybody was in favour of some 
government action against the „evil‟ consequences of laissez-faire. Mises fought 
inflationism while a large majority of people were convinced that only a courageous 
expansion of money, credit and governmental budgets could secure prosperity, full 
employment and economic growth. Mises fought socialism in all its forms, while most 
intellectuals had written off capitalism as a decaying system to be replaced either 
peacefully or by revolution, by socialism or communism. Mises fought coercive 
egalitarianism while „high-minded‟ citizen thought that social justice required 
redistribution of wealth and/or income. Mises fought government-supported trade 
unionism, while progressive professors of political science represented increasing power 
of labor unions as an essential ingredient of democracy. Hayek became the most 
forceful exponent and defender of the economic and political views of Mises.
195
 
 
In the settings of intellectual Vienna of the 1920s, both thinkers and their 
associates were the misfits – the remnants of old Vienna‟s privileged urban 
elites whose security had been shattered, whose savings had been decimated by 
wartime and postwar inflation, and whose taxes were financing the pioneering 
housing programs of Vienna‟s municipal administration. They created a 
common cause with the rising forces of clerical reaction, which eventually led 
to the suspension of Parliament in 1933 and the violent destruction of the 
working-class movement in February 1934, leaving the country defenseless 
against Hitler‟s occupation in 1938. The heirs of the Liberal tradition of the 
1860s joined forces with clerical fascism in their paranoiac fear of the working 
classes. 
A special target of Von Hayek‟s polemics in the 1920s was the regime of 
rent control and public housing, which effectively eliminated private high-rental 
                                                          
195
 Machlup, “Ludwig von Mises.” 
56 
 
residential construction. Working-class families were now privileged with 
access to low-rental, bright, spacious, modern apartments with parks, 
kindergartens, and other communal facilities. These programs, together with a 
sweeping educational reform, plus the large-scale participation of the working 
people of Vienna in a remarkable variety of cultural, recreational, and 
educational activities organized by the Socialists made „Red Vienna‟ a world-
class showpiece of avant-garde urban lifestyle. The elite of the Intellectuals of 
Vienna were socialist sympathizers. In Vienna alone 350,000 people belonged 
to Social Democratic organization, while socialist trade unions compromised 
700,000 workers. Never before or since has a Social Democratic Party been so 
powerful, so intelligent, or so attractive as was the Austrian party of the mid 
1920s. 
Vienna of Von Mises and Von Hayek, which profoundly shaped their 
lifelong writings, was a shrinking middle-class city which clung desperately to 
its dwindling wealth and place in society, whose moral foundations were eroded 
when it sanctioned the destruction of democracy in fear of „socialist 
dictatorship,‟ leaving the First Republic defenseless against Hitler in March 
1938. Also it is interesting to note that during the Second Austrian Republic 
since 1945, after Von Mises and Von Hayek had left for America and Britain, 
the Socialist Party had constructed a flourishing economy with the largest 
nationalized state sector in Western Europe, an extensive system of social 
security, a very high degree of trade unionization, an enviably low rate of 
unemployment, stable prices and exchanges rates, and the virtual absence of 
strikes. In the Austrian context, one could think that neo-liberalism was a 
natural reaction to the strong social tradition.  
However, the neo-liberal politics since the mid-1970s in the Western world 
(including Britain and America) occurred under different circumstances. John 
Gray criticizes the expansionist welfare state as it developed under the rule of 
Keynesian economic theory:  
     
The modern British state, like the contemporary American state, and like practically 
every other modern state, owns vast assets. At present levels of taxation and expenditure, 
something between a third and a half of national income is pre-empted by government. 
Furthermore, the modern British state, again like virtually every other modern state, 
operates a colossal apparatus of income transfers via progressive taxation, welfare 
payments, and a welter of tariffs and subsidies. As a result of its tremendous economic 
power, the modern British state continues to exercise an invasive influence on social life 
of a sort only comparable to that of the absolutist monarchies of early modern Europe. It 
is perhaps worth remarking that, in virtue of the current burden of taxation, government 
in Britain today expropriates more of the income and wealth of its subjects than did the 
lords of feudal times (who were often restricted to command over the labour of only one 
in three of their serfs).
196
 
                                                          
196
 John Gray, Beyond the New Right (London [etc.]: Routledge, 1993), 12. 
57 
 
 
According to a statistics of public social expenditure of 1970-1997, British 
governments continued to take close to 20% of GDP, America around 15%, and 
the most Continental countries between 20% and 30%.
197
 In this situation, neo-
liberal policies of „privatization‟ and „deregulation‟ have become to gain 
momentum as correctives to the so-called „welfare disease‟, „government 
failure‟, and „high-cost and low-efficiency economy.‟    
But what about South Korea? It enjoyed a beautiful social tradition called 
„Doorae‟ for a long time. It is reported that „Doorae‟ had already existed during 
the Samhan period (ca. 3
rd
 century B.C. - 3
rd
 century A.D.). Its concrete form 
was established during the Chosun Dynasty (A.D. 1392-1910).
198
 It is a 
communal work in rice farming. It is based on spontaneity, cooperation, 
solidarity, and conviviality. Each small village organizes its own „Doorae‟ 
without an external intervention. The villagers overcome the hard work of 
agriculture by sharing hands. The first object they cultivate together is the 
common land of the village; and then the land of widows, the aged or disabled, 
and lastly, their own lands. This is a good example of solidarity. However, its 
most unique point is probably that the farming work is accompanied by music, 
public meal and rest.
199
 Work and joy are appropriately combined.  
However, the „Doorae‟ was crushed by the abolishment of the village 
common land under the rule of Japanese imperialism (1910-45). After the 1945 
Liberation, the custom revived until the modernization program of rural villages, 
„Saemaul movement,‟ under the military dictator Chung-Hee Park‟s regime 
(1961-1979). As the result of the mechanization of farming and the use of 
agricultural chemicals, the custom expired decisively. His export-led 
industrialization policy, which privileged a few chabols such Hyundai, Samsung, 
and Daewoo, changed not only the whole economic system into the 
oligopolistic one, but also brought about a serious rural exodus. Since the 1990s 
the tradition has completely disappeared.
200
 The very existence of rural 
communities has been threatened because of the indiscriminate opening of the 
domestic market to transnational agro-food corporations according to the neo-
liberal agendas such as Uruguay Round, WTO and FTA [Free Trade 
Agreement]. The principle of „unlimited competition‟ has come to dominate 
even the rural communities. 
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Against such tendency, some movements to revitalize the Korean 
traditional political economy have occurred. The representative one is the 
„Hansalim movement‟. „The declaration of Hansalim,‟ pronounced in 1989, 
diagnoses that Western industrial civilization is based on a mechanistic ideology. 
The ideology is considered to be a world-view of death and implies oppressing 
man and destroying nature. The declaration suggests „the thought of life‟ of the 
Korean traditional „Donghak‟ (Eastern learning) as an alternative.201 Donghak 
was established by Je U Choi in the 1860s with the intention of helping farmers 
suffering from poverty and unrest and to restore political and social stability. 
Choi was alarmed by the intrusion of Christianity and the Anglo-French 
occupation of Beijing during the Second Opium War. He believed that the best 
way to counter foreign influence in Korea was to introduce democratic and 
human rights reforms internally.
202
 
Donghak tries to synthesize Christianity as well as Confucianism, 
Buddhism and Taoism from the perspective of life. It believes that God and man 
and nature belong altogether in a „Universal Life‟ (Hansaengmyong). Donghak 
teaches activating the Universal Life by respecting God (Hanul) and man and 
nature.
203
 It is noteworthy that in the Eastern religions there is no western 
modernistic distinction between human society and nature. They all have a 
political economy of mutual living among all beings (Sangsaeng).
204
 Evidently, 
this traditional agricultural culture conflicted with the so-called industrial 
developmentalism. For example, Ji Ha Kim, one of the founders of the 
Hansalim movement and perhaps one of the greatest poets in modern Korea, 
was imprisoned in 1970. He published „Five Thieves,‟ a scathing parody of 
business conglomerates, members of Parliament, high government officials, 
generals and Cabinet ministers, sung in the traditional rhythm of „pansori‟. In 
1974, Kim was courted-martialed and sentenced to death. National and 
international efforts to free him culminated in the commuting of his death 
sentence to life-imprisonment. 
In recent decades an ecological movement grounded in Korean tradition 
has been kept alive only through small agricultural producers‟ or/and customers‟ 
cooperations. Since the Park‟s regime (1961-79) South Korea has almost lost an 
entire tradition of social agriculture. While it has been appraised as a model of 
rapid economic growth, it hasn‟t distributed the fruits justly. The government 
                                                          
201
 Hansalim, “The declaration of Hansalim,” www.hansalim.or.kr (accessed July 30, 
2012). 
202
 Wikipedia, “Donghak Peasant Revolution,” 
   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donghak_Peasant_Revolution (accessed July 30, 2012). 
203
 Hansalim, “The declaration of Hansalim.” We can criticize that these doctrines of 
Donghak are syncretic and pantheistic. However we could praise that Donghak 
raised the issue of „life‟ so early.  
204
 Yong Bock Kim, “Political economy of life in the context of globalization” (Dec. 30, 
2004), www.oikozoe.or.kr (accessed Feb. 1, 2008). 
59 
 
has spent only 5.9% of GDP for public social expenditure in 1998. It is 
strikingly contrasted with 14.6% of America, 24.7% of Britain, and 24.5% of 
average EU-15. It is far lower than 11.5% of Turkey and 8.2% of Mexico, 
which have respectively less than half the level of GNP per capita.
205
 
    With regard to its social security system, Korea has been the 
“developmental „workfare‟ state” in which the state maximally intervened in the 
process of resource allocation and production but minimally engaged in state 
welfare and redistribution. It pursues a workfare strategy to increase workers‟ 
economic dependency on work, by minimizing social protection for workers 
and repressing workers‟ self-protective measures such as unionization.206 To 
use Esping-Andersen‟s term, Korean workers had been almost completely 
commodified under the developmental workfare state. Thus an individual‟s 
welfare came to be totally dependent upon employment in the labor market.
207
 
From the perspective of social welfare, therefore, Korea was already an 
extremely liberalized and deregulated society before the IMF trusteeship. It has 
never suffered from the „welfare disease‟ enacted by social government. Maybe 
Koreans would have wanted eagerly to „suffer‟ from that disease. Its growing 
economic development has become even a model for other developing countries, 
but it has always developed at the expense of cheap labor and the longest 
workweek in the world. The IMF package of neo-liberal policies such as the 
more flexible labor market and more liberalized trade following the Washington 
Consensus in the 1990s therefore was anticipated by the earlier destruction of its 
social system. The long tradition of „life-long employment‟ in modern Korea 
was crushed. Even the dictatorial Park‟s regime was paternalistic as well as 
repressive in that it tried to protect „job security.‟208  
The package enlarged the gap between big business and small- or medium-
size business. While the latter in 2005 takes charge of 88.1% of employment, its 
productivity compared to the former goes down from around 50% in the early 
1990s to about 33% now.
209
 The gap between cities and rural villages became 
wider. The income ratio of rural household to city household changed from 99.5% 
in 1994 to 76.2% in 2003. The increase of inequality within rural households is 
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more striking. The ratio of the income of the lowest 20% class to that of the 
highest 20% changed from 7.2 in 1998 to 12 in 2003.
210
 The accelerated 
industrialization of agriculture has speeded up destruction of rural communities 
that are the source of ecological sustainability, and caused the breaking up of 
rural traditions that are the basis of Korean culture.          
As a consequence of these developments, the Koreans‟ quality of life has 
become severely worse. According to a survey, the pain index of Korean people 
increased from 1.5 in 1997 to 20.9 in 1998, which means that after the crisis 
Koreans suffered upwards from fourteen times as much as they did before the 
crisis. And an survey in 2001 indicates that 45.3% of Koreans would consider 
immigration if they had that option.
211
 
The above account of Korean economy under the rule of neo-liberal 
economics indicates that it didn‟t bring the Korean people what it promises. No 
progress and no trickle-down effect. It proves that in Korean context, the 
Washington Consensus is anachronistic. To date Korea has many areas that are 
in need of extended social regulation and control – tax, real estate market, labor 
market, agriculture and stock raising, education, medical insurance, and so on. 
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Chapter 3 
The Case Studies of Capital, Labor and Land: Tax Havens, 
Labor-Management Relations and Real Estate 
     
 
In order to substantiate the verdict that completed the previous chapter, we will 
in the present chapter look in more detail at how the neo-liberal principles 
discussed above work in practice. To this end we have chosen three issues to be 
presented as case studies: tax havens, labor-management relations and real 
estate, which represent the most serious economic problems the Korean society 
and people have faced under neo-liberalism. They correspond respectively to 
capital, labor and land, that is, three factors of production. So these case studies 
will also help us to understand the Korean economy within the big picture. 
We give attention to how the primary neo-liberal principle of „self-
regulating market,‟ examined in 2.1, has brought about socially and ecologically 
harmful effects since the Korean Crisis by means of the „commodification of the 
factors of production,‟ which is the essence of the second neo-liberal principle 
of „fictitious economy,‟ discussed in 2.2. Karl Polanyi describes this as a „self-
regulating market‟ which produces devastating effects with the help of the very 
„commodification of the factors of production‟: 
 
The commodity fiction, therefore, supplies … the principle according to which no 
arrangement or behavior should be allowed to exist that might prevent the actual 
functioning of the market mechanism …. To allow the market mechanism to be sole 
director of the fate human beings and their natural environment … would result in the 
demolition of society. For the alleged commodity „labor power‟ cannot be shoved about, 
used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual 
who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity… Robbed of the protective 
covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social 
exposure … Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes 
defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw 
materials destroyed. Finally, the market administration of purchasing power would 
periodically liquidate business enterprise, for shortage and surfeits of money would 
prove as disastrous to business as floods and droughts in primitive society.
212
  
 
Furthermore the devastating effects are related to the principle of „social 
evolutionism‟ of section 2.4. There the principle of social evolutionism is 
summarized into „the survival of the fittest‟ through competition and is used to 
defend the monopolistic or oligopolistic dominations of big businesses in the 
current neo-liberal economy. We will see that in all the three case study areas – 
tax havens, labor-management relations and real estate - the inequality between 
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poor and rich is expanded and the powers of transnational companies, in 
particular, of chaebols in the Korean context, are enlarged. 
However, the other principles of „full faith in free markets,‟ „subjectivism 
and utilitarianism of the Austrian School,‟ and „anachronism of neo-liberalism 
in the Korean context,‟ examined in Chapter 2, are not the proper principles of 
neo-liberal economy itself, but the evaluative principles of it from the social 
philosophical and comparative perspectives. So they are not the objects of proof 
in these case studies. 
 
3.1. Tax Havens  
 
William Brittain-Catlin argues that what lies behind the current global crisis is a 
particularly virile form of capitalism, and calls it „offshore capitalism.‟ 213 
„Offshore‟ means that it had locked itself into a network of tax havens and 
offshore financial centers that formed the shadow side of the world‟s banks and 
mega-corporations. It was in the 1970s that this form of capitalism began, from 
the margins, to make itself known in the wider world. Multinationals and banks 
began as a matter of course to expand and grow through tax havens. Financial 
whizzkids – much like those experimenting with micro-computers at time – 
developed instruments that financialized every asset and commodity and turned 
them into derivatives, to be traded on their own markets. 
    The new offshore wizardry soon had an impact on the wider world. Up 
until this time, nation-states had complete control over their economies and 
finances. That changed. Offshore tax havens put enormous pressure on domestic 
banking systems to deregulate and liberalize. In turn, onshore banks and 
monetary authorities tried desperately to control and regulate the new 
international capital markets that were based offshore. But it was an unequal 
struggle; governments across the industrialized west eventually repealed their 
own regulations and let offshore finance wash up and make a home onshore.
214
 
    Today world financial markets have become heavily dependent upon 
offshore activity. Around 50% of world trade passes through tax havens. 31% of 
assets of wealthy individuals was held offshore in 2002/2003. Offshore 
locations accounted for 40% of the number of hedge funds and 49% of the 
assets in 2003. And the major accountant firms operate in all the world‟s major 
tax havens.
215
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    Tax havens are also an important topic for comprehending the Korean 1997 
financial crisis and the post-crisis Korean economy. In 1990s Korea confronted 
rising pressures in support of financial liberalization. It had to accept it as a 
precondition for joining the OECD. As deregulations on capital inflow made it 
easier for domestic financial institutions to borrow foreign funds, the domestic 
financial system was exposed to the inherent vicissitudes of international 
financial markets. Offshore funds and banks were the underground actors of the 
rapid inflow of short-term foreign loans that financed excessive investment, and 
of the mass capital flight of late 1997 and 1998 that brought Korea to its knees.        
    First, we will look at the definition of tax havens. Second, we will examine 
the relations between tax havens and the 1997 Korean crisis and its destructive 
influences upon Korean economy since then. Third, we will discuss the negative 
nature of tax havens, and its detrimental roles as hotbeds and channels of global 
dirty money and its influence as a root of global financial instability. 
 
3.1.1. What is a Tax Haven? 
 
According to Richard Murphy, “Tax havens are places that create legislation 
designed to assist persons – real or legal – to avoid the regulatory obligations 
imposed upon them in the place where they undertake the substance of their 
economic transactions.” 216  He explains the two main implications of this 
definition.
217
 
    First of all, the difference between the substance and form of a transaction 
has to be understood. The form of a transaction is the legal identity given to it. 
So, for example, if a CD is sold by a UK resident, the legal form of the 
transaction is that a UK company made the sale under UK law to a UK person. 
UK taxes will be paid on any profit arising from the sale, UK VAT will be paid, 
and a UK court could arbitrate on any resulting dispute that might have arisen. 
UK trading standards will apply.   
    Suppose now that the same CD was shipped from the same warehouse in 
the UK to the same person in the UK, but with the CD being routed through the 
Channel Islands on its way from the warehouse in the UK to the customer in the 
UK. The sale in this case is recorded as having taken place from the Channel 
Islands. The substance of the transaction has not altered. However, in this 
second transaction the form of the transaction has been changed significantly. 
The sale may be subject to the law of one of the Channel Islands. Tax on any 
profit arising on the transaction may either be paid solely in the Channel Islands, 
or may be split between the UK and the Channel Islands since presumably the 
warehouse operator still requires remuneration for their services in shipping the 
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product from the UK. UK VAT may well not apply in this case since a loophole 
is available that prevents this charge on this form of transaction. UK trading 
standards may not apply. UK courts may not be able to intervene in any dispute 
that arises on the transaction.  
    There is a second characteristic that most tax havens have in common. 
They create an environment of secrecy that allows the user of the structures 
created using its law to do so either wholly anonymously, or largely so. This 
secrecy may be backed by statute: the Swiss created their banking secrecy laws 
in 1934 and they have been much copied. Despite claims that this was done to 
hide Jewish deposits from Nazi investigation it was actually enacted to prevent 
French authorities making enquiries on Swiss bank accounts to enforce French 
taxation laws. The facilitation of tax evasion in another country was 
Switzerland‟s motive. Low tax rates and lax regulation, with both designed to 
undermine obligations elsewhere, are the lure to attract business to tax havens. It 
is, however, the secrecy that guarantees that a sale of tax haven services takes 
place. It is impossible to imagine one without the other.   
    We can broadly classify tax havens into seven types, according to its 
role.
218
 It should be noted that many tax havens play more than one role 
although by no means all of them combine all these roles.  
 
1. Incorporation locations, examples being Montserrat and Anguilla. In these 
locations there is no effective Offshore Financial Center
219
. The tax haven is 
primarily used for the registration of entities such as offshore companies used 
in transactions recorded in other tax havens. These places have tended to be 
associated with very low effective regulation and minimal information 
disclosure. 
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2. Secrecy locations, examples being Liechtenstein, the Turks & Caicos Islands, 
Singapore and Dubai where secrecy is considered absolutely paramount and 
is heavily protected. 
 
3. Specific geographic market suppliers. An example being the British Virgin 
Islands, which creates large numbers of corporate entities to service the 
Chinese demand for offshore entities, many of which are associated with 
what is known as „round tripping‟. Other examples include Panama, which 
serves the US market, and Jersey that specifically targets the London market 
whilst Vanuatu has served Australia. 
 
4. Specialist service providers. These are tax havens that secure a specific type 
of business activity. For example, Bermuda and Guernsey target the 
reinsurance market whilst the Isle of Man has specifically set out to secure a 
market in companies floating on the UK‟s AIM (Alternative Investment 
Market, a sub-market of the London Stock Exchange) and Cayman has 
attracted hedge funds. 
 
5. Market entry conduits. These tax havens seek to earn a margin from the 
routing of transactions through their domain because little tax is charged 
when this is done. Most seek to exploit their network of double tax treaties in 
the process and tend to be those that many would not consider tax havens. 
They include Malta and Cyprus who compete for funds being routed from the 
developing world into the EU; Mauritius which is a conduit for investment in 
India; the Netherlands, which acts as a location for holding companies for 
investment throughout Europe; and Belgium and Luxembourg which have at 
various times sought similar roles for themselves. 
 
6. High net worth providers. These have the resources to actually manage the 
funds deposited within their domain by the world‟s wealthiest people and 
have the means of access to ensure that those people can get to see their fund 
manager with relative ease. They include Switzerland, New York and London. 
 
7. The tax raider. This is a country that sets out to attract the relocation of profits 
to its domain where they are taxed at a lower rate than they might be 
elsewhere, but where there is a high degree of financial security and limited 
risk of the transactions being identified as taking place in a tax haven. 
Foremost amongst these locations is Ireland. 
 
There is no absolutely agreed list of tax havens. Various persons or groups 
suggest different lists according to their own politico-economical backgrounds. 
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For example, the list of the OECD in 2000
220
 includes only smaller countries, 
but misses all the major countries of their own membership. The list of the IMF 
in 2000
221
 excludes the United Kingdom and the United States
222
, even though 
it contains some other OECD member countries. Tax Justice Network UK 
suggests 56 countries worthy of serious consideration as tax havens, including 
not only small island countries but also major power countries
223
:  
 
Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Aruba, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, 
Belgium, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Costa 
Rica, Cyprus, Dominica, Dubai, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Ireland, Isle 
of Man, Jersey, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Macau, Malaysia 
(Labuan), Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, 
Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, Samoa, Seychelles, Singapore, St 
Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent & Grenadines, Switzerland, Turks & Caicos Islands, 
United Kingdom, Uruguay, USA, US Virgin Islands, Vanuatu. 
 
3.1.2. Tax Havens and the Korean Financial Crisis 
  
However bad it is for richer countries, it is the poor and vulnerable in 
developing countries who will suffer most from the financial crisis, which is not 
of their making. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon warns that the 
world financial crisis „could be the final blow that many of the poorest of the 
world‟s poor simply cannot survive‟. The bitter irony is that the turmoil now 
engulfing the world‟s wealthier economies, triggered by the U.S. sub-prime 
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mortgage market crisis, has the same factor – that is, tax haven - that has 
undermined the developing world for years, condemning poor countries to a 
cycle of poverty.
224
  
With that zeal for emerging markets to exploit in their hedge funds, 
investment portfolios, and loan schemes, it was the offshore funds and banks 
that „pump primed‟ countries in Asia and Latin America with plentiful supplies 
of capital to get their economies hooked on market capitalism. Western - mostly 
U.S. - banks acted as super-conduits for the flow of foreign investment into Asia 
and Latin American economies, bringing about the growth of a domestic 
banking infrastructure that enabled local companies and investors to borrow 
money and take their own financial risks in the market. But the supply of 
offshore capital could be withdrawn just as easily when a downturn in any given 
emerging market made it a less promising investment for Western banks. And 
when that happened, the loans and investment that had fueled the economy 
dried up. For local banks that had lent well beyond their means, often in 
ventures that incurred huge losses that were hidden offshore (sometimes in the 
same offshore banks that channeled capital into the economy), the withdrawal of 
ready capital to the local market was a disaster.
225
  
Once the market dried up and there was no more capital to borrow, the 
only thing left was the hidden losses. And when the magnitude of these losses 
came to light, Asian and Latin American economies collapsed. The IMF noted 
the same pattern of offshore banks triggering economic meltdowns in Venezuela 
(1994), where billions in problem loans were hidden offshore; Argentina (1995), 
where some $3 billion to $4 billion in losses were held offshore; and in Korea, 
Thailand, and Malaysia (1997), where, respectively, insider dealing offshore 
bypassed regulatory limits on bank lending, poor lending decisions were „rolled 
over‟ offshore, and $10 billion in losses were hidden offshore.226  
Now let‟s focus on the Korean case with regard to the financial 
liberalization. In the 1990s Korea faced both rising external pressures in support 
of liberalization from international organizations such as IMF or G7 and 
transnational firms and banks, who wanted their piece of Korea‟s miraculous 
economic growth, and  internal pressures from the big enterprise groups 
known as chaebols and wealthy people, who wanted to pursue their own 
interests without government restraints.
227
 At last Korea introduced financial 
liberalization in order to acquire an OECD membership in 1996 without enough 
preparation.  
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Taking advantage of the new opportunity, Korean financial institutions 
competitively have invited short-term loans from international institutions.
228
 
As a result, short-term external debt rose from $40 billion in 1993 to $98 billion 
at end-September 1997, representing 54 percent of total external liabilities. 
Short-term external debt also quickly outpaced growth in usable reserves, 
creating the potential for liquidity problems and raising doubts about Korea‟s 
external position. The ratio of usable international reserves to short-term debt 
fell from 42 percent in 1993 to 29 percent at end-1996.
229
  
    The lack of transparency in key financial data contributed to the 
uncertainty in the markets and inflated the fears of international lenders. For 
example, official data on external debt omitted debt contracted by offshore 
entities, which was estimated to have understated the true level of external 
indebtedness by a half.
230
 
    The collapse of several large chaebols like Hanbo, Sammi, and Kia quickly 
spilled over to the banks, eroding their capital positions and raising doubt about 
the soundness of the entire financial system.
231
 It is true that chaebols, the long-
served engines of Korean economic development, have turned into severe moral 
hazards; they have neglected to care for their resources for research and 
development when their businesses were in good shapes. Many of them, instead, 
sought to make profits in real estate and portfolio investments.
232
  
    The wave of corporate bankruptcies and rising nonperforming loans 
created doubts about the overall health of the financial system and drove foreign 
banks to withdraw their credit lines to Korea. The drying up of foreign credit 
lines in turn made it more difficult for Korean banks to roll over their large 
stock of short-term external debt, creating the potential for a currency crisis and 
contributing to capital flight and further falls in the value of the won.
233
 The 
Korean government, being afraid of the moratorium, asked for relief loans from 
the IMF, and a total loan of 55 billion US$ was agreed upon between the IMF 
and Korea on 3 December in 1997.
234
  
After the IMF agreement the cross-border capital inflows accelerated 
dramatically because the remaining restrictions were largely removed. Foreign 
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ownership in the Korean companies increased rapidly. Foreign control of the 
financial institutions also enlarged enormously.
235
 
    We can confirm the relations between the progress of financial 
liberalization around 1997 crisis and the increase of tax haven money through 
several statistics. 
 
Table 1: Foreign Direct Investment 
                                                   ($ thousand) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total 894,505 1,044,274 1,316,505 1,970,429 3,205,479 6,971,138 8,857,995 15,544,618 15,264,880 
KMKE 
10236 
10,269 
(1.15%) 
     936 
(0.09%) 
    9,612 
 (0.73%) 
14,821 
(0.75%) 
28,961 
(0.90%) 
38,234 
(0.55%) 
73,754 
(0.83%) 
    58,923 
   (0.38%) 
315,445 
(2.07%) 
OECD 
41237 
54,636 
(6.11%) 
    3,104 
(0.30%) 
11,263 
(0.86%) 
   16,992 
  (0.86%) 
49,146 
(1.53%) 
  225,698 
  (3.24%) 
  170,963 
  (1.93%) 
424,274 
(2.73%) 
 2,220,305 
  (14.55%) 
IMF 
46238 
98,414 
(11.00%) 
94,951 
(9.09%) 
  255,144 
(19.38%) 
  442,632 
(22.46%) 
1,569,319 
(48.96%) 
1,539,292 
(22.08%) 
1,763,748 
(19.91%) 
 3,295,925 
  (21.20%) 
 4,156,629 
  (27.23%) 
TJN 
56239 
556,147 
(62.17%) 
  637,908 
(61.09%) 
670,606 
(50.94%) 
1,389,599 
(70.52%) 
2,728,846 
(85.13%) 
5,829,038 
(83.61%) 
6,197,369 
(69.96%) 
11,339,326 
  (72.95%) 
 9,115,252 
  (59.71%) 
 
(Note) calculated on a notification basis 
Source: Korean Ministry of Knowledge Economy (www.mke.go.kr)
240
 
 
As the financial liberalization developed, the total amount soared about 17 times 
from 1992 to 2000. According to KMKE and OECD lists
241
, the percentage of 
foreign direct investment via tax havens is insignificant except for 2000. For 
KMKE has a very short list of tax havens and the OECD list doesn‟t include 
Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore that are Korea‟s important partners. 
According to IMF, the percentage more than doubled from 1992 to 2000. TJN 
data shows that the major percentage of foreign direct investment enters through 
tax havens – including the USA and the UK. It peaks especially to above 80% 
in 1996 and 1997.
242
      
                                                          
235
 See 1.3. „South Korean Economy under Neo-liberalism‟ in this thesis for the 
elaboration on the accelerated financial liberalization since the IMF agreement. 
236
 Bahamas, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Panama, 
Samoa, Nevis and Tonga as of 2000. 
237
 See 3.1.1. „What is a tax haven?‟ 
238
 See 3.1.1. „What is a tax haven?‟ 
239
 See 3.1.1. „What is a tax haven?‟ 
240
 Accessed Nov. 1, 2009. 
241
 Cf. Korean National Tax Service designated only five countries (Andorra, Liberia, 
Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Monaco) as tax haven in 2006 and three countries 
(Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco) in 2009, www.nts.go.kr (accessed Nov. 1, 2009). 
242
 In the same trend, the percentage of foreign stock investment via tax havens, which 
is the major part of foreign indirect investment, is also very high: 74.17% in 2001; 
89.50% in 2003; 77.23% in 2004 (calculated on just 7 countries- USA, UK, 
Luxemburg, Ireland, Singapore, Netherlands, Cayman Islands), Tae Yun Lee, “The 
present situation of overseas investment and foreign investment and its 
implications,” Foreign Exchange and International Finance Review 7 (June 30, 
70 
 
Table 2: Overseas Direct Investment  
                                                   ($ thousand) 
         1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total 2,150,900 2,205,938 3,685,880 5,303,295 7,112,582 6,067,534 5,844,098 4,652,430 6,199,196 
KMKE 
10 
   9,400 
  (0.44%) 
12,757 
(0.58%) 
20,191 
(0.55%) 
24,503 
(0.46%) 
66,837 
(0.94%) 
 112,968 
 (1.86%) 
66,245 
(1.34%) 
42,510 
(0.91%) 
21,237 
(0.34%) 
OECD 
41 
10,900 
(0.51%) 
14,091 
(0.64%) 
30,395 
(0.82%) 
 171,021 
 (3.22%) 
84,543 
(1.19%) 
 147,892 
 (2.44%) 
 150,611 
 (2.58%)  
 140,014 
 (3.01%) 
1,447,553 
(23.35%) 
IMF 
46 
 118,097 
  (5.49%) 
 208,124 
 (9.43%) 
 369,875 
(10.03%) 
 419,748 
 (7.91%) 
 426,009 
 (5.99%) 
 595,794 
 (9.82%) 
 966,733 
(16.54%) 
 656,136 
(14.10%) 
2,012,762 
(32.47%) 
TJN 
56 
 482,899 
 (22.45%) 
 679,476 
(30.80%) 
1,178,933 
(31.99%) 
2,146,874 
(40.48%) 
2,760,352 
(38.81%) 
1,965,275 
(32.39%) 
2,509,284 
(42.94%) 
2,673,859 
(57.47%) 
3,473,017 
(56.02%) 
          
(Note) calculated on an acceptance basis  
Source: Export-Import Bank of Korea (www.koreaexim.go.kr)
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On the contrary, Table 2 summarizes Korea‟s overseas direct investment 
via tax havens. The total amount tripled from 1992 to 2000. The other three lists, 
except for one from KMKE, indicate clearly the trend that the percentage 
passing through tax havens has increased. According to the IMF list the 
percentage increased about 6 times, and according to the TJN one about 2.5 
times.    
 
Table 3: Trade (Import/ Export)  
                                                ($ thousand) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total 220,916,171 262,440,442 333,913,495 292,496,330 
KMKE10   3,072,674 (1.39%) 3,167,284 (1.21%) 3,191,028 (0.96%) 3,258,725 (1.11%) 
OECD 41   4,123,670 (1.87%) 4,108,733 (1.57%) 4,452,176 (1.33%) 4,911,949 (1.68%) 
IMF 46 31,644,493 (14.32%) 30,911,144(11.78%) 35,484,038 (10.63%) 31,421,468 (10.74%) 
TJN 56 89,593,988(40.56%) 101,808,104 (38.79%) 124,261,649(37.21%) 104,827,062(35.84%) 
          
Source: Korea Customs Service (www.customs.go.kr)
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Table 3 shows the amount of trade (import + export) and its percentage 
passing through tax havens after 1997. Even according to KMKE and OECD, 
the absolute amount of trade via tax havens is 3-5 billion dollars. According to 
IMF and TJN, it is 30-120 billion dollars, and the percentage is 10-40%.   
Let us look at some examples which illustrate how dirty money crosses the 
Korean border through tax havens. US-based Newbridge Capital is said to have 
reaped a massive profit of 1.16 billion US$ via investments in Korea First Bank, 
but did not pay a penny of tax to South Korea. Newbridge could avoid paying 
taxes by making investments through a paper company in Labuan, a tax haven 
in Malaysia. Malaysia has a treaty on preventing double taxation with South 
Korea.
245
  
                                                                                                                                              
2006): 111, www.bok.or.kr (accessed July 30, 2012). 
243
 Accessed Nov. 1, 2009. 
244
 Accessed Nov. 1, 2009. 
245
 Taipei Times, “S Korea vows to revise tax treaties to thwart abuses” (Jun. 7, 2005), 
71 
 
Two other US-based investment funds, Lone Star and Carlyle Group, also 
used a similar method. Lone Star is reported to have earned hundreds of 
millions of dollars in real estate investments and had a huge unrealized profit 
through acquiring Korea Exchange Bank for 1.2 billion US$ in 2003. The fund 
avoided taxation by registering its unit in Belgium, which has a treaty with 
South Korea not to impose taxes on profits from share sales. Carlyle Group sold 
a 36 percent stake in South Korea's KorAm Bank to Citigroup for 2.6 billion 
US$ in 2004 but did not pay taxes by registering its affiliate in the Cayman 
Islands, a tax haven in the Caribbean.
246
  
According to a Korean weekly magazine‟s article in 2001, “Tax havens 
becoming the shelters of big enterprises,”247 four subsidiaries of 30 chaebols 
were disclosed as doing illegal foreign exchange transactions of around 200 
million dollars via tax havens by the Korea Customs Service. It turned out that 
most often they pretended to trade. For example, a local subsidiary brought to 
Korea a loan from a foreign financial institution by pretending to do an export 
payment, and then stashed it overseas by pretending to do an import payment 
for paying back the loan and interest. In addition, they created a number of false 
shipping documents and leaked foreign currency by pretending to do an import 
payment, or traded with a „paper company‟ and leaked foreign currency by 
intentionally not collecting an export payment. The Korea Customs Service is 
also suspecting and investigating the other seven subsidiaries of illegal foreign 
exchange transactions. Twenty-three among thirty chaebols invested 2.3 billion 
dollars in 14 tax havens
248
, and Samsung is the biggest investor, followed by 
Hyundai, Dongyang, and Hansol. For the number of subsidiaries, Samsung has 
12 and Hyundai, SK, LG have 8 respectively.  
    Korean chaebols establish paper companies in tax havens for „tax 
avoidance or reduction.‟ SK Energy has SK Energy Road Investment in the 
Cayman Islands and SK Insurance Ltd. in Bermuda. In 2008 the former received 
a net profit of 5.7 million dollars and the latter that of 1.5 million dollars with 
neither paying a penny to Korea. For the same reason, Hyosung has Hyosung 
Power Holdings Co. in the Cayman Islands, and Kumho Asiana has Water 
Pipeline Works Ltd. in the British Virgin Islands.
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In the January 2009, Marshall Islands was calculated to be Korea‟s 6th 
largest export partner. The amount recorded was 752.8 million U.S. dollars. The 
small country occupied a large proportion because of the booming shipbuilding 
export. Many ship owners establish special purpose companies (types of paper 
companies) in tax havens and through them purchase and register their ships to 
avoid taxes. But, unlike statistics, a large number of ships don‟t actually go 
there. Marshall Islands is one of the major „flag states.‟ She has recently bid 
aggressively for inviting such special purpose companies, and so Korea‟s export 
to Marshall Islands has rapidly risen.
250
 
 
3.1.3. The Fictitious Traits of Tax Havens 
 
As we have mentioned in the part of „the fictitious economy‟ of Chapter 2, 
global capitalism has the fictitious traits of the extreme separation between 
finance and production, or between „formal‟ and „substantial‟ economy, owing 
to the rapid expansion of commodifying money. We may obviously find these 
fictitious traits in the subject of „tax havens‟.   
Richard Murphy explains that the United Kingdom played a key role in the 
development of tax havens, and points out that its core idea is “the separation 
between real and nominal location of economic activity.” The separation forms 
the fiction of the „secrecy space‟ that is essential to offshore economy251: 
     
Then in October 1957 the Bank of England created the regulatory concept of offshore 
when it declared that transactions that took place in London but which were undertaken 
between two parties resident outside the UK were not subject to UK financial regulation 
as they were deemed to take place somewhere „elsewhere‟ to London, even though it 
was obvious to all involved that this was a fiction. As such the UK created all the key 
components that underpin the fiction of the „secrecy space‟ that is critical to offshore 
activity. Only banking secrecy was created elsewhere, but since, as the Swiss like to 
point out, the same result can be achieved by the use of UK trusts owning UK 
companies registered in the names of nominees; even this distinction is somewhat 
arbitrary. 
 
The fiction of „secrecy space‟ of the tax havens finally produces the most 
serious separation between economy and society. In his book Offshore: the Dark 
Side of the Global Economy William Brittain-Catlin criticizes very sharply this 
anti-social aspect of tax havens: 
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Offshore entities that had aspired to a kind of moral purity for the preservation of 
individual freedom - a release from control - were reduced in practice to the naïve 
transport of crime and ruin, not merely because the criminal had abused them or had 
found a home away from home, but because the moral psychology from which these 
entities originated had necessarily defined freedom as a secret detachment from the 
world. In return, with the loss of connection to that world, and with the envelope of 
isolation drawn around it, freedom would descend into a horrific realm of crime and 
revenge. And in the midst of destruction, offshore entities would offer themselves up as 
allegories of a ruined, fallen freedom, their secret, terrible meaning finally revealed.
252
 
 
3.1.4. Tax Havens and the Global Cross-border Dirty Money  
 
Now we will discuss how tax havens promote dirty money that has harmful 
effects upon the social world. Following Raymond Baker, we divide the dirty 
money into three components: corrupt, criminal, and commercial.
253
 
First, they hide corrupt practices.
254
 This usually involves bribery or the 
corruption of public officials. This issue is of great significance, but its role 
should not be overstated. When estimating the relative importance of different 
forms of capital flight, almost all of which go through tax havens, Raymond 
Baker has estimated that just 3% relate to corruption. Baker‟s figures are 
accepted by the World Bank as the best currently available. 
There is no doubt though that this corruption, which would be hard to 
undertake without the existence of offshore, is immensely harmful. It 
undermines confidence in aid, which reduces aid budgets. The process of 
government in many countries in the world is also fundamentally harmed by 
widespread corruption, which because it permeates from the heart of 
government down to all layers of the administration, erodes the relationships of 
trust between people and government, causing incalculable harm to the 
economies of the countries in question, failure of the rule of law, difficulty in 
promoting local enterprise because of the increased cost of capital that results 
and the misallocation of resources in these places. The arising cost, whilst 
impossible to estimate, is largely attributable to tax havens. 
Second, tax havens facilitate crime, whether it be money laundering, drug 
trafficking, human trafficking, racketeering, fraud, insider dealing, piracy, and 
the purchasing of favor.
255
 Baker estimates that this represents 30% to 35% of 
illicit financial flows. Terrorism financing makes up a tiny part of this. It is 
apparent that these activities, all of which also lead to tax evasion, are the cause 
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of considerable harm to society. The closure of tax havens would not eliminate 
these activities, but it would make them harder. 
Third, tax havens promote tax evasion and aggressive forms of tax 
avoidance.
256
 Baker estimates that tax driven illicit cash flows amount to 60-65% 
of all illicit flows. This suggests that flows motivated for this purpose have a 
value of between 600 billion US$ and 1 trillion US$ a year. Half of this might 
come from developing countries. What is striking is that the commercial aspect 
occupies a central position in cross-border illicit flow. It shows how seriously 
our commercial world is perverted. To illustrate how tax havens are used for the 
ordinary white-color crimes, let‟s take two major examples: mispricing and 
transfer pricing.
257
  
About 65,000 multinational companies operate across borders. Trade 
within corporations comprises some 50 to 60 percent of global commerce. The 
remaining 40 to 50 percent is traded between unaffiliated parties. And an 
estimated 50 percent of all global commerce passes through tax havens and 
secrecy jurisdictions at some point between seller and buyer. Much of this 
global trade is falsely priced. This serves to eliminate taxes, avoid regulations, 
and accumulate wealth secretly.
258
  
    First, mispricing refers to false pricing in unrelated party transactions. A 
Venezuelan businessman calls on a U.S. machinery manufacturer to negotiate 
purchase of up-to-date equipment for his factory in Caracas. After hard 
bargaining, they settle on a price of $1 million. Then the buyer asks that the 
commercial invoice be drawn to read $1,200,000. Why would he want that? 
Because when he pays the $1,200,000, he wants the extra $200,000 sent for 
deposit into his New York bank account. The machinery manufacturer, anxious 
to conclude the transaction, agrees; the sale is made.
259
  
    Second, transfer pricing refers to false pricing in related-party transactions. 
Apple does manufacture computers in Singapore. However, the purpose of the 
Cayman subsidiary paper company is to pay the Singapore subsidiary, on paper, 
bottom dollar - say, $200 - for a Singapore-produced Macintosh. The Cayman 
company then sells its Singapore product to Apple in America for $900. 
American Apple sells the computers to its dealers for $1,000, and the dealers 
take receipt of the brand-new computers directly from the Singapore factory. 
The offshore advantage is clear. Apple sells its computers in the United States, 
but taxes on only $100 profit, while $700 profit is preserved tax-free in 
Cayman.
260
 
The Tax Justice Network has estimated that 11.5 trillion US$ of funds are 
held offshore by individuals, based on data published by major banks and 
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financial service institutions in 2004. They estimate that 255 billion US$ of 
taxes is lost to the countries of the world as a result. Christian Aid has estimated 
that the cost of lost corporate taxes to the developing world is currently running 
at 160 billion US$ a year. That is more than one-and-a-half times the combined 
aid budgets of the whole rich world –103.7 billion US$ in 2007. They estimate 
that the lost revenue alone contributes to the death of 350,000 children a year.
261
 
    These, though, are the more obvious impacts of tax havens. Their indirect 
consequences are at least as harmful, and yet have been almost entirely ignored 
by economists although the reality is that economic theory provides the clearest 
evidence that tax havens must harm the health of the global economy.
262
 This is 
because neo-classical market economics says that three things are needed to 
ensure optimal outcome results from the operation of a market. Those things are: 
equal access to capital, equal access to markets and the availability of perfect 
information to ensure the optimal allocation of economic resources to efficient 
activity. 
Tax havens deliberately set out to subvert all three of these requirements. 
They do this by exploiting the one, so-called, competitive advantage they have. 
That advantage is the very „secrecy‟. First, that secrecy is used to ensure that 
those who can use these places, legally or illegally, have access to capital at 
lower rates than those who do not have that access. This lower cost of capital 
results from the fact that those who can hide behind the veil of tax haven 
secrecy accumulate their capital faster because it is in a tax-free environment. 
Second, this limited access to tax haven secrecy is used to deny access to 
markets on an equal footing. Most ordinary people and almost all small and 
medium-sized businesses in the world cannot use offshore structures to access 
the markets that the wealthy, lawbreakers and multinational businesses can 
access at lower cost using tax haven facilities. This puts the ordinary person, the 
law-abiding person and small business at a deliberately constructed competitive 
disadvantage. 
Third, the secrecy also undermines all the principles of open access to 
information that are essential to ensure that the effective decision-making 
resulting in optimal allocation of resources in market economies takes place. 
The result is obvious. Tax havens set out to undermine effective markets. As a 
result, tax havens do not extend liberty, as some would claim, they are actually 
designed to grant monopoly rights to a privileged few, and that is exactly what 
they do. 
Those few are the wealthiest of the world, the largest businesses of the 
world and the lawbreakers of the world. Those groups exploit that monopoly 
advantage as all monopolists do, to close down effective competition. The result 
is simple. The richest have gotten wealthier at the expense of the middle class 
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and the poor who have to pay the taxes to provide the services multinational 
business demands. Multinational businesses meanwhile squeeze out medium 
and small nationally-based businesses that have an unfair higher cost structure 
than their larger rivals and the poorest nations of the world that do not have the 
resources to challenge the hemorrhage of illegal and mispriced money from 
their shores subsidize the tax take of the richest nations of the world. 
 
3.1.5. Tax Havens and Financial Instability 
 
Many of the roots of the current global financial instability also trace back to tax 
havens. George Soros describes well „the inherent instability of the current 
financial markets‟: “Financial markets are supposed to swing like a pendulum: 
They may fluctuate wildly in response to exogenous shocks, but eventually they 
are supposed to come to rest at an equilibrium point…… Instead… financial 
markets behaved more like a wrecking ball, swing from country to country and 
knocking over the weaker ones.”263 We could find the essence of the problem in 
tax havens, which are almost entirely off the global radar screen of regulation 
and supervision. The offshore world creates the conditions that led to the 
financial instability. Although it has not all been induced by tax havens, it could 
not have happened without tax havens. Fundamentally they bring about the 
financial instability by ensuring that information is not available.
264
 Tax havens 
set out to create asymmetric access to information. As a result risk is increased 
because: 
 
1. In many cases a person will have no way of knowing the true identity of who 
is being dealt with. 
 
2. Counterparty risk in many financial transactions will increase as a result. 
 
3. Default risk increases as a result, whatever the trade. 
 
4. There is increased risk of moral hazard as it is easier to allow a company to 
fail in a tax haven where there is little or no chance of the true nature of its 
ownership being established than there is in a mainstream economy where such 
information is more likely to be disclosed for public record.  
 
5. The offshore economy exacerbates risk with the structures it creates. For 
example protected cell companies create what are, in effect, ring fenced limited 
liability companies with what are already almost opaque offshore entities. These 
are used within the insurance sector; in particular, when party to legitimate 
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activity but will, inevitably, make it difficult to determine what, if any, assets 
are available to creditors. This is particularly disturbing in a sector where the 
insurer is meant to act as payer of last resort. 
 
6. Offshore is prone to the creation of what might best be called Ponzi-style risk. 
According to Anastasia Nesvetailova, an advanced financial system goes 
through three stages:  
 
It begins with hedged finance, whereby borrowers raise money against collateralized 
assets. But as the period of growth continues, borrowers over-estimate the potential for 
growth, and borrow against future asset growth: in short, they speculate. Eventually, the 
bubble of speculative finance develops into what Minsky called Ponzi finance. The term 
comes from Carlo Ponzi, the most famous, though clearly not the only one, architect of 
a pyramid scheme. Ponzi‟s pyramids, involving „investment‟ in real estate and land, 
ripped off more than forty million Americans during the US property boom of the 
1920s.
265
  
 
By the time the model has reached the Ponzi stage the only way it works is 
for more and more people to join the scheme. When, for any reason that stops, 
the scheme collapses.  
 
7. In this situation accounting becomes unstable. Under both US and 
international accounting rules assets of major corporations have to be stated at 
their market worth on the balance sheets of major corporations. This is called 
„mark to market‟ accounting and is part of the model of accounting adopted 
since the 1990s called „fair value accounting‟ which replaced the previously 
accepted „historical cost accounting‟. The impact in the credit crunch has been 
enormous. Historical cost accounting leaves assets stated as having a value 
equivalent to the price paid for them unless that value materially declines. This 
creates stable balance sheet accounting. Fair value accounting replaces historical 
cost with current value, thus creating volatile balance sheet values. This suits 
companies, and especially financial corporations very well if asset values are 
rising: they can book that increase in value as profit even if they have not sold 
the assets in question. There can be no doubt that this simple fact motivated 
enthusiasm for this form of accounting. 
In a downturn the reverse happens. Losses have to be booked. But the 
situation in a credit crisis has the capacity to deteriorate fast: if the market for an 
asset fails then balance sheet values collapse in an inverse Ponzi- related 
accounting crisis that can spiral out of control with insolvency resulting. 
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3.2. The Labor-Management Relations in South Korea 
 
First, we undertake a general survey of the Korean labor-management 
relations over three periods: before the 1987 Great Workers‟ Struggle, from the 
1987 Great Workers‟ Struggle to the 1997 Financial Crisis, and since the 1997 
Financial Crisis. Second, we deal with its chronically antagonistic character. We 
will emphasize that the neo-liberal industrial relations since the 1997 financial 
crisis is characterized by „labor market flexibility‟ and re-strengthened its 
chronic antagonistic character. Their evaluations based on the concept of 
„commodification or instumentalization of labor‟ and on an alternative view of 
the Dutch Protestant Church will be carried out in Chapter 5. 
 
3.2.1. A General Survey of the Korean Labor-Management Relations 
 
3.2.1.1. Before the 1987 Great Workers’ Struggle  
 
Although the history of Korean industrial relations may be traced to as far back 
as the Japanese occupation (1905-45), modern industrial relations began to 
emerge with modern industrialization in the 1960s. Before the Great Struggle 
(1961-87), Korean industrial relations were dominated by authoritarian military 
government and governmental interventionism was embedded throughout the 
industrial relations system, playing a dominant role in production and 
distribution. The government supported competitive chaebol, which led to 
successful economic growth under the financial and political patronage of the 
government, while suppressing Korean unionism.
266
 So it seemed that there was 
only State-labor relations, with autonomous labor-capital relations being 
virtually absent.
267
 There had been a tendency for top policy makers to treat 
labor disputes as social evil.
268
 
The authoritarian industrial relations regime was shaped in the initial stage 
of industrialization initiated by Chung-Hee Park‟s developmentalist government, 
which came to power through the military coup in 1961. With its first priority 
on economic growth, Park‟s government (1961-79) promoted an export-oriented 
industrialization strategy both by supporting competitive chaebol and by 
repressing Korean unionism. Deep intervention of the government and the 
positive roles of chaebol in combination with governmental patronage were key 
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aspects of the Korean economy in the initial stages of industrialization. For 
example, the government played the roles of entrepreneur in economic 
development by planning development, investing in the public sector, and 
providing the private sector with massive financial support. In particular, the 
government provided multiple forms of support such as subsidies, privileged 
policy loans, and the maintenance of an undervalued currency for the chaebol. 
In the 1970s, the government facilitated a heavy-chemical industry drive in 
which large government investments were made in steel, motor vehicles, 
shipbuilding, petrochemicals and machinery. Through such economic policy, 
Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, and other notable chaebol grew to become big 
competitive businesses in the international market.
269
 
On the other hand, the government took an authoritarian approach to 
organized labor in order to maintain a low wage policy and preempt political 
challenges in the course of industrialization. Export-oriented industrialization 
was sustained by low labor costs. In order to maintain price competitiveness in 
the international market, the government depressed wages through direct wage-
controls such as wage guidelines. In addition, Korean unionism was politically 
suppressed and it was even dealt with as part of national security. The Korean 
CIA (Central Information Agency) always intervened in labor matters as the 
labor movement was led by socialist leaders. The freedom of association and the 
right to bargain were institutionally restrained. For example, unions were 
required to file with the administration for their establishment, and had to be 
financially audited by the government. They were obliged to affiliate with the 
industrial federation of the FKTU (the Federation of Korean Trade Unions), 
which was a government-sponsored national organization under the rule of 
Park‟s regime. Rival organizations were outlawed and oppressed. The Trade 
Union Act prohibited unions‟ political activities, blocking political connections 
between labor and political parties. Labor disputes were restricted at the 
establishments with direct investments by foreigners.
270
  
The self-burning of a worker named „Tae Il Jon‟ in 1970 gave birth to a 
new militant trade union movement, called the „Democratic Trade Union 
Movement.‟271 However, the government oppressed the workers in a harsher 
way throughout 1970s, suppressing the struggles of Dongil Textile unions, 
Chunge Garment Workers‟ union and others through surveillance, assault, 
torture, confinement and arrest, while the FKTU hampered the struggle for a 
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democratic union through bureaucratic authority as well as sheer force. This 
inspired nationwide anti-government demonstrations organized by intellectuals, 
students, church organizations and opposition political leaders. The nationwide 
movement against the government culminated in the YH workers‟ struggle in 
1979, when thousands of riot policemen invaded the headquarters of the first 
opposition party, the New Korean Democratic Party, where YH workers were 
holding a demonstration, beating workers and congressmen of the opposition 
party and eventually killing a 21 year-old woman worker. The violence against 
the YH workers in Seoul incited riots as far away as Masan and Pusan. 
President Park was killed by his closest and most loyal colleague, Jae Kyu Kim, 
who later claimed that „he did it to save the nation from a blood bath that Park 
intended to rain down upon Masan and Pusan.‟272 
Massive nationwide demonstrations demanding political democratization 
were held, while over 700 strikes against the repressive control of labor were 
dramatically organized in a few months, providing the expectation for 
democratic government. Sadly, however, the crisis was dealt with through a 
disastrous collision between the military and citizens in Kwangju, a southern 
city of Chola province, after another military coup by Doo-Whan Chun in the 
form of an armed struggle organized by workers, students, housewives and 
others. This struggle ended with the massacre of thousands of people in May 
1980.
273
 
Chun‟s regime followed Park‟s repressive authoritarian rule. His 
government sent the leaders of the democratic trade union movement to 
concentration camps (Samchonggyoyukde). It dissolved industrial unionist 
structures and established a system of enterprise unionism under the Trade 
Union Act. It continued to prohibit political activity by unions and locked out 
„third-parties‟ to prevent further involvement of religious groups and students. 
In addition, industrial strikes were prohibited in the public and defense 
sectors.
274
 
The incredible economic growth since 1960s, the so-called „Miracle of Han 
River,‟ was made possible at the cost of the oppressive control over workers. As 
late as 1987, Korean working conditions included a 58-hour work week, the 
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longest of any country surveyed by the International Labor Organization; an 
industrial accident rate which tripled from 1960 to 1988 and was the highest of 
any country in the world; and wages in manufacturing that were 11% of U.S. 
wages and 14% of Japanese wages.
275
 
However, under the military regimes, Korean workers partially benefited 
from stable employment. Sustained economic growth maintained job security in 
Korea. Unemployment in Korea dropped from 16.4% in 1963 to 3.8% in 1986 
and remained below 5% through the 1970s and 1980s. The chaebol absorbed a 
large share of the employment. Employment more than doubled from 1963 to 
1986, increasing from 8 million to 16.8 million. The percentage employed in 
agriculture declined from 58.5% in 1965 to only 16.7% in 1991, while during 
the same period, the percentage employed in manufacturing rose from 9.4% to 
26.3%.
276
 
In addition, institutional protection contributed to sustained job security. 
For example, employees in firms with five or more workers were covered by the 
Labor Standards Act (LSA) and were protected from dismissal. Under the vast 
majority of collective agreements, unless a worker was unable to work for 
mental and/or physical reasons, or committed a criminal offense, or was given a 
penalty according to the company‟s regulations, s/he could not be dismissed. 
Courts also strictly limited layoffs for managerial reasons unless there was no 
other way of solving the business‟ problems. The LSA also regulated severance 
pay schemes, which required employers to pay one month of salary per service 
year to fired workers. This system imposed a high cost of dismissal on 
employers, thereby preventing them from firing workers unnecessarily.
277
 
In sum, the Korean industrial relations system before the 1987 Great 
Workers‟ Struggle was an authoritarian regime in which the government 
economically and politically repressed the Korean working class, while chaebol 
were supported to lead economic development. But the fruits of economic 
growth were partially redistributed to the working class in the form of job 
security and other benefits through protectionist institutions. In a sense, the 
authoritarian regime was paternalistic as well as repressive.
278
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3.2.1.2. From the 1987 Struggle to the 1997 Financial Crisis 
 
The struggle for democracy in June 1987 weakened the military dictatorship and 
led Tae-Woo Roh, Chun‟s collaborator during the 1980 military coup and his 
nominated successor, to proclaim the June 29
th
 decree. The decree included the 
principle of autonomous industrial relations, securing the right to unionize and 
bargain collectively.
279
 During the following three months (July-September), 
Korean workers embarked upon strikes throughout the nation, under the banner 
of “We want to live in the way of human-beings, not machines!” 
The Great Workers‟ Struggle was a historical event in Korean industrial 
relations, which brought about an explosive expansion and growth of the 
Korean labor movement. The number of labor disputes was 3,749, 1,873, and 
1,616 in 1987, 1988, and 1989 respectively, but only 265 and 276 respectively 
in 1985 and 1986. Between 1986 and 1989, trade unions almost tripled from 
2,675 to 7,883, union membership almost doubled from 1,036,000 to 1,932,000, 
and union density increased from 12.3% to 18.6%.
280
 
These developments fundamentally changed Korean industrial relations 
from the unilateralism of the past to the politics of industrial relations. 
Collective bargaining became a primary vehicle in determining wage and 
employment terms, and the daily activities of unions in addressing grievances 
expanded at the workplace.
281
 
Nonetheless, industrial relations remained authoritarian. Restrictive devices, 
so-called „three prohibition‟ on plural unions, third party intervention and 
political activity constrained democratic, independent unionism. In addition, 
large-scale labor disputes led by independent unions were often suppressed by 
governmental discretionary intervention.
282
 As economic repression and the 
collapse of socialist countries occurred at the end of 1989, the government 
resorted to the old traditional repressive strategies. Roh‟s government restricted 
wage increase through wage guidelines, while physically and legally oppressing 
militant independent unions.
283
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Under Young-Sam Kim‟s government, which was the first civilian 
government after 32 years of military rule, there was a shift from authoritarian 
control to an increasingly neo-liberal policy stance.
284
 Partly driven by its 
perceived need to be seen as a good global economic citizen, being a prelude to 
membership of the OECD (achieved in 1996), the administration instituted 
policies that were designed to change South Korea‟s image from that of a 
developing economy, „piloted‟ by an interventionist state, to one of a mature 
and developed economy, governed by market forces and a relatively disengaged, 
economically liberal government.
285
 The government significantly relaxed the 
control on foreign borrowing, mainly through allowing the establishment of 
fledging merchant banks and finance companies, and practically abandoned 
control over the exchange rate and investment coordination that was an apparent 
feature of the selective promotion of industries.
286
 
While the government had been able to use access to credit as a means of 
controlling the chaebol during the authoritarian period, financial market 
liberalization during the 1990s, which had been accelerated under the Young-
Sam Kim‟s government, had allowed many of the chaebol direct access to 
international financial markets. With access to foreign loans, the chaebol 
became less dependent on the state.
287
 Rather, the state had granted a greater 
degree of autonomy to the chaebol in the flexible usage of the workforce, which 
departed from the long-sustained practices for lifetime employment.
288
 The 
legalization of a more flexible labor market was repeatedly attempted by the 
Kim government, culminating in the illegitimate renewal of the labor law in 
January 1997,
289
 which was passed by the ruling party without notifying the 
other parliamentary members of the opposition. 
However, this measure provoked the first nationwide general strike in 
Korea since 1948. Over 140,000 workers from the KCTU (Korean 
Confederation of Trade Unions), which had been established as a center of the 
democratic labor movement in 1995, initiated the first general strike, with over 
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70,000 workers of the Hyundai Group Union Federation joining it afterwards, 
while thousands of unionists, citizens and students held rallies in Seoul. Also, 
FKTU, which is the largest but most reactionary union, organized a walkout by 
over 156,000 workers at 486 work sites. This strike continued until early March, 
going well beyond the government‟s control. As a result, lawmakers had to 
remove the anti-union elements in the collective labor law so that the law 
permitted multiple trade unions (with a five-year moratorium at company level), 
political activity of unions,
290
 and a delay in the introduction of layoffs for 
managerial reasons.
291
 
In summary, the industrial relations system from the 1987 Great Workers‟ 
Struggle to the 1997 Financial Crisis was a transitional regime from an 
authoritarian one to a neo-liberal system. The Great Struggle undermined the 
past unilateral authoritarian relations and opened a path for autonomous 
relations between labor and capital. The workers secured the right to unionize 
and bargain collectively with their managers without the government‟s direct 
intervention. However, the so-called „three prohibition‟ on plural unions, third 
party intervention and political activity remained restraints on democratic, 
independent unionism. As economic repression and the collapse of socialist 
countries came along at the end of 1989, the Roh government returned to old 
traditional repressive strategies. 
During the tenure of the Young-Sam Kim‟s government, which was the 
first civilian government after 32 years of military rule, the workers 
significantly strengthened their political position. They succeeded in 
establishing the democratic national organization, KCTU, an alternative to the 
government-sponsored FKTU, and obtained the right to engage in political 
activity. But with direct access to foreign loans, enabled by the government‟s 
neo-liberal policy, the chaebol became less dependent on the state, which had 
granted wider autonomy to chaebol in the flexible use of their workforce, 
departing from the long-sustained practices for lifetime employment. 
 
3.2.1.3. Since the 1997 Financial Crisis 
 
Industrial relations since the financial crisis were deeply affected by IMF 
intervention in the economy. In the course of the crisis, the Korean government, 
being afraid of a moratorium, asked for relief loans from the IMF. As a 
condition for granting such loans, the IMF imposed extensive neo-liberal 
industrial restructuring obligations, including chaebol reform, intensified 
financial retrenchment, structural adjustment of financial institutions, and labor 
market reform toward greater flexibility. Dae-Jung Kim‟s government, which 
                                                          
290
 Dae-Oup Chang, “Crisis of capital accumulation and the crisis of theory and practice 
of the „developmental‟ state”: 10-11. 
291
 Russell D. Lansbury and Nick Wails, “Social partnership in Korean industrial 
relations”: 327. 
85 
 
had come into office in 1998 immediately after the crisis, was installed upon 
both the successful implementation of the IMF bail-out program and the 
domestic economic recovery from the crisis.
292
 
The government intended to implement the economic restructuring 
program imposed by the IMF through a form of „social corporatist compromise‟ 
between labor, capital and the government. In January 1998, the government 
created the „Tripartite Commission‟, consisting of these three participants in 
order to negotiate a national agenda for the social protection of workers, 
economic restructuring and industrial relations laws. This form seemed to be the 
option that the government could take in order to induce the political support of 
organized labor, as required for the fulfillment of the IMF standby 
arrangement.
293
 
Representatives of capital, the government and the government-allied 
FKTU pressured delegates from the more militant and independent KCTU to 
agree to the labor law changes, arguing that the crisis made their passage 
inevitable. KCTU representatives eventually conceded. Although the KCTU 
rank and file immediately reneged on their leaders‟ initial approval of the so-
called „Social Pact,‟ the new capital-friendly labor laws were enacted in 
February 1998. For the first time in modern Korean history, layoff for 
managerial reasons was legalized, and so was the use of a hired worker system 
in July 1998.
294
 In return for this sacrifice, trade union rights to engage in 
political activities and to organize teachers and public servants were 
recognized.
295
 
The unemployment rate soared from 2.6% in 1997 to 6.8% in 1998 and 
peaked in early 1999 at 8.6%. In the face of such rapid rise in unemployment, 
real wages fell by 10% in 1998, and though they increased in 1999 and 2000, 
their growth rate was below the rate of growth of productivity.
296
 With real 
wages rising more slowly than productivity, labor‟s share of GNP fell from 62.3% 
in 1997 to 61.9% in 1998 and 59.6% in 1999 and 58.8% in 2000. This data may 
be dramatically contrasted with that of the previous period since the 1987 Great 
Workers‟ Struggle: it has risen from 53.7% in 1987 to 63.4% in 1996.297 
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A more distinctive change was the growth of irregular employment. The 
enactment of a hired worker system allowed employers to use labor more 
flexibly. The system induced employers to reduce the number of regular 
workers and replace them with irregular (daily or temporary) workers.
298
 While 
the unemployment rate went down to 4.1% in 2000, the percentage of irregular 
workers increased from 45.9% in 1997 to 52.4% in 2000.
299
 According to the 
August 2000 statistics, the average monthly salary of irregular workers was 53.7% 
of that of regular workers, while the workweek of the former (47.5 hours) was 
longer than that of the latter (47.1 hours).
300
 The long-term effects of the 
increase in irregular workers will undermine the organizational foundation of 
unions, as Korean unionism had been dominated by regular workers 
concentrated in the large-size firms.
301
 
Total spending on social welfare programs as a percent of GDP, including 
unemployment insurance, did rise a little after the crisis from 6.8% in 1997 to 
over 7.5% in 1999. Even under the dire situation, Korea‟s welfare spending 
came nowhere near the U. S. level of 15% of GDP, not to mention Western 
European levels well in excess of 20% of GDP. Thus the level of income 
protection for most workers was woefully inadequate. A 2000 OECD report on 
Korean labor and welfare policies reported that only one in nine unemployed 
workers received unemployment benefits, such benefits amounting to only 50% 
of the previous wage, and the maximum duration of benefits was three to eight 
months. Moreover, only a quarter of those of retirement age received a pension 
of any kind, while the average pension was about two to three U. S. dollars per 
day.
302
 
The government‟s policy of labor market flexibility was accompanied by 
changes in the wage system. An annual salary system and pay-for-performance 
system were widely introduced instead of the existing seniority-based system. 
Thus, the percentage of firms introducing an annual salary system increased 
from 3.5% in 1997 to 23% in 2000 and the percentage of firms introducing pay-
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for-performance from 7% in 1997 to 20.6% in 2000.
303
 This fuels competition 
among individual workers and reduces workers‟ solidarity.304 
The growth of unemployment and irregular employment, along with the 
expansion of flexible wage systems, widened the gap between the rich and poor. 
The Gini coefficient increased from 0.283 in 1997 to 0.317. The ratio of average 
income of the highest quintile families to the lowest rose from 4.49 to 5.32 for 
the same period. The so-called „society of 20 versus 80‟ of neo-liberalism has 
already started to form in Korea.
305
 
In summary, industrial relations since the Financial Crisis have been 
governed by a neo-liberal regime, which is characterized by labor market 
flexibility. For the first time in modern Korean history, layoffs for managerial 
reasons and use of leased workers have been legalized. The result is permanent 
crisis of unemployment and increase in employment insecurity, extension of 
irregular employment and deterioration in income distribution. 
 
3.2.2. The Antagonistic Character of the Korean Labor-Management 
Relations 
 
Korean labor-management relations have been characterized by strong 
antagonism, which has been summed up as an authoritarian oppression of 
government and capital on labor, and a militant resistance of labor.
306
 During 
the military regimes, the workers stood individually against the control and 
physical oppression upon their lives. Since the 1987 Great Workers‟ Struggle, 
the labor movement has developed into a more organized resistance. 
Young-Sam Kim‟s government, the first civil government, created the 
„Industrial Relations Reform Committee,‟ which consisted of representatives 
from labor, capital and the government. The Dae-Jung Kim‟s government, the 
so-called „people‟s government,‟ institutionalized the „Tripartite Commission‟ 
consisting of these three representations, based on the model of European 
corporatism.
307
 However, the commission has not functioned well as a forum 
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for dialogue and compromise. The cause of the antagonism is attributable to 
three main factors. 
First, there has been a deep ideological conflict between capitalism and 
communism or socialism in Korean society since World War II. Following the 
division of Korea by the occupation forces of the Soviet Union and the United 
States, the labor movement in South Korea was split into Junpyung (National 
Council of Chosun Trade Unions), pro-Communists, and Daehan Nochong 
(Confederation of Korean Trade Unions), the anti-Communists. In 1947, the 
leftist Junpyung was banned by the American Military Government and soon 
replaced by its rival, Daehan Nochong.
308
 
After the Korean War (1950-1953), anti-Communism made people 
skeptical of socialist ideas and less compassionate to labor unions. Government 
and business have utilized this anti-unionist sentiment successfully to crack 
down on defiant unions. The military governments oppressed not only pro-
communist but also independent democratic labor unions in the name of 
„national security.‟309 The nature of the leadership of the democratic labor 
movement provides the key to the militant approach of labor unions, as many of 
the leaders were trained by early activists and socialists and experienced first 
hand state repression during the long military regimes.
310
 
Second, industrial relations at both the industry and national levels were 
underdeveloped
311
 and consequently social dialogue to resolve labor disputes 
did not work well. Each enterprise trade union is considered independent and 
trade unions at the enterprise level use union dues for themselves and not for the 
support of superior industrial or nationwide organizations. National 
organizations and industrial unions are poorly financed
312
 and improperly 
staffed, and therefore do not have enough power to coordinate whole trade 
unions. One incident relating to the Tripartite Commission, which provides 
evidence that the national organization did not play a crucial role in the strike, 
was when union leaders at the national organization made an agreement with 
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government and management; some enterprise unionists demanded the 
revocation of the agreement and eventually dismantled the leadership of the 
KCTU.
313
 
Third, the insufficient social protection of workers is an obstacle to 
peaceful industrial relations. While collective bargaining of wage and work 
conditions has been extended since 1987, the neo-liberal policy of labor market 
flexibility and the lack of the corresponding social welfare system forces 
workers to confront a life-or-death situation. Thus it is still difficult to establish 
cooperative relations. 
 
3.3. The Real Estate in South Korea 
 
According to the „First Survey of Household Asset‟ of the Korea National 
Statistical Office in 2006, the ratio of the asset of the highest 20% households 
to that of the lowest 20% is 171.5:1, while the ratio of the income is 7.64:1. 
The inequality of assets turns out to be as many as 22.4 times more serious 
than that of income. Real estate accounts for 76.8% of the assets, while 
financial assets are 20.4%, and others 2.7%.
314
 It shows that the inequality of 
assets is mainly due to real estate. Based on this serious disparity in real estate 
Nak Gu Son names Korea a „Real Estate Class Society.‟315 The „Real Estate 
Class Society‟ has been constructed by the rapid industrialization and 
urbanization for the long developmental dictatorial regimes since Chung-Hee 
Park‟s military coup in 1961. Since the late 1980s it has been moderated by the 
so-called „public concept of land‟ movement of citizen groups. However it has 
been revived by a series of liberal policies since the 1997 financial crisis.
316
  
First, we will make a short sketch of the developing processes and 
realities of the real estate class society over three periods: before the „public 
concept of land‟ movement in the late 1980s, from the „public concept of land‟ 
movement to the 1997 financial crisis, and since the financial crisis. Second, 
we will deal with the absolutism of the private property right which justifies 
the disparity of real estate in Korea. Third, we discuss the ecological 
degradation owing to the developmentalism.           
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3.3.1. A Real Estate Class Society 
 
3.3.1.1. The Developmental State and the Formation of a Real Estate Class 
Society 
     
In 1945, when the Japanese left, Korea was a poor agrarian society. Its 
circumstances were exacerbated by the war on the Korean peninsula (1950-53) 
that followed shortly after. In 1961 the new authoritarian government initiated 
and implemented a series of five-year economic development programs that 
pursued the export-oriented developmental strategies in order to obtain 
legitimacy for its undemocratic politics. The five-year programs were succeeded 
by Doo-Hwan Chun who came to power through another military coup in 1979, 
and by Tae-Woo Roh who was Chun‟s co-conspirator and became president in 
1988. The Korean economy has been a mostly government-directed, 
government-led or government-propelled economy, made possible by state 
control over financial institutions and direct control of the credit allocation 
process. Since the 1960s Korea‟s economic growth has been spectacular.317  
    Although real incomes have risen significantly along with the dramatic 
economic growth, Koreans are regarded as under-housed relative to their level 
of economic development. Home ownership declined from 80% in 1960 to 51% 
in 1990. Urbanization accelerated after 1960, driven by rural-urban migration 
and industrialization, largely a consequence of the government export-oriented 
development strategies. While about 39% of the population was urbanized in 
1960, this increased to about 82% in 1990 and to 89% in 2000.
318
 Many 
families who moved to the cities could only find accommodation in squatter 
settlements. In spite of state initiatives to promote home construction, the sector 
has been under-financed, primarily as a consequence of state restrictions on 
access to credit for home-builders, instead channeling available finance to 
industrial development.
319
  
    Along with the industrialization and urbanization, land prices have risen 
rapidly. During 1963-1990, land prices in six largest cities rose 734 times, while 
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the GNP and wholesale prices increased 10 times and 15 times respectively.
320
 
This rapid increase in land prices caused housing prices also to rise steeply. For 
example, the nationwide housing prices increased about 7.3 times from 1974 to 
1989, while the nationwide land prices about 14 times.
321
  
    The chaebol have been primarily responsible for driving up the nation‟s 
land prices through their massive land speculation. During Korea‟s 
developmental periods since the early 1960s, vast amounts of money from 
domestic and foreign sources have been given to business groups under the 
name of industrial funds. Much of these funds, however, have been used for 
land speculation rather than for production investment. For instance, the 
chaebol received 51.5% of all commercial bank credits and 48.5% of the 
secondary financial institutions‟ credits in 1989. In 1988 they invested 1.38 
trillion won in land, while they invested 1.22 trillion won in industrial 
facilities.
322
 While the state has developed various small- or large-scale 
industrial estates by providing urban infrastructure, the chaebol have been able 
to buy industrial land at low prices and at preferential terms, such as using 
installment payment options. They realized significant savings because this land 
was priced far below the value of existing sites with equivalent infrastructure. 
When prices for this land increased, they quickly realized high development 
gains. They were also able to use this land and its equity as collateral to obtain 
large amounts of bank credit. When this land was sold at its inflated prices, they 
obtained huge capital gains. After selling their land, they could purchase more 
industrial land provided by the state at low prices. They have been allowed to 
continue this cycle and continuously increase their capital gains from land.
323
    
    Besides extending the industrial land by using the state‟s preferential 
treatment, the chaebol have mobilized all other means to accumulate their assets 
of land. They set up new businesses that require significant amounts of land, 
such as subsidiaries for forestry, the pasture industry and pig farming. They also 
entered the leisure industry, building golfing, skiing, and sports complexes and 
hotels. They utilized their land for semi-legitimate uses, such as employee 
training centers or athletic facilities like tennis courts and exercise fields for the 
local defense forces. These facilities did not need much capital to install, but 
provided legal excuses for owning land. Most chaebol also have their own 
construction firms which purchase land not only in the residential or urbanized 
areas, but also in the green belt and agricultural areas. If these areas are rezoned, 
then construction companies reap significant profits. In fact, the profits from 
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construction itself are sometimes minor compared to those gained from 
rezoning.
324
    
     In the meantime, the collusion between politics and business has taken 
root. It was customary that chaebol have to offer Park‟s inner circle 10% of their 
expenditures as political funds to gain contracts of government-ordered 
projects.
325
 Big businesses also bribed government officials to get low-interest 
foreign loans or to avoid paying taxes. Moreover, Park‟s government made as 
many as about 120 regulations to prohibit new companies from entering the 
fields of existing chaebol. Around 40 chaebol became to monopolize most 
industries in the 1960s.
326
  
The black connection in construction industry was more serious. To take an 
example of road construction, it is witnessed that 30-40% of the cost was used 
for unholy purposes other than construction itself.
327
 Chaebol collected top 
secrets of scheduled areas of industrial or residential development in advance 
from high-ranked government officials, bought land as much as possible around 
the areas and could easily accumulate a large amount of unearned wealth later. It 
is also reported that the government officials themselves took part in speculation 
to raise slush funds. For instance, in 1970 the mayor of Seoul directed one of his 
officials to buy land in the areas south of the Han River to make a fund for 
Park‟s re-election campaign in 1971. He bought about 820,000 square meter of 
land with money from the Korea First Bank and the Ssangyong Group, sold the 
land at a price about three times higher than the original one in 1971. They 
offered the margin of gain to Park.
328
  
The corruption related to real estate became rampant among the power 
elites. The top class of the „food chain‟ is composed of five main groups- 
chaebol construction firms, politicians, bureaucrats, mass media and scholars. 
The mass media depend largely upon advertising revenue from the construction 
firms. Scholars of universities or institutions do not readily express a critical 
voice because often some portion of their research projects are determined by 
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the construction firms or government officials. These five groups are called the 
„Five Thieves of Real Estate [or Development].‟329                 
    Landownership is extremely concentrated. The top 5% of landowners held 
65% of all privately-owned lands, the top 10% 77%, and the top 20% 88% in 
1988.
330
 If we calculate per household and include landless households, the 
concentration is more remarkable. For example, in Seoul only 28.1% of 
households possess land, other 71.9% possess no land. It is roughly estimated 
that the top 1.4% of households hold 57.7% of privately-owned lands and the 
top 7% 77.8%. Landowners accumulated huge unearned wealth from land. For 
instance, in 1988 as land speculation became rife, total capital gain from land is 
estimated to have been 211.7 trillion won. It is 1.7 times more than the GNP 
(123.5 trillion won) and 4.2 times more than total employee income (50.1 
trillion won).
331
 The top 5% of private landowners received about 60% of the 
total gain of private landowners, and the top 25% about 80%. If landless groups 
are included, the top 1.3% and 3.9% of the population are calculated to 
appropriate 60% and 80% of all capital gain from land.  
However, the taxation of the unearned wealth was very low. The real tax 
collected on capital gain from land would be less than 1% of the total capital 
gain during the 1980s. The inequality in real estate is passed on from generation 
to generation. According to the National Taxation Office‟s statistics, real estate 
accounts for about 85% of inherited property, of which land is about 60% and 
housing 25% during the 1980s.
332
      
 
3.3.1.2. The Democratization and the ‘Public Concept of Land’ Campaign 
 
Over three decades of the consecutive military governments a series of real 
estate speculations has swept throughout the whole nation around the 
development areas. The unearned income accrued from the real estate price hike 
has soared so sharply that it has surpassed even the working income as well as 
the GNP. This has caused a serious social disharmony. For example, on April 
10, 1990, the public heard the story of a family who killed themselves. Mr. 
Sung-Uk Om, 40 years old, had lived for 4 years with his wife and two children 
in a studio apartment of about 13.2 square meters. He had worked for 10 years 
as a driver for an assemblyman. In October 1989 he resigned from this position 
and since then had worked at a real estate agency. His landlord gave him an 
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eviction notice to leave the house by the end of April 1990. He could not find a 
house he could afford. On April 10, 1990, he finally killed by himself and his 
family by using coal gas. He left a five page will:  
 
Because of the failure of the government‟s economic policy, real estate prices have 
skyrocketed. Not even having the hope of my own house, I can not afford to pay rent…. 
The poverty of my father was left to me, and without a miracle, it will be left to my 
children. The vicious cycle that the poor get poorer and the rich get richer tends not to 
be broken…. Oh God, please give the politicians, especially economic technocrats, 
ability and wisdom, so that they will stop their foolish policies that have strangled the 
poor to death, and thus the depression and frustration of the poor will not continue 
anymore.
333
 
 
That was not an isolated incident. From only February to April 1990, at least 
fifteen workers and urban poor committed suicide due to steep increases in 
housing prices and rents, resulting from the rapid rise in land prices.
334
 
A few Christians, influenced by R. A. Torey III, an Anglican priest who 
founded „Jesus Abbey,‟ a community of believers, in a mountain valley north of 
South Korea, organized „Henry George Association of Korea‟ to enlighten 
Korean society on the issue of land in 1984. Along with the progress of 
democratization since 1987,
335
 various groups established together „Citizens‟ 
Coalition for Economic Justice‟ and conducted a campaign for so-called „public 
concept of land‟ as their first task. It pressed the government to introduce the 
„Three Laws of the Public Concept of Land,‟ i.e., the ceiling on the housing site, 
super-normal capital gains tax and the developmental capital gains tax in 1990, 
and the „Real Name System in Real Estate Market‟ in 1995. They have 
contributed to a decade of real estate price stabilization since the early 1990s.  
Table 4 below shows that the land price continued to increase annually at 
about 20% on average in the whole country and at about 30% in Seoul during 
the developmental dictatorial regimes until the early 1990s, and has distinctly 
settled up to the early 2000s. Although we miss the systematic and official data 
before 1987, the housing price also shows a similar trend.  
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Table 4: Trends in Land and Housing Price (1975-2007, 1987-2007) 
                                                           
(%) 
Year   Nationwide Land  Nationwide Housing Land of Seoul Housing of Seoul 
1975 26.99  31.63  
1976 26.60  16.06  
1977 33.55  31.70  
1978 48.98  135.70  
1979 16.63   6.40  
1980 11.68  13.42   
1981  7.51   3.56  
1982  5.40   8.70  
1983 18.50  57.70  
1984 13.20  23.30  
1985  7.00   8.10  
1986  7.30   3.70  
1987 14.67  7.1  6.29  2.0 
1988 27.47 13.2 28.06  9.1 
1989 31.97 14.6 33.54 16.6 
1990 20.58 21.0 31.18 24.2 
1991 12.78 -0.5 11.15 -2.1 
1992 -1.27 -5.0 -2.78 -5.4 
1993 -7.38 -2.9 -8.72 -3.2 
1994 -0.57 -0.1 -1.36  0.5 
1995  0.55 -0.2  0.18 -0.6 
1996  0.95  1.5  0.94  1.5 
1997  0.31  2.0  0.29  2.0 
1998 -13.60 -12.4 -16.25 -13.2 
1999  2.94  3.4  2.66  5.6 
2000  0.67  0.4  0.05  3.1 
2001  1.32  9.9  1.89 12.9 
2002  8.98 16.4 15.81 22.5 
2003  3.43  5.7  5.23  6.9 
2004  3.86 -2.1  4.09 -1.4 
2005  4.98  4.0  6.56  6.3 
2006  5.61 11.6  9.17 18.9 
2007  3.88  3.1  5.88  5.4 
Source: Korea Land & Housing Corporation, ‘Trends in annual land price 
(1975-2009),’ www.lh.or.kr336 and Kookmin Bank, ‘National Housing Price Trend 
Survey (2009),’ www.kbstar.com.
337
 
 
 
3.3.1.3. The Financial Crisis and the Liberalization of the Real Estate 
Market 
 
The government has carried out a series of policies to liberalize the real estate 
market since the financial crisis. First, she discarded the laws of the public 
concept of land. The serious economic depression gave the pretext of abolishing 
or delaying all three laws of the „public concept of land‟ that functioned to 
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prohibit speculation. They asserted exchanging the „public concept of land‟ for 
„economic revitalization.‟338  
Second, they lifted the price ceiling on apartments. The price ceiling on 
apartments had lasted for a long time in previous governments except for one 
and a half years after June 1981. Dae-Jung Kim‟s government removed it in 
1999. Since then chaebol construction firms have competitively supplied 
expensive brand apartments. The average sale price of new apartments per 3.3 
square meters in Seoul has more than tripled from 5,120,000 won in 1998 to 
15,460,000 won in 2006.
339
 The increased price of apartments in Seoul took the 
lead in the increase of housing prices after the Financial Crisis.
340
 It has also 
caused housing prices to rise generally more than land prices since the financial 
crisis.
341
                
Third, they freed the Green Belt. The system of Green Belt, formally 
referred to as the Restricted Development Zone, had been introduced in 1971 
during the authoritarian Chung-Hee Park‟s government and maintained without 
big changes for almost three decades. Besides national security, the objectives 
were to control urban sprawl and land speculation, and to protect environmental 
and natural resources.
342
 But soon after the Financial Crisis, Dae-Jung Kim‟s 
government decided to lift development bans on 29.2% of the total green belts, 
or 1,577 square kilometers.
343
 The green belts have been turned into numerous 
development projects and especially into a forest of apartments. City residents 
have lost even the small amount of natural environment that had still existed. 
For instance, the green space coverage per capita in Seoul is only 4 square meter, 
while it is 13, 23 and 27 square meters respectively in Paris, New York and 
London.
344
  
Fourth, the real estate market was opened extensively to foreigners. Like 
other sectors of the economy, the real estate market was flung open after the 
1997 financial crisis. In the process of restructuring, Korean companies had to 
sell off their real estate in order to survive. Some renowned securities firms in 
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the Yoido district of Seoul, the city's financial area, began to transfer to foreign 
ownership at fire sale prices.
345
  
Foreign investors also set to purchase other office buildings including well-
known skyscrapers and acquired 17% of prime office buildings until 2003. The 
price of their investment per year increased from 270 billion won in 1988 to 1 
trillion won in 2001. The total price of investment in office buildings from 1998 
to 2004 is about 5.6 trillion won. On the other hand, the land ownership by 
foreigners rose from 50 million square meters in 1998 to 157 million square 
meters in 2004. The latter is an equivalent of 26% of the size of Seoul or 18.6 
times bigger than the size of the Yoido district. The price of the latter is 23 
trillion won.
346
  
Foreigners have made good profits in the Korean real estate market. For 
example, the profit of the foreign investments in office buildings through 
reselling or renting are on average estimated about 25% per year. For instance, 
Lone Star, one of many US-based investment funds, bought Star Tower, now 
called Gangnam Finance Center, for 600 billion won in 2001. After three years, 
it sold the building for 860 million won. However, Lone Star avoided taxation 
by registering its unit in Belgium, which has a double taxation treaty with South 
Korea.
347
 
Finally, real estate financing was liberalized along with financial 
liberalization. Financial deregulation has been underway since the early 1990s. 
One of the most important changes, which is related to real estate financing, was 
a series of interest-rate deregulations which started in 1991 and was completed 
in 1997. The government also softened the regulation which requires some 
financial institutions to lend a certain portion of their funds to small- and 
medium-sized industries in 1997. The ratio of the Small and Medium Industry 
Bank was decreased from 90% to 80%, and that of the local banks 
(headquartered outside of Seoul) from 70% to 60%.
348
 
The most important event, which had a direct impact on the housing 
finance market, was the privatization of the Korea Housing Bank (KHB). The 
Bank had dominated the sector for the past three decades. The process of 
privatization started with the 1995 amendment of the Korea Housing Bank Act 
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which stipulated that the government shareholding be at least 50% of the total 
capital. Subsequently the government lowered its share from 95.6% to 46.8% in 
1996. In 1997 its share was lowered only to 26.3%, and the foreigners became 
the largest shareholder, accounting for 47.7%. The KHB Act itself was repealed, 
and the Bank was transformed into a commercial bank called the Housing and 
Commercial Bank (H&CB). The H&CB merged with Kookmin Bank in 2001 
and the name of the Housing Bank disappeared completely.
349
 Since the 
government eliminated all regulations on foreign ownership of Korean banks 
soon after the Financial Crisis, the share of foreigners has expanded further. The 
foreign ownership of the H&CB was 65.4% in Dec. 2000 and that of the 
Kookmin Bank 75.3% in Mar. 2004.
350
 
With the deregulations, the banks have become more market-driven to 
increase their profit-making. They have shifted their focus from corporate loans 
to household loans and, in particular, mortgage loans. The commercial banks 
lent only about 33% of their total won loans to households, while loaning about 
65% to corporations in 1997. However, the ratio of households surpassed that of 
corporations by 49.1% to 48.9% in 2001. The former rose to 55.1% in 2004, 
while the latter lowered to 43.5%. Especially the ratio of loans to small- and 
medium-sized corporations has decreased from 54.3% of the total won loans in 
1996 to 39.7% in 2003. It is also notable that foreign-controlled banks lent more 
to households. They have enlarged household loans by 35.2% from 1998 to 
September 2003, while have reduced corporate loans by 33.3%.
351
 The 
mortgage market took the lead in expanding the household loans. The share of 
mortgage loans among the total household loans of banks has soared from 47.8% 
in 2000 to 59.2% in 2003.
352
 
Until 1997 mortgage interest rates were lower than market interest rates 
because mortgage loans were provided based on policy consideration rather than 
market principles. Together with the deregulation of interest rate and 
privatization of the KHB, however, market rates have dropped lower than 
mortgage rates. It has led to favorable conditions for the mortgage market.
353
  
The size of the mortgage market, subsequently, has rapidly expanded. The 
outstanding balance of mortgage loans in the banking sector has jumped more 
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than 4 times from 54.2 trillion won in 2000 to 218.3 trillion Won in 2006.
354
 
However, a great deal of the mortgage loans were appropriated for speculative 
demand of the established homeowners rather than real demand of the homeless 
people. For instance, the total number of new houses that have been built from 
1995 to 2005 is 3,788,242. The total number of houses that homeowners owning 
more-than-one house possess has almost doubled from 2,407,265 to 4,694,419 
for the same period. It means that the established homeowners have 
accumulated more than half of the new houses. They had 2.8 houses on average 
in 1995, but 4.5 in 2005. The housing supply ratio has significantly risen from 
86.0% to 105.9% for the same period, while home ownership has just slightly 
risen from 53.3% to 55.6%.
355
 
 
3.3.2. The Absolutism of the Private Property Right 
 
3.3.2.1. The Disparity of Real Estate and the Absolutism of the Private 
Property Right 
 
In South Korea ownership of real estate is extremely concentrated. The top 5.5% 
of households held 77% of privately-owned land and the top 27% held 99% in 
2006. The following 33% of households possess only 1% and the other 40% of 
households don‟t possess any land. The top 16.5% of households own more than 
one house and accounted for 59.4% of the total number of houses in 2002. The 
following 33.2% hold one house and account for 40.6%. The other 50.3% do 
not possess a house.
356
        
    The inequality of real estate ownership has expanded since the Financial 
Crisis. The ownership of the top 20% of land owners has increased from 87.7% 
of privately-owned land in 1988 to 90.3% in 2006 and that of the top 50% from 
98.2% to 99.4% for the same period. In contrast, that of the following 50% has 
decreased from 1.8% to 0.6%.
357
 The disparity of housing ownership has 
remarkably expanded. For instance, approximately the top 7.5% of the 
population, which possessed more than one house, owned 25.5% of the total 
houses in 1995. But only about the top 6.1%, which possess more than one 
house, held as much as 35.5% in 2005.
358
  
    It was „the absolutism of the private property right‟ that allowed real estate 
speculation and justified the severe inequality of real estate.
359
 Historically the 
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state owned the land before Japan colonized Korea in 1910. While the state 
allocated land rights to gentry groups, these were not ownership rights but rights 
to collect rent from farmers. Although the right to collect rent was originally 
given only for the duration of the rent collector‟s service to the state and 
reverted to the state when he retired, gradually this right became inheritable, and 
became de facto private ownership. But the modern notion of private ownership 
was established during the Japanese colonial regime. The Japanese colonial 
government conducted a cadastral survey from 1910-18. On the basis of it, she 
issued certificates of ownership to those who had the right to collect rent and 
who resided there. She resumed all other land and sold it to Japanese or 
Japanese collaborators. After Korea was liberated in 1945, the new government 
enacted the Constitution, which guaranteed the Private Property Right of land, 
and implemented a land-to-the tiller program. Since this time private ownership 
of land became the norm. Although Korea‟s modern Constitution has undergone 
many revisions, the tenet of private property has never been challenged.
360
 
Since the Korean War (1950-1953) the Private Property Right has been 
strengthened by anti-communistic ideology. It has been supported by the 
National Security Law throughout the military dictatorial regimes.
361
 It was 
weakened for a while by the „public concept of land‟ campaign since the late 
1980s. It was, however, reinforced by a series of neo-liberal policies after the 
1997 Financial Crisis. 
 
3.3.2.2. The Origin of the Absolutism of the Private Property Right 
 
We can trace back the theoretical root of the Korean absolutism of the Private 
Property Right to John Locke‟s idea of property. The Korean modern property 
laws were imported from the western world through Japan. The western 
property laws are based on the Locke‟s concept of property.362 The Korean 
property laws, consequently, were influenced by Locke‟s idea of property. 
The absolutism of the Private Property Right was first systematically 
articulated by John Locke in his book, „Second Treatise of Government,‟ 
published in England in 1689. Locke argued that all right and legitimacy 
whatever was the right and legitimacy of private property. The „public good‟ is 
nothing other than the property security of property-holders erecting 
government as their legislative and executive „deputy.‟ „Political power‟ is the 
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right of making laws with penalties of death and all less penalties for the 
regulating and preserving of property.
363
  
„Reason‟ is also defined in this world view as the capacity to obey these 
laws of private property. If someone does not obey these laws of „right reason,‟ 
then he is judged to have „put himself into a state of war‟ with the one whose 
property he transgresses.
364
 So it is „lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not 
in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than, by 
the use of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away his money, or what 
he pleases, from him.‟365 
The underlying absolutism seems greater than that of King Charles I who 
had his head cut off by the bourgeois private-property party in 1649. The king at 
least wondered who would look to „the people‟s interest‟ against the militarily 
ascendant private-property party when he was gone. „I shall have the hide of 
whoever infringes my property,‟ this doctrine secretes as its inward message. 
„He has attacked my being, because I am my property. Whoever threatens a jot 
of it makes war on humanity.‟ This is the Beast behind the system. It demands 
calling those who stand against its universal rule „violent‟ and „terrorist,‟ and 
caging for them.
366
  
Locke defends the Private Property Right on the basis of human labor: 
private property is the outcome of mixing one‟s labor with what is appropriated 
from nature. He states: 
 
Though the earth, all inferiour creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a 
property in his own person: this nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his 
body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. What then he removes 
out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, 
and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by 
him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour 
something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men. For this labour 
being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can a right to what that 
is once joined to.
367
 
 
He begins the argument from the primitive society before money was used. 
Natural limits existed for private property possession in that society: first, 
private property was confined to as much as the owner needed or could use
368
; 
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second, private property left „enough and good in common for others‟ to do 
likewise
369
. In primitive society the Private Property Right appeared self-evident 
and reasonable. The natural limits seem to make it more acceptable socially.  
However, Locke doesn‟t prove how the Private Property Right is sensible 
in the more developed society where money is introduced. He explains that 
money links „use value‟ with „exchange value.‟ For example, if someone collect 
more apples than he could use, he would trade the extra apples for money – 
shells, gold and so on. In this simple understanding, the Private Property Right 
can continue to be legitimate in the more developed society. Money is 
considered to function as a medium of exchange or a means of store of value 
and to represent his original labor.
370
 
Locke acknowledges that the two natural limits are no longer available in 
the latter society. The owner is able to enlarge his possession more than he could 
use.
371
 His excessive accumulation could be detrimental to others.
372
 It could 
make the Private Property Right unacceptable socially. But he doesn‟t discard 
the Private Property Right itself.  
The reason he insists on the Private Property Right is probably that he 
thinks the inner logic of the Private Property Right on the basis of human labor 
holds even in the monetized society. However, he disregards the function of 
money as a means of valorization of value. When money functions as a means 
of valorization of value, it no longer represents the possessor‟s original labor. 
The possessor would be able to accumulate an unlimited wealth without an 
appropriate labor. In the current free market economy, unearned compound 
interest and land, stock and bond speculation together multiply the Private 
Property Right to tens or hundreds of times the original values with no labor 
performed
373
.          
Now let‟s apply the absolutism of the Private Property Right to the Korea‟s 
real estate situation. Before the Japanese colonial government introduced private 
property ownership, most of the land was publicly owned. Now only about 30% 
of land is publicly owned in Korea, while this is 81% in Singapore, 69% in 
Taiwan and 40% in Sweden. Only about 2% of houses are publicly owned, 
while this is 36% in the Netherlands
374
 and 22% in the United Kingdom.
375
 As 
already examined above, the disparity of privately owned real estate is extreme.  
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Korean laws don‟t protect the disadvantaged in real estate, but guarantee 
the Private Property Right of the advantaged. According to the laws, landlords 
can evict their tenants from their houses every two years arbitrarily and increase 
their rent unlimitedly. In 1988 about one quarter of the Korean total population, 
10 million people, moved. Half of them, 5 million people, moved owing to 
housing.
376
 For about 44% of households, except for 54% who possess their 
own houses plus 2% who rent the publicly owned houses, „housing security‟ is 
threatened. They have to be always ready to move at the whim of their landlords. 
In contrast, in the Netherlands tenants can live for an indefinite period of 
time one year after they make a first contract with their landlords and as for 
houses below some a certain amount of monthly rent any increase in rent is 
directly regulated by law. As for houses of higher rent, if tenants disagree with 
the increase in rent, they may petition before the Magistrate Court. Furthermore, 
even after having signed a contract, tenants can submit a request to the rental 
assessment committee („Huurcommissie‟) to readjust the rent within some 
period of time.
 377
 
The so-called „Yongsan Tragedy‟ is the most notorious example that the 
Korean laws have recently disregarded „the right to housing‟ or „the right to 
livelihood‟ for the disadvantaged, but supported the exclusive Private Property 
Right of the advantaged. On January 20, 2009, six people – five protestors and 
one policeman - were killed and 23 people were injured during the protest 
against forced eviction and police crackdown in Yongsan, a central part of Seoul 
in Korea.
378
  
In 2008 the Yongsan area was designated as one of the objects for an urban 
redevelopment project, whose people were to move to other places. The tenants 
of the shops asked for rental or temporary shopping places, and the residents for 
rental or temporary residential places, but the government decided on the 
immediate demolition of the district with no proper answers to them. The 
tenants organized the committee of demolition protesters under the Federation 
against Housing Demolition (Jun Chul Yun). On the morning of January 19, 
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2009, 50 protesters plunged into a strike from the rooftop of a five-story 
commercial building in the Yongsan district. They were armed with Molotov 
cocktails and liquid petroleum gas tanks and so on.
379
 
The government and the police decided on compulsory measures to break 
up the protesters within just 24 hours after the initial staging of the protest. They 
regarded the protesters as „terrorists‟ and mobilized a great number of roughly 
1600 policemen including about 50 police commandos trained for anti-terrorism 
and major crime operations. Ar around 5 a.m. on January 20th, they launched 
operations to suppress the demonstration. They brought all kinds of equipment 
into play – water cannons containing tear gas material, cranes, floodlight cars, 
ladder trucks and so on. The police made their way into the ground floor of the 
building, while some others, by using the crane, lifted the container with the 
commandos inside to the rooftop. The protesters then hurled Molotov cocktails 
toward them. However, the commandos who reached the rooftop began to fire 
their weapons at random. More violent clashes erupted and in the process an 
unidentified fire was started. The watchtower, which the protesters had reached 
as their shelter on the rooftop, collapsed and six people who were inside lost 
their lives.
380
 
There have been constant victims of forced evictions before. Especially in 
the late 1980s urban redevelopment projects have been carried out extensively 
and about 20 people died within about 5 years. However, since then the number 
of victims of forced evictions has been few and the issue has become less 
serious. The Yongsan Tragedy is related to the new government‟s keynote of 
real estate policies. The new president had worked as CEO of a chaebol 
construction company, Hyundai Construction, for a long time. He expanded 
urban redevelopment areas dramatically during his mayorship of Seoul. 467 
locations (2.39 million square meters) are designated for an urban 
environmental improvement project. 618 locations (23.18 million square meters) 
are designated for redevelopment and restructuring throughout the Seoul 
Metropolitan City, taking up as much as 10% of her total residential area. And 
26 locations (24.05 million square meters) were designated for a new town area 
during the 4 years from 2002 to 2006, exceeding all the areas designated for 
redevelopment (19.39 million square meters) during a 32-year period from 1973 
to 2008 prior to his mayorship.
381
  
Redevelopment projects have to consider the level of income and the 
population of the original residents. But the newly built houses are so big and 
high priced that most people cannot rent or buy them. The original residents 
aren‟t given fair compensations. So the projects practically expel them out of 
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their residential areas. In the case of the new town projects, only about 20% of 
the original residents have resettled in the redeveloped areas.
382
 In contrast, the 
government and the big construction firms share huge development profits. The 
rich living in the neighborhoods around the redevelopment areas enjoy the 
increase of prices of their real estate. The new houses become new objects of 
speculation.  
The Supreme Court upheld a sentence that convicted nine protestors after a 
long 22 months of battle. The Court concluded that the protesters only were 
responsible for setting fires. Seven protestors were given four to five years in 
prison. Another two protestors were given two and three year sentences 
respectively. But the Court asserted that the operations by the police 
commandos were legally appropriate. The government and the police were 
completely cleared from legal responsibility.
383
  
 
3.3.3. Ecological Destruction and Developmentalism 
 
3.3.3.1. A Construction State under Developmentalism and Ecological 
Degradation 
 
„Development‟ refers to whatever activity processes nature for man‟s use. 
Before modernization men had to adapt themselves to nature or could process 
nature passively. „Modern development‟ indicates the deed to process nature 
actively and is related essentially to industrial civilization. „Developmentalism‟ 
is an attitude to take this modern development as the central goal of society. The 
history of developmentalism began with industrialization. However it is since 
the late capitalist countries such as Germany, Japan and America have emerged 
that the history of developmentalism as the goal of a state has began. 
Communist Soviet Union also pushed forward on developmentalism. Since the 
1950s, developmentalism has spread throughout the world which now includes 
the modernization of the Third World.
384
        
    In Korea, the history of developmentalism started in earnest with the Park‟s 
regime since the 1960s. His regime is called „an era of developmental 
dictatorship.‟ He, who came to power with military help, tried to gain his 
political legitimacy through economic development. The economic development 
was pursued mainly by industrializing the traditional agrarian society. It 
achieved a rapid economic growth which was, for example, represented by the 
growth of GNP from 2.1 billion US$ in 1961 to 66.8 billion US$ in 1981 and to 
280.8 billion US$ in 1991. The rapid economic growth, however, entailed „the 
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double exploitation both of man and of nature.‟385 In this section we focus on 
the exploitation of the latter.
386
 
    Industrialization involved not only the change of industrial structure and 
technology but also the change of space. The latter includes creating industrial 
estates, constructing industrial infrastructures - roads, dams and power plants - 
and building houses for workers. In shor,t industrial development is linked 
directly to the development of real estate. The major cause of ecological 
degradation is the development of real estate rather than the industrial 
development itself.
387
  
    The developmental state that concentrates her efforts more on the 
development of real estate than on the industrial development is called a 
„Construction State.‟388 The term is originally coined to point out the negative 
traits of modern Japanese society. During the long one-party rule in post-war 
Japan, a system of collusion between politicians, construction companies, and 
bureaucrats evolved. They were linked by an extensive network of formal and 
informal ties and were bound in a so-called „iron triangle‟ of benefit and 
influence.
389
 Public works projects are a major focus of structural collusion. 
The system of vested interests in construction activities encouraged bribery and 
bid rigging and spread a net which embraced Japan at different geographical 
levels of scale. This system led to massive government spending on public 
works projects. However the public works spending has often not served a 
genuine public need, particularly not in comparison to budgetary rationality. 
Moreover, these public projects have damaged and destroyed the natural 
environment.
390
  
Alex Kerr describes, in his Dogs and Demons, the environmental 
devastation of Japan, a construction state, sharply
391
:  
 
During the past fifty-five years of its great economic growth, Japan has drastically 
altered its natural environment in ways that are almost unimaginable to someone who 
has not traveled here …… Across the nation, men and women are at work reshaping the 
landscape. Work crews transform tiny streams just a meter across into deep chutes 
slicing through slabs of concrete ten meters wide and more. Builders of small mountain 
roads dynamite entire hillsides. Civil engineers channel rivers into U-shaped concrete 
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casings that do away not only with the rivers' banks but with their beds. The River 
Bureau has dammed or diverted all but three of Japan's 113 major rivers. The contrast 
with other advanced industrial nations is stark. Aware of the high environmental cost, 
the United States has decided in principle not to build any more dams, and has even 
started removing many that the Army Corps of Engineers constructed years ago. Since 
1990 more than 70 major dams have fallen across America, and dozens more are 
scheduled to be dismantled. Meanwhile, Japan's Construction Ministry plans to add 500 
new dams to the more than 2,800 that have already been built.  
 
South Korea is another „Construction State.‟ Over the last 30 years the 
proportion of construction sector investment to GDP in Korea has been about 
20%, more or less. According to recent data, it is roughly twice as large as 
figures tallied in leading industrialized economies. It is 18.4% in Korea, while 
9.5% in Germany, 9.7% in Taiwan, 10.5% in the United States, 10.6% in the 
United Kingdom and 11.8% in Japan. But Korea invested in facility less than 
half in construction. The proportion of facility investment to GNP in Korea is 
9.1% while 8.1% in Germany, 11.1% in Taiwan, 6.8% in the United States, 6.0% 
in the United Kingdom and 9.6% in Japan.
392
    
A statistics report of the OECD on the proportion of value added in 
construction to GDP shows that Korea has already surpassed Japan since 1990. 
The former exceeded the latter by 11.3 to 9.7% at first in 1990. The proportion 
of the latter has continued to decrease since then and increased to 6.1% in 2006. 
On the contrary, that of the former had slightly increased and remained around 
12% until 1997. Since then it has slightly decreased but has still remained at 
around 9%.
393
      
The epicenter of corruption in Korea is the construction sector. According 
to an analysis of bribery cases reported in the mass media during the 12 years 
since 1993, the construction sector accounted for 55.3% of the total number of 
cases, 64.3% of the number of cases in which politicians or bureaucrats were 
implicated, and 43.4% of the amount of bribes.
394
 Similar to Japan, construction 
companies, politicians and bureaucrats form a corrupted „food chain‟ in 
connection with public works projects. 
Development corporations have spearheaded the public works projects to 
supply social overhead capital. All of the major development corporations - 
Korea Electric Power Corporations, Korea Land & Housing Corporations, 
Korea Water Resources Corporation, Korea Expressway Corporation and Korea 
Rural Community Corporations - were systemized or established during the 
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Park‟s regime. Even since his regime, their role has never diminished. They 
have continually planned and undertook development projects which require 
huge spending budgets. For example, the expenditure for public works reached 
almost 30% of the total government budget expenditure in 2007.
395
   
The construction sector, rather, has expanded since the 1990s. For example, 
the proportion of value added in construction to GDP was about 4-8% in the 
1970s and 1980s but since the 1990s it has been about 8-12%.
396
 Politically this 
is owing to the localization and the following „pork barrel politics.‟ Politicians 
have poured out new local development projects to gain votes. Ideologically the 
so-called „neo-developmentalism‟ is behind this. With the environmental 
awakening of civil society and the rise of neo-liberalism, the traditional 
developmentalism has to be transformed into neo-developmentalism.
397
 Post-
military dictatorial governments since the 1990s have pretended to be concerned 
about environmental issues, but, in reality, gave priority to developing rather 
than to preserving nature and pushed ahead with more development projects. 
Due to more pressure to search for new and profitable opportunities under the 
more competitive global capitalism, nature also became the object of 
commodification. In the neo-liberal world, commodity relations penetrate 
further and further into all aspects of social life: from body components, 
motherhood and information to health care, medicine and education. The 
examples of commodification of nature itself include city tourism, ecotourism 
and mountaineering.
398
     
The „Cheonggyecheon Restoration Project‟ is a typical case of neo-
developmentalism. Cheonggyecheon is a 5.8 km stream flowing west to east 
through Seoul. It was gradually covered with concrete for 20 years after 1958, 
and a 5.6 km-long, 16 m-wide elevated highway was completed over it in 1976 
during the presidency of Chung-Hee Park. The area became a symbol of the 
successful industrialization and modernization of South Korea.
399
  
In 2003, however, a huge project requiring 900 million US$ was initiated 
to remove the elevated highway and restore the stream and was completed in 
2005. Its walkways, landscaping, fountains, and illumination provided an oasis 
in what had been a grimy industrial area. It became popular among city 
residents and tourists. But the stream was far from natural. About 120,000 tons 
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of water must be pumped in daily by electricity, mainly from the Han River. 
The water flows through a concrete channel, which is another artificial 
structure.
400
 The project didn‟t attempt to seek authentic re-naturalization, but 
to strengthen the economic competitiveness of the city through utilizing nature 
itself. It was a result of „commodification of nature‟ under neo-liberalism.401  
    The „Four Major Rivers Restoration Project‟ also might be the latest case 
of neo-developmentalism. Myung-Bak Lee, who supervised the 
Cheonggyecheon Project as mayor of Seoul, was elected as President of Korea 
in 2007. He launched another much bigger project requiring about 17.3 billion 
US$, which calls for building 16 dams, dredging 570 million cubic
 
meters of 
sand and gravel to deepen nearly 700 kilometers of
 
riverbed, renovating two 
estuarine barrages and so on.
402
 He was a former construction company 
executive, nicknamed „the bulldozer‟ for his „can do‟ approach to engineering 
projects. He wants the project finished before his 5-year term ends in early 
2013.
403 
 
The two main objectives are claimed to be meeting flood control and water 
scarcity. Opponents, however, see those objectives as unreasonable. The areas 
of high risk of flooding and drought damage are located mainly in Gangwon 
Province and the highlands. But the areas of this project are located in other 
provinces (Gyunggi, Gyungsang, Junra and Choongchung) and the lowlands.
404
  
The other objectives are related to ecological and cultural improvement. 
The government asserts that the project is a „Green New Deal‟ promoting 
sustainable development. She publicizes widely bike trails, athletic fields, and 
parks, which will be built along the waterways. There is, however, general 
concern that the magnificent long total length of 929 km. of the four major 
rivers which would be transformed into stepped lakes, and the natural high-
water-level land ecosystems into artificial forests of mountain and field trees 
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such oaks, and seasonal flower gardens.
405
 Although the project is wrapped in a 
green mantle, it is fundamentally another development project which exploits 
and destroys nature for the greed of human beings. 
The symptom of a construction state under developmentalism and neo-
developmentalism brought about extensive ecological devastation. The most 
important example is the dam. There are 1214 large dams among the 
approximately 18,000 dams in Korea as of 2002.
406
 The number of large dams 
ranks seventh in the world. However, the density per unit area is the first in the 
world. The dams were constructed mainly to provide a large amount of water 
for industrial development. However, with the building of dams a vast stretch of 
field and valley and a lot of villages and animal life and cultural heritages were 
submerged in a moment and a number of people lost their hometowns.
407
 Even 
though there is no proper public statistics, it is estimated that a couple of million 
people nationwide had to leave their homes.
408
    
The second example is cement, which is a basic ingredient in construction. 
Korea needs a large amount of cement for numerous construction projects. 
According to data from 2003, Korea ranked fifth in the world in the amount of 
both production and consumption of cement, while Japan ranked fourth
 
respectively with a slightly bigger amount. But in the amount of consumption 
per capita Korea ranked first with 1216 kg. while Japan ranked sixth with 471 
kg.
409
 Cement is related to a variety of environmental impacts. In the process of 
its quarrying, mountains of magnificent scenery are damaged. Its manufacturing 
causes the release of pollution materials such as CO2 and heavy metals - 
thallium, cadmium, mercury, etc. The cement industry is the second largest CO2 
emitting industry after power generation. The heavy metals could give rise to 
disease. Moreover, overfull gray-colored concrete buildings and structures make 
for desolate landscapes across the country.  
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At the groundbreaking ceremony of Pohang Iron & Steel Company in 
April 1968, Chung-Hee Park encouraged his listeners by saying: “Let the air be 
covered fully with black smoke surging from the chimneys of the finished 
plants!” This is the symbolic result of ecological illiteracy within the leading 
circle of development, and their giving priority to development over 
environment. It has resulted in the destruction of nature and an unbalance 
between development and environment. „The land of beautiful rivers and 
mountains‟ was changed into „the republic of concrete or apartments.‟ In 
contrast to her high ranking of around tenth in the world in terms of GDP, 
Korea ranks 136
th
 among 146 countries surveyed in terms of the Environmental 
Sustainability Index in 2002 according to the World Economic Forum.
410
 
 
3.3.3.2. The Origin of Develomentalism: the Descartian Dualism between 
Man and Nature 
 
The philosophical origins of developmentalism date back to Descartes (1596-
1650) and his dualism of the human mind (subject) and mechanical matter 
(object), which has determined „modern thought‟ right up to the present day.411 
Prior to Decartes, philosophy generally assumed as its starting point that the 
thinker is part of a larger world. The question of how people know this world 
was worked out in a context that assumed the existence of both the knower and 
the known. Descartes refound philosophy on the basis of radical doubt. This 
meant that the question of whether anyone knows anything, and if so, how, 
became the starting point of philosophical inquiry.
412
  
Descartes‟ universal doubt quickly gave way to confidence in his own 
existence. He saw that if he doubted, then he existed. There could be no 
doubting without the doubter. What remains questionable is how one can get 
from the subjective existence to an objective world, remembering that the 
objective world includes the human body.
413
  
    Descartes himself solved this problem through a form of the ontological 
argument for the existence of God. Having proved to his own satisfaction that 
his idea of perfection entailed a perfect being, he could argue that a perfect 
being would not allow him to be fundamentally deceived in his interpretation of 
sensory experience. Hence, in addition to the knowing subject or mental 
substance, he could be confident that there also exist objects, or material 
substances. As a result Decartes divided the world into two metaphysically 
distinct orders: mind and matter.
414
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    Few philosophers have followed Descartes in bringing in God to insure the 
reality of the material world, but his dualistic way of thinking has remained 
deeply influential in two respects. First, for much of the common sense of the 
modern world, the sharp distinction of subjects and objects has seemed evident 
and necessary, and there has been a strong tendency to identify them with 
mental and material substances. Second, with the exception of certain 
materialists, the primacy of the subject has remained the philosophical starting 
point.
415
 
    When Descartes divided the world into mental subjects and material 
objects, he put animals entirely on the side of the latter. This implied that they 
are complex machines without subjective experiences. Descartes argued as 
follows: “It seems reasonable since art copies Nature, and men can make 
various automata which move without thought, that Nature should produce its 
own automata, much more splendid than artificial ones. These natural automata 
are the animals.” 416  Only human beings remained mental subjects and 
consequently were treated to be superior over anything else. This led to 
„anthropocentrism,‟ in which human virtue or enjoyment constitutes what is 
valuable in itself and everything else is a means to that end.
417
  
The Descartian dualism and anthropocentrism provides developmentalism 
with theoretical foundations. Developmentalism assumes that human beings 
should process actively or even exploit nature. Its assumption is justified well 
by the Descartian worldview in which the former and the latter are divided 
respectively as subject and object, and the former is taken to be superior to the 
latter. The Descartian system supports developmentalism by penetrating into 
economic thought as well. The good example is the modern development of 
value theory, which tends to marginalize or deny the role of land, that is, nature. 
This leads to disregarding and degrading nature.       
In agricultural societies the two factors of production universally are land 
and labor. The question was not whether both were necessary but how to 
conceive their relation. The French physiocrats saw land as the active source of 
wealth. Land works along with the laborer in production. Indeed, the surplus 
product is considered to result solely from the contribution of land. Sir William 
Petty (1623-87), in contrast, is noted for his view that labor is the active 
principle and land is the passive principle. This emphasis continued in John 
Locke (1632-1704), who held that value is a function of the labor expended, and 
that it is this expenditure of labor that justifies private property. Locke treats the 
role of land negligible as far as the economic order is concerned. Nature‟s gifts 
are equally there for all until labor has been applied to them. Ricardo developed 
Locke‟s labor theory of value, denying a contribution by land to the 
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determination of exchange value or price even in the case of agricultural 
commodities.
418
  
Karl Marx followed Ricardo in this regard. Thus the passivity of land was 
followed by its exclusion from any contribution to value. In reaction to Marx‟s 
use of the labor theory of value, non-Marxist economists ceased to employ it. 
But they did not return to an analysis of the contribution of nature to production. 
On the contrary they thought to find the way in which subjective individual 
preferences, aggregated through the market, autonomously establish prices. In 
either case, land no longer contributes to value, and seen as passive, it ceased to 
be significant in the analysis of production.
419
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Chapter 4 
The Value-free [Positive] Methodology  
of Modern Economics 
 
 
The general denial of the need for a theory of social justice or an ethics of the 
common good in neo-liberalism and the consequent criticism of government‟s 
control over market and social expenditure are related to the so-called „value-
free‟ or „positive‟ methodology of modern economics. This is the connection we 
will investigate in the current chapter. As we will see, neo-liberalism‟s 
economic theory is rooted in a tradition in the philosophy of the social sciences 
that claims to base knowledge of human society on the separation of „fact‟ and 
„value‟. It is a tradition that in fact begins with Adam Smith. From his work 
onwards, economic theory has begun to adopt the positivistic methodology of 
natural sciences and the positivistic methodology has taken the dominant 
position by the middle of the 20
th
 century, mainly owing to the works of Lionel 
Robbins and Milton Friedman. The latter attracts our special attention because 
he has been one of the leading neo-liberal economists. His essay „the 
methodology of positive economics‟ (1953) has been one of the most influential 
texts on economic methodology since World War II. 
    First, we will discuss the traditional view of economics as a moral science 
until Alfred Marshall (1842-1924), who was one of the founders of neo-
classical economics. Although economics has begun to accept positivistic 
methodology since Adam Smith, economics has remained a moral science, at 
least to some extent, before Robbins and Friedman. Second, we will examine 
the influences of enlightenment philosophy upon the positivistic methodology 
by referring chiefly to Immanuel Kant and David Hume. Finally we will discuss 
the objections to the dichotomy between positive and normative of value-free 
economics.  
 
4.1. Traditional Economics as a Moral Science 
 
In the Scholastic tradition, economics was “a subordinate part of the broader 
theological/moral concerns.”420 For example, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) 
dealt mainly with moral issues in his economic discussions: the correct wage for 
labor, the just price, the prohibition of interest and usury and so on. The 
Scholastic influence lasted for a number of centuries. Owing to Mercantilism, 
which focuses upon increasing the wealth of businessmen and their countries 
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through government intervention, economics was gradually “escaping from the 
moral and ethical concerns of the past.”421 But until the 18th century economics 
was taught as a part of moral philosophy within the European universities.
422
 
Adam Smith, for instance, was a professor of moral philosophy at the 
University of Glasgow. We can find Adam Smith‟s words of Christian morality 
in the first edition of his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), which are 
preserved in James Bonar‟s Philosophy and Political Economy: 
 
If we consult our natural sentiments, we are apt to fear lest before the holiness of God, 
vice should appear to be more worthy of punishment than the weakness and 
imperfections of human vice can ever seem to be of reward. Man when about to appear 
before a being of infinite perfection can feel but little confidence in his own merit or in 
the imperfect propriety of his own conduct ... If he would still hope for happiness, he is 
conscious that he cannot demand it from the justice, but that he must entreat it from the 
mercy of God. Repentance, sorrow, humiliation, contrition at the thought of his past 
conduct are, upon this account, the sentiments that become him, and seem to be the only 
means which he has left for appeasing that wrath which, he knows, he has justly 
provoked…. Some other intercession, some other sacrifice, some other atonement, he 
imagines, must be made for him beyond what he himself is capable of making, before 
the purity of Divine justice can be reconciled to his manifold offences….
423
 
 
We can see several cases in which Smith mentions the moral problems of 
economic participants in the Wealth of Nations as well: 
 
Masters are always and every where in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform 
combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their natural rate … Masters too 
sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labour below this 
rate.
424
 
 
Our merchants and master-manufacturers complain much of the bad effects of high 
wages in raising the price, and thereby lessening the sale of their goods both at home 
and abroad. They say nothing concerning the bad effects of high profits. They are silent 
with regard to the pernicious effects of their own gains. They complain only of those of 
other people.
425
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People of the same trade seldom meet together even for merriment and diversion, but 
the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise 
prices.
426
 
 
The interest of the dealers, however, in any particular branch of trade or manufactures, 
is always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the public. [The 
dealers are] an order of man, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the 
public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and 
who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.
427
   
 
James Alvey argues that Smith‟s works are the outcomes and extensions of his 
moral philosophy: “As Smith‟s student John Millar explained, in Smith‟s course 
on moral philosophy there were four parts: natural theology, ethics (published 
as The Theory of Moral Sentiments, first edition 1759), justice (published 
posthumously from student notes as Lectures on Jurisprudence), and finally, 
„political regulations which are founded … [upon] expediency, and which are 
calculated to increase the riches, the power, and the prosperity of the state‟ (and 
largely published as The Wealth of Nations, first edition 1776) … For Smith, 
economics (or what he called political economy) was situated within this grand 
scheme of moral philosophy.”428   
    Other assessments of Smith‟s moral philosophy, on the other hand, find in 
it the beginnings of positivistic methodology. In Bob Goudzwaard‟s words: “It 
is the approach which tries to frame or mould economic thought increasingly to 
the natural sciences, with their admirable high standards of objectivity and 
measurement… Adam Smith…is the first economist who tries to understand 
economic life mechanically, as a functioning mechanism…In this way a new 
perspective was opened for Economics, which gradually became a type of real 
science as respectable, for instance, as Physics: a science built on its own 
scientific foundations, no longer dependent on insecure subjective opinions or 
normative value-judgments, but founded on the basis of experimentally-found 
concrete laws (supply and demand) and secure measurement (prices!).”429     
The next leading economist after Adam Smith was the Reverend Thomas 
Malthus (1766-1834). Although he was „the first professor of political economy 
in England,‟ he still took economics as a moral science.430 In contrast to David 
Ricardo (1772-1823), who thought of economics as a technical rather than 
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moral subject and „a strict science like mathematics,‟431 Malthus stated: “It has 
sometimes been said of political economy that it approaches to the strict science 
of mathematics. But I fear that it must be acknowledged, particularly since the 
great deviations which have lately taken place from the definitions and doctrines 
of Adam Smith, that it approaches more nearly to the sciences of morals and 
politics.”432  
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was the leading figure in economics after 
Malthus and Ricardo. His formal methodology distinguished between science 
(„what is‟) and art („what ought to be‟), following the Ricardian approach rather 
than the Smithian.
433
 But Mill considered the political economy as not being 
exact like physical sciences, saying that it “cannot be a science of positive 
predictions, but only of tendencies.”434 And, in practice, throughout his main 
book, “Principles of Political Economy with Some of their Applications to 
Social Philosophy (first edition 1848),” he repeatedly crossed „the line between 
science and art‟435 as the full title implies.436 James Alvey takes this example: 
“At the beginning of a chapter on wages, in the Principles, Mill indicates that 
his political economy is relevant to the question: „How is the evil of low wages 
to be remedied?‟ … There are policies that can be recommended to overcome 
this social „evil‟.”437 
Alfred Marshall (1842-1924), one of the founders of neo-classical 
economics, followed Mill “in the formal, narrow notion of the realm of 
economic science.”438 And he supported William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882, 
another founder of neo-classical economics) for replacing „political economy‟ 
as the name of the discipline with „economics‟ and fought for the independence 
of economics as a separate science at his university, Cambridge.
439
 Similar to 
Mill, however, he maintained „no sharp line between science and art.‟440 He 
presented the list of “practical issues which … supply a chief motive in the 
background to the work of the economist” including the following passage: 
“How should we act so as to increase the good and diminish the evil of 
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economic freedom, both in its ultimate results and in the course of its progress? 
… Taking for granted that a more equal distribution of wealth is to be desired, 
how far would this justify changes in the institutions of property, or limitations 
of free enterprise even when they would be likely to diminish the aggregate of 
wealth?”441 His Inaugural Address revealed a high moral tone: “It will be my 
cherished ambition, my highest endeavour, to do what … I may, to increase the 
number of those, whom Cambridge … sends out into the world with cool heads 
but warm hearts, willing to give some at least of their best powers to grapping 
with the social suffering around them.”442 
We can see some relations between these classical and early neo-classical 
economists‟ positions of economics as a moral science and their Christian 
backgrounds. John Maynard Keynes‟s biographical essay on Marshall contains 
an insightful summary of the relations in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century: 
 
    Marshall‟s Cambridge career came just at the date which will, I think, be regarded 
by the historians of opinion as the critical moment at which Christian dogma fell away 
from the serious philosophical world of England, or at any rate of Cambridge. In 1863 
Henry Sidgwick, aged twenty-four, had subscribed to the Thirty-Nine Articles as a 
condition of tenure of his Fellowship, and was occupied in reading Deuteronomy in 
Hebrew and preparing lectures on the Acts of the Apostles. Mill, the greatest intellectual 
influence on the youth of the age, had written nothing which clearly indicated any 
divergence from received religious opinions up to his Examination of Hamilton in 1865 
… Alfred Marshall [was] a candidate for holy orders … In 1869 Sidgwick resigned his 
Trinity Fellowship, „to free myself from dogmatic obligations.‟ A little later none of 
these could have been called Christians.  
Nevertheless, Marshall, like Sidgwick, was as far as possible from adopting an 
„anti-religious‟ attitude. He sympathized with Christian morals and Christian ideals and 
Christian incentives. There is nothing in his writings depreciating religion in any form: 
few of his pupils could have spoken definitely about his religious opinions. At the end 
of his life he said, „Religion seems to me an attitude,‟ and that, though he has given up 
Theology, he believed more and more in Religion. The great change-over of the later 
sixties was an intellectual change, not the ethical or emotional change which belongs to 
a later generation, and it was a wholly intellectual debate which brought it about.
443
     
 
During this period economics was gradually getting the status of a separate 
science and economists were gradually distancing themselves from religious 
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doctrines. But a good many Christian moral and cultural heritages remained and 
economics remained a moral science to some degree.
444
    
After Alfred Marshall the view of economics as a moral science declined. 
The key factor was that it has adopted the positivist methodology of the natural 
sciences. This trend culminated in the works of Lionel Robbins (1932) and 
Milton Friedman (1953) both of whom influenced the profession decisively.
445
 
They separated ethics strictly from economic science and asserted a stronger 
version of positivist economics. Their position has since become conventional 
wisdom in the mainstream economics. Alvey states, “While economists still 
tend to skip over methodological issues, they are generally „loose-fitting 
positivists‟. The impression is given – especially in the first class or two of the 
introductory course in economics, when methodology is mentioned – that 
economics deals with facts and the means to the end given by others.”446 
 
4.2. The Enlightenment Philosophies of Immanuel Kant and David Hume 
& the Value-free Economics 
 
In this section we will look at how the positivism of Enlightenment philosophy 
has influenced the decline of economics as a moral science and the development 
of value-free economics. We discuss the epistemological positions of Kant and 
Hume, the two main figures of Enlightenment philosophy, and connect them 
with the positivistic methodologies of economists. As Douglas Vickers puts this: 
“clear linkage will be found to exist between the philosophical, the 
epistemological, and methodological bequest of the eighteenth-century 
enlightenment and the „age of reason‟ on the one hand and the constructs of 
economic thought and procedures on the other.”447 Vickers sees Immanuel Kant 
as the central figure of the linkage and elaborates on his epistemology and its 
impact on modern economics: 
 
Economic thought, throughout its development and maturity in nineteenth century and 
on into its present Keynesian and neo-classical structures, has felt the powerful 
influence of the post-Kantian scientific epistemologies. These have stemmed in well-
known fashion from Kant‟s distinction between the phenomenal realm, the realm where 
things can be seen and touched and handled and measured on the one hand, and the so-
called noumenal realm on the other. It was in the former realm that the knowledge 
transaction completely occurred. Knowledge was abolished from the noumenal realm in 
order, as Kant said, to make way for faith …… the post-Kantian positivism which came 
to maturity in the inter-war years of this century appears to have influenced very heavily 
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the methodological procedures and the substance of economics, as well as those of the 
natural sciences.
448
 
 
    An influential position in this development is that of Max Weber, on the 
tradition of Kantian epistemology
449
, has developed an influential „value-free 
[wertfrei]‟ (the German counterpart of „positive‟) methodology of not only 
economics but also of social science in general. At first glance Weber‟s 
methodology appears modest. First, he points out the differences between social 
[cultural] and natural science. The laws of social science can‟t be universal or 
general in contrast to those of natural science: “Even in the case of all so-called 
„economic laws‟ without exception, we are concerned here not with „laws‟ in 
the narrower exact natural science sense, but with adequate causal relationships 
expressed in rules and with the application of the category of „objective 
possibility.‟ …… Laws are important and valuable in the exact natural sciences, 
in the measure that those sciences are universally valid …… In the cultural 
sciences, the knowledge of the universal or general is never valuable in 
itself.” 450  An endeavor to formulate socio-scientific theories by parallel 
methods to those of natural science is called to be „naturalistic prejudice.‟ It falls 
to fail since an access to the totality of the existing historical reality is 
impossible in social science.
451
     
Second, he recognizes inextricable relations between factual perception 
and value judgment in the social science: “In the empirical social sciences … 
the possibilities of meaningful knowledge of what is essential for us in the 
infinite richness of events is bound up with the unremitting application of 
viewpoints of a specifically particularized character, which, in the last analysis, 
are oriented on the basis of evaluative ideas …… The „objectivity‟ of the social 
sciences depends rather on the fact that the empirical data are always related to 
those evaluative ideas which alone make them worth knowing and the 
significance of the empirical data is derived from these evaluative ideas.”452 It 
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is through value ideas that we can select a portion of social phenomena as our 
subject matter and order them and lend them significance.
453
    
    But Weber advocates the value-free principle of the distinction between 
positive analysis and normative prescription more strongly than any other. His 
primary concern in his two main essays
454
 on methodology is to criticize the 
methods of German historical economists “in which social and economic 
sciences are fused with the framing of policies for social reform, with little or no 
regard to any distinction or demarcation between positive and normative.” He 
even expresses that “the mixing of normative with scientific questions was „the 
work of the devil.‟”455  
    Accordingly, Weber defines social science as „strictly empirical science‟456 
and confines its task to treating empirical facts: “In the pages of this journal, 
especially in the discussion of legislation, there will inevitably be found social 
policy, i. e., the statement of ideals, in addition to social science, i. e., the 
analysis of facts. But we do not by any means intend to present such discussion 
as „science‟…it should be constantly made to the readers …exactly at which 
point the scientific investigator becomes silent and the evaluating and acting 
person begins to speak. In other words, it should be made explicit just where the 
arguments are addressed to the analytical understanding and where to the 
sentiments.”457 Thus he opens the way of modern economics as a science, 
excluding the discussion of the normative outside of the proper realm of 
scientific investigation and marginalizing it as a secondary task or devolving its 
responsibility to a separate branch named „welfare economics.‟458 
    In addition we find a correspondence in methodology between natural and 
social science in an important sense. Even though Weber shows the difference 
between them, as mentioned above, he understands both of them as „empirical‟ 
study.
459
 Although he indicates the limited validity of socio-scientific laws, he 
thinks that they can be drawn by an causal imputation of social phenomena in a 
similar way to that of natural science, and affords them scientific justification: 
“Naturally, it does not imply that the knowledge of universal propositions, the 
construction of abstract concepts, the knowledge of regularities and the attempt 
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to formulate „laws‟ have no scientific justification in the cultural 
sciences…Everywhere, however, and hence also in the sphere of complicated 
economic process, the more certain and the more comprehensive our general 
knowledge the greater is the certainty of imputation.”460 
According to Bob Goudzwaard, Richard Strigl has played a decisive role in 
the construction of value-free system of economic sciences by applying Kant‟s 
ideas, especially, his doctrine of categories, to economics. Categories, for Kant, 
are principles by which one orders the chaos of sense perceptions. For example, 
we can order the chaos of our perceptions by making chronological or spatial 
distinctions or by grasping the causality of cause and effect. It is through the 
categories that we can obtain genuine knowledge.  
Strigl, borrowing Kant‟s concept of categories, invented „economic 
categories,‟461 which indicates the so-called „data circle,‟ a whole series of 
„given factors‟ for the economist. While „categories‟ for Kant are more 
positively used to combine disordered sensory experiences, „economic 
categories‟ for Strigl are more negatively used to eliminate all forms of 
uncertainty for gaining genuine knowledge:  
 
He [Strigl] stated that economists had to choose economic categories in order to 
organize and delineate the bounds of a set of given factors, thereby creating a realm for 
economic study within which economists could reach „objective‟ scientific conclusions. 
„Objective‟ here refers to statements having a degree of certainty and a capacity for 
prediction equal to those of natural sciences …… So he removed all forms of 
uncertainty from the economic scene by placing them in the category of a data cluster, 
making them into „given‟ factors for the economist. For example, the behavior of the 
rational consumer confronted with a rise or fall in the price of a good is initially 
uncertain. But the economist can predict the behavior of the rational consumer as 
another „given‟ as soon as the consumer's preferences (ends) are arbitrarily fixed. Then 
the consumer's behavior in the market follows simply as a natural, predictable outcome 
from these given preferences.
462
 
 
Goudzwaard continues to assert that Lionel Robbins, inheriting Strigl‟s 
system
463
, has articulated the standard value-free methodology for modern 
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economics, “On this Neo-Kantian foundation, together with Walter Eucken in 
Germany, Lionel Robbins has formulated the standard methodology for 
economic theory, a methodology still adhered to in textbooks today. When the 
ends of the economic agents, all natural endowments, and the social and 
political structure of society are given to him, the economist can devote himself 
fully and without hindrance to the task of explaining the economic process, the 
process of the workings of markets. His domain is restricted to that process. 
Standing atop his pile of givens, the economist can observe prices and their 
movements. Every economist can observe them in a neutral way, without any 
value judgment. In this way a neutral economic theory emerges, one which is 
outside of the realm of „values.‟”464  
“Everything which could possibly make the conclusions of the theory 
indeterminate” and require value judgments – the ends of the economic agents, 
all natural endowments, and the social and political structure of society and so 
on – “is shifted by economic theory to the data-circle as the big „asylum 
ignorantiae‟ of economics, the hiding place of all forms of ignorance.”465 Now 
the economist, with the help of the ceteris paribus („with other things the same‟) 
clause, is able to study “what is fully determinate and measurable and therefore 
can be „explained‟ – which boils down to no more than all the movements of 
prices and quantities within the market-mechanism” - in an „objective‟ 
deterministic way.
466
 
    Nobel-prize winner John Hicks selects David Hume as well as Immanuel 
Kant as philosophers of the Enlightenment who have suggested new direction to 
modern economics. Up to the 18
th
 century causality in a theologico-legal 
manner was universal. In the old causality “every event must either be the act of 
some person, who was thus responsible for it, or it must be an „Act of God.‟” 
But when “such purposeless disasters as the great Earthquake at Lisabon, on 
which Voltaire wrote his poem, a crushing reply to Pope,” occurred, the old 
causality was brought into question. In contrast, in their new causality “it was 
the „Old‟ association between Causality and Responsibility which had to be 
rejected. Causality is a matter of explanation; but when we explain, we do not 
necessarily praise or condemn.”467 Hicks adds that Adam Smith, the father of 
economics, “must have been thinking in terms of the New Causality. For Adam 
Smith … was a friend of Hume‟s …… Economics, ever since that day, has 
committed to the New Causality….”468 The adoption of the new causality in 
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economics is ascribed to Hume. David Hume thought that human and social 
sciences had to resemble the mechanical-mathematical methodology of natural 
sciences in order to increase their certainty.
469
  
Besides providing this impersonal and non-moral new causality, David 
Hume has heavily contributed to the development of a value-free economics in 
the Anglo-Saxon tradition by providing a clear definition of the distinction 
between „is‟ and „ought,‟ which has therefore been called „Hume‟s dichotomy.‟ 
His primary concern is to prevent us from basing moral judgments upon natural 
facts. In his own words:      
 
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd that 
the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the 
being of God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am 
supriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and, is not, I 
meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This 
change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as ought, or ought 
not, expresses some new relation of affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observ'd 
and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems 
altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which 
are entirely different from it.
470
 
 
G. E. Moore introduced the term „naturalistic fallacy‟ early in the 20th century 
for attempting to derive/deduce an „ought‟ from an „is,‟ and the principle that 
„one cannot deduce an ought from an is‟ is often considered to be the most 
enduring philosophical lesson of the positive-normative dichotomy.
471
 Based 
upon the same distinction, John Neville Keynes presents the authoritative 
economic formulation of separating the normative from the positive by using 
the Humean distinction between „is‟ and „ought.‟ It is worth quoting him at 
length: 
 
As the terms are used here, a positive science may be defined as a body of systematized 
knowledge concerning what is, a normative or regulative science as a body of 
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systematized knowledge relating to criteria of what ought to be, and concerned therefore 
with the ideal as distinguished from the actual; and art as a system of rules for the 
attainment of a given end. The object of a positive science is the establishment of 
uniformities, of a normative science the determination of ideas, of an art the formulation 
of precepts. The problem whether political economy is to be regarded as a positive 
science, or as a normative science, or as an art, or as some combination of these, is to a 
certain extent a question merely of nomenclature and classification. It is, nevertheless, 
important to distinguish economic enquiries according as they belong to the three 
departments respectively; and it is also important to make clear their mutual relations.
472
 
 
It is, however, noteworthy that while John Neville Keynes distinguishes 
between positive and normative, he doesn‟t think that normative ideas have no 
place in economics. In contrast, he sees the positive and the normative as 
different kinds of sciences, thus leaving the door open for economists to search 
for the realm of social welfare.
473
 Keynes‟ weaker version of „Hume‟s 
dichotomy‟ notwithstanding, Lionel Robbins presents the stronger version of it 
that has become conventional wisdom in mainstream economics. He argues not 
only that it is necessary to recognize that positive and normative statements are 
fundamentally different, but also that the normative is scientifically illegitimate 
and should be prohibited from the proper economic science
474
: 
 
Economics deals with ascertainable facts: ethics with valuations and obligations. The 
two fields of enquiry are not on the same plane of discourse. Between the 
generalizations of positive and normative studies there is a logical gulf fixed, which no 
ingenuity can disguise and no juxtaposition in space or time bridge over … Propositions 
involving the verb „ought‟ are different in kind from propositions involving the verb „is‟ 
… the validity of assumptions relating to the value of what exists or what may exist is 
not a matter of scientific verification, as is the validity of assumptions relating to mere 
existence … it is worth while delimiting the neutral area of science from the more 
disputable area of moral and political philosophy … It is fundamentally distinct from 
Ethics.
475
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    Robbins‟ position was endorsed and reinforced by a growing number of 
influential economists and the dissolution of ethics from economics was fairly 
definitively complete by the middle of the twentieth century.
476
 Paul Samuelson, 
for example, follows Robbins faithfully: “It is fashionable for the modern 
economist to insist that ethical value judgments have no place in scientific 
analysis. Professor Robbins in particular has insisted upon this point, and today 
it is customary to make a distinction between the pure analysis of Robbins qua 
economist and his propaganda, condemnations, and policy recommendations 
qua citizen … Wishful thinking is a powerful deterrent of good analysis and 
description, and ethical conclusions cannot be derived in the same way that 
scientific hypotheses are inferred or verified.”477 Samuelson relegates value 
judgments to a separate branch of the so-called „welfare economics‟ and doesn‟t 
consider it as a strictly scientific field: “But it is not valid to conclude from this 
that there is no room in economics for what goes under the name of „welfare 
economics‟ … It is only fair to point out, however, that the theorems enunciated 
under the heading of „welfare economics‟ are not meaningful propositions or 
hypotheses in the technical sense.”478  
    
Milton Friedman‟s view of the positive-normative dichotomy is essentially 
the same.
479
 He presented a hugely influential work on economic methodology, 
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„the methodology of positive economics‟ 480  in 1953, which, for many 
economists since World War II, was “the only essay on methodology that a 
large number, perhaps majority, of economists have ever read.” 481  He 
distinguishes between positive and normative economics strictly and accords the 
former the same kind of objectivity as that of physical science: “Positive 
economics is in principle independent of any particular ethical position or 
normative judgments …… Its task is to provide a system of generalizations that 
can be used to make correct predictions about the consequences of any change 
in circumstances. Its performance is to be judged by the precision, scope, and 
conformity with experience of the predictions it yields. In short, positive 
                                                                                                                                              
         Hayek asserts paradoxically that “the concern with „social justice‟ has 
become one of the greatest obstacles to the elimination of poverty.” (The Mirage 
of Social Justice, 139) The free market system has brought about the increase of 
aggregate income, which also has made it possible to improve the living of those 
who are left behind. “But the attempt to „correct‟ the results of the market in the 
direction of „social justice‟ have probably produced more injustice in the new 
form of privileges, obstacles to mobility and frustration of effort than they have 
contributed to the alleviation of the lots of the poor.” (The Mirage of Social 
Justice, 139-40) “[T]he phrase „social justice‟ is not, as most people probably feel, 
an innocent expression of good will towards the less fortunate, but ... it has 
become a dishonest insinuation that one ought to agree to a demand of some 
special interest which can give no real reason for it.” (The Mirage of Social 
Justice, 97) He shows his deep hostility to „social justice‟ by such expressions as: 
“the general belief in witches or ghosts,” “simply a quasi-religious superstition” 
and “I may ... have become unduly allergic to it.” (The Mirage of Social Justice, 
66, 97) In the same context he names the second volume of his Law, Legislation 
and Liberty series “The Mirage of Social Justice.” 
        This rejection of social (or distributive or economic, see The Mirage of Social 
Justice, 63, 100) justice is linked to the rejection of „social ethics.‟ He says that 
“the transition from the small group to the Great or Open Society” of free market 
“requires a reduction of the range of duties we owe to all others” ... and that “all 
those duties which are based on personal acquaintance and familiarity with 
individual circumstances must cease to be enforceable.”  (The Mirage of Social 
Justice, 90) In the point that he denies morality to a bigger social group than a 
small group consisting of relatives or friends and so on, he is also an anti-
normative economist. Although, in fact, Friedman and Hayek have different 
methodological positions, they have common academic directions of opposing 
„social justice and ethics‟ and thereby minimizing social welfare policies and 
social control over market. 
480
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economics is, or can be, an „objective‟ science, in precisely the same sense as 
any of the physical sciences.”482 
 
Friedman claims that positive economics plays a more decisive role in 
deciding appropriate economic policy than normative economics does: “[A] 
consensus on „correct‟ economic policy depends much less on the progress of 
normative economics proper than on the progress of a positive economics 
yielding conclusions that are, and deserve to be, widely accepted. It means also 
that a major reason for distinguishing positive economics sharply from 
normative economics is precisely the contribution that can thereby be made to 
agreement about policy.” 483  He takes the example of „minimum-wage 
legislation.‟ Even the opponents don‟t always oppose the very moral ideal of 
achieving a „living wage‟ for all. They, however, are only worried that legal 
minimum wages may dampen employment and thereby give rise to chronic 
poverty.
484
 To reach a social consensus of a particular economic policy, it is 
more necessary to analyze the pros and cons of an economic policy thoroughly 
on the basis of empirical evidence than to persuade its ethical propriety.  
   However, the dominant position of the positivist approach is proclaimed 
conclusively by Kurt Klappholz: “I have tried to show that the various claims, 
often advanced „… with an air of penetrating profundity‟, that economics is 
necessarily value-impregnated can easily be refuted. Why, then, should 
criticisms, which so clearly miss the target, continue to be urged so vociferously? 
And why should the defenders of the „orthodox‟ position respond to these 
criticisms by reiterating the principle of ethical neutrality-rather as if present-
day geographers continued to insist that the earth is not flat?”485 He compares 
those who disagree to the positive-normative dichotomy to flat-earth critics. He 
implies that the „orthodox‟ methodology is so obvious that there is nothing more 
to discuss.
486
  
 
4.3. The Objections to the Dichotomy between Positive and Normative of 
Value-free Economics    
 
But the standard view of value-free economics has not been universally 
accepted. Gunnar Myrdal is the most important figure. In the preface to the 
English edition of The Political Element in the Development of Economic 
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Theory in 1953, he stresses the impossibility of purely non-normative 
economics: “There lurks the idea that when all metaphysical elements are 
radically cut away, a healthy body of positive economic theory will remain, 
which is altogether independent of valuations …… This implicit belief in the 
existence of a body of scientific knowledge acquired independently of all 
valuations is, as I now see it, naïve empiricism.”487  
Furthermore, he claims that value judgments play a vital role in socio-
economic analysis in another work in 1961: “Valuations enter into social 
analysis, not only when conclusions concerning policy are drawn, but already in 
the theoretical endeavour to establish what is objectively true - in the choice of a 
field of enquiry, the selection of assumptions, even the decision as to what is a 
fact and what is a value.”488  Myrdal has clarified how deeply normative 
presuppositions have influenced economic reasoning and argument. Two main 
moral philosophies behind economic doctrines are natural law and utilitarianism. 
The theory of value is a good example:  
 
The whole history of economic thought is stamped by the notion that by recourse to 
purely logical operations it is possible to construct on the basis of empirical 
observations the concept of a kind of „value‟ which is somehow profounder than mere 
exchange-value or price. The classical concept of Real Value is derived from the 
philosophy of natural law. It is based upon the labour-value and property theories of 
Hobbes and Locke. Under the influence of utilitarian philosophy, the classical writers 
infused a psychological element into value theory. The neo-classical theory of 
Subjective Value or the theory of marginal utility was from its inception purely 
psychological. It is really just an elaboration of Bentham‟s hedonistic pleasure-pain 
calculus.
489
 
 
    The concept of Social Value is also developed to draw political norms for 
society as a whole on the same utilitarian tradition, which has created the 
individualistic Subject Value. The concept is implied in various expressions: 
social utility, general welfare, social housekeeping and public finance and so on. 
Bentham, for instance, concludes that a government policy of income 
redistribution would increase total utility of a society on the basis of the social 
pleasure calculus. Myrdal explains, “His argument is the same as that which 
was later elaborated by the marginal utility theorists, though they use it with 
reference to individual commodities in the first place. As a person‟s income 
rises the utility, which he derives from an additional unit of money, falls. He 
will satisfy his most important wants first. Gradually, as his income rises further, 
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he will meet less important wants. Given total social income, total utility is 
maximized if income is distributed equally.”490          
    „Social harmony‟ is another case of normative ideas, which pervades all 
economic theories and systems. Liberal economists adopt the doctrine of social 
harmony “in order to resolve two difficulties; first, the difficulty of estimating 
and computing individual utilities; second, the difficulty of basing both actual 
and moral action on pleasure and pain as empirical facts.”491 Myrdal says, “If it 
were true that the interests of individuals are always and everywhere 
harmonious, so that everyone, by promoting his own interests, promotes 
automatically the interests of all, there would be no need for a social 
summation.”492 Adam Smith makes a definite “expression in the words that the 
individual is „led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of 
his intentions….‟” 493  Mandeville tries even “to show that social welfare 
depends upon private vices …… The prosperity of a nation depends upon the 
acquisitive efforts of its citizens. But acquisitiveness has its roots in such 
immoral qualities as the desire for power, ambition, the love of luxury, etc.”494 
    Myrdal continues to argue that more progressive or socialist economists 
also presuppose the idea of harmony. He elaborates: “Laissez-faire was no 
longer considered to be in the interest of society under all circumstances. It was 
thought that there was room for improvement, particularly with respect to 
income and property distribution …… Harmony of interests was no longer 
thought to apply to the status quo but to a social order which had to be brought 
about. J. S. Mill introduced this revolutionary tendency into classical welfare 
theory …… It assumes tacitly that there is such a thing as the interest of society 
as a whole, and that particular interests, though superficially antagonistic, are at 
heart reconcilable.” 495  Even Marx, Myrdal adds, doesn‟t escape the idea 
altogether, “For Karl Marx history was a continuous class struggle of the 
exploited against the exploiters. But there is a vestige of the idea of a common 
welfare in his thesis that certain social phenomena are the natural results of 
certain productive conditions, which are realized with maximum efficiency, and 
develop, in due course, into new productive conditions.”496  
    Douglas Vickers, confirming Myrdal‟s position, takes various examples in 
which widely different visions and pre-theoretical commitments have affected 
different theoretical formations. He states, “For example, a pre-commitment to 
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forms of economic individualism, or to collectivist planning, liberal market 
capitalism or libertarianism, the inevitability of aggregative economic 
disharmony, or notions of degrees of equity or equality and justice, all have 
potential and deeply determinative influence. On more technical levels also, 
such pre-theoretical commitments may predispose an economist to or against a 
variety of initial positions. These may be, for example, a demand-pull or a cost-
push explanation of inflation, the imagined effectiveness of monetary or fiscal 
policy, or forms and degrees of market competitiveness and antitrust 
regulation.” 497  Vickers describes how economists are involved in value 
judgments, in particular, regarding social norms, “But the economist, by 
importing pre-determinative value judgments into his or her work, will be 
influenced in general by idiosyncratic conceptions of desirable social aims, to 
the achievement of which economics as a discipline might be thought capable of 
making some contribution. To the extent that such aims are determinative, even 
though they might not be precisely articulated at every turn, the economist‟s 
work that is imagined to be technical and value-free takes on, to use previous 
thought forms, a decided teleological and axiological character.”498           
    Vickers enumerates several scholars to illustrate that the positive and the 
normative are entangled together in economics.
499
 Paul Samuelson‟s well-
known paper, “An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without 
the Social Contrivance of Money” (1958)500 contributed to the development of 
„Overlapping Generations Theory,‟ which had a heavy influence on subsequent 
theories of money and macroeconomics. He deals with the following issue: 
“Suppose individuals want to save for their old age, when they cannot produce 
anything, and suppose nothing lasts from one period to the next. All people can 
do if they don‟t want to starve is to strike a bargain during their working years 
so that those who are younger will support them when they are retired. In a 
world of endlessly overlapping generations of workers and retirees, what will 
the pattern of interest be?”501  
Samuelson begins with such a positive question concerning the effects on 
interest rates of the desire to save for retirement, but shifts midway to the 
normative question of the efficiency of competitive market. He believes that the 
socially optimal biological rate of interest (equal to the rate of population 
growth) could be achieved by means of competitive markets with a social 
contract, in which people collectively agree to an obligation to support retirees, 
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or „fiat money‟502, which they agree to accept from retirees, rather than do 
without it. And the two major initial comments on Samuelson‟s paper by 
William Meckling and Abba Lerner originate respectively from a concern to 
defend competitive markets without a social contract and a concern to defend 
the social security system while doubting the efficiency of competitive markets. 
What appears on the surface to be a highly technical analysis draws heavily on 
the normative positions of the efficiency of competitive markets.
503
 Daniel 
Hausman describes Samuelson‟s contradiction of methodological doctrine and 
practice in this case as “a vivid example of the methodological schizophrenia of 
contemporary economics.”504      
   Gary Becker, one of the representatives of the Chicago School, explicates 
his normative assumptions more openly. He applies economic analytical 
categories to the explanation of human behavior, relating, for example, to the 
family, fertility, marriage, and crime and punishment.
505
 He assumes the 
ubiquity and determinative relevance of “maximizing behavior506 … and the 
existence of markets that with varying degrees of efficiency coordinate the 
actions of different participants … so that their behavior becomes mutually 
consistent.”507 He, adding stable preferences (such as health, prestige, sensual 
pleasure, benevolence, or envy), to the previous two, suggests three main 
assumptions of economic human behavior: “The combined assumptions of 
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maximizing behavior, market equilibrium, and stable preferences, used 
relentlessly and unflinchingly, form the heart of the economic approach.”508   
Another example is a group of scholars participating in a neo-Marxian 
revival movement of the so-called „Post-modern Marxism.‟ It began in the late 
1980s with Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff‟s book „Knowledge and 
Class‟ 509  and was expanded mainly by their disciples in University of 
Massachusetts Amherst, USA.
510
 They take the concept of „class‟ as their basic 
entry point of social analysis, which “is shot through with normative 
assumptions and propositions.”511  
For example, Wolff and Resnick apply the Marxian concept of class or 
exploitation to households like this: “Many housewives have traditionally 
performed the labor required to make meals, clean rooms, and repair clothing, 
Such women also perform surplus labor – that is, they produce a quantity of 
meals, cleaned rooms, and repaired clothing that exceeds their own personal 
requirements for or consumption of these products. Their husbands, cotenants of 
these households, typically appropriate the surplus labor embodied in these 
surplus products.”512 The group of post-modern Marxists has continued to 
publish their quarterly journal „Rethinking Marxism‟ since 1988, which has 
dealt with various topics such as gender, race, the labor theory of value, crisis 
theory, capitalism and imperialism.  
Finally, Amartya Sen, the 1998 Nobel-prize winner, has questioned the 
monopolistic status of „self-interest‟ in the standard economic explanation of 
human behavior. His essay on „Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral 
Foundations of Economic Theory‟ (1977) proposes that we have to consider not 
only the normative assumption of self-interest but also the other normative 
assumptions of „sympathy‟ and „commitment‟.513 In the essay he focuses upon 
examining „commitment.‟ Commitment is related especially to a variety of 
groups intermediate between oneself and all – “for example, families, friends, 
local communities, peer groups, and economic and social classes”.514  
He takes an example of „work motivation‟ to highlight the importance of 
commitment, “Every economic system has, therefore, tended to rely on the 
                                                          
508
 Gary Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, 5, quoted in Vickers, 
Economics and Ethics, 71. 
509
 Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff, Knowledge and Class: A Marxian Critique of 
Political Economy (Chicago and London: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1987). 
510
 Cf. J. K. Gibson-Graham, Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff, eds., Re/presenting 
Class: Essays in Post-modern Marxism (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 2001). 
511
 Vickers, Economics and Ethics, 71. 
512
 Richard Wolff and Stephen Resnick, Economics: Marxian versus Neoclassical 
(Baltimore/ London: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1987), 219.  
513
 Amartya Sen, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of 
Economic Theory,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (Sum. 1977): 317-344. 
514
 Amartya Sen, “Rational Fools”: 318, 344. 
134 
 
existence of attitudes toward work which supersedes the calculation of net gain 
from each unit of exertion …… I am persuaded that Britain's present economic 
difficulties have a great deal to do with work-motivation problems that lie 
outside the economics of rewards and punishments, and one reason why 
economists seem to have so little to contribute in this area is the neglect in 
traditional economic theory of this whole issue of commitment and the social 
relations surrounding it.”515 He then argues that “these questions are connected, 
of course, with ethics, since moral reasoning influences one's actions, but in a 
broader sense these are matters of culture, of which morality is one part.”516 
Sen attempts to reinterpret Adam Smith who has been supposed to be a 
protagonist of the exclusively self-interested behavior in On Ethics and 
Economics (1987).
517
 Smith‟s understanding of moral sentiments was 
influenced by Stoicism so that “both sympathy and self-discipline played such 
an important part in Smith‟s conception of good behavior.”518 Sen quotes the 
words of Smith himself, “man, according to the Stoics, ought to regard himself, 
not as something separated and detached, but as a citizen of the world, a 
member of the vast commonwealth of nature …… to the interests of this great 
community, he ought at all times to be willing that his own little interest should 
be sacrificed.”519  
Sen revisits Smith‟s well-known passage, “It is not from the benevolence 
of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from 
their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity 
but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their 
advantages.”520 He insists that “what Smith is doing here is to specify why and 
how normal transactions in the market are carried out, and why and how 
division of labour works, which is the subject of the chapter in which the quoted 
passage occurs. But the fact that Smith noted that mutually advantageous trades 
are very common does not indicate at all that he thought self-love alone… could 
be adequate for a good society.”521 And then Sen adds: “The defense of self-
interested behavior comes in specific contexts, particularly related to various 
contemporary bureaucratic barriers and other restrictions to economic 
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transactions which made trade difficult and hampered production.” 522  He 
concludes: “The misinterpretation of Smith‟s complex attitude to motivation 
and markets, the neglect of his ethical analysis of sentiments and behavior, fits 
well into the distancing of economics from ethics that has occurred with the 
development of modern economics.”523 
   Douglas Vickers ends his discussion of value-free economics with a couple 
of instructive remarks. First, he, similar to Myrdal, asserts that economists 
should recognize honestly the inevitability of value judgments throughout their 
economic activities – not only policy proposals but also theoretical analyses - 
and reveal clearly where value judgments are made and what they are: “In the 
light of the inevitability of its value-impregnation, economic argument …… 
should strive consistently to make its values and value judgments explicit and 
clearly recognizable. That applies to a number of the economist‟s activities: the 
selection of fields of study, the conceptualization of research problems and 
agendas, the methods of enquiry, the interpretation of data and the way in which 
„facts‟ are to be understood and defined as relevant, and the behavior criteria or 
policy proposals that follow.”524  
Second, he suggests that the distinction between descriptive and analytical 
economics would be more appropriate and productive than the established 
distinction between normative and positive economics: “the inevitable value 
impregnation of economic argument suggests that the unsustainable normative-
positive distinction might more usefully be replaced by a different 
methodological distinction. That is the division between descriptive economics 
on the one hand and analytical economics, with all its scope for model-building 
and its assumption content, on the other …… Value judgments remain. But 
their presence and, moreover, their determinative influence can be recognized 
on both the descriptive and the analytical levels.”525  
Finally, Vickers re-emphasizes the inseparable relations between 
economics and value judgments by reminding us of the fact that both its 
subjects and objects are human beings: “The economy is not a mere machine, 
and the economist, along with the worker and every other participant in the 
economy at every level and stage, is not, and cannot be, and cannot be expected 
to be, a part of the machinery. Economics takes its place among the intellectual 
disciplines by recognizing the heavy moral import of the fact that it is a human 
science, whose objects of investigation are thinking, sentient, acting, and 
reacting beings.”526 
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Chapter 5 
The Christian Responses to the Neo-liberal Economic 
Thoughts, Practices and Methodology 
 
 
In this chapter we ponder how Christians could respond to the neo-liberal 
principles, practices and methodology, which were discussed in the previous 
chapters. We refer mainly to the figures of Calvinistic Reformed tradition such 
as Abraham Kuyper, Bob Goudzwaard and Douglus Vickers.
527
 First, we 
present the main neo-liberal concepts of market, economics and globalization 
which are composed of the principles of global capitalism in Chapter 2, and 
suggest the Christian alternative views of them. Second, we evaluate the 
previous case studies – tax havens, labor-management relations and real estate – 
in Chapter 3 and propose the Christian alternative ideas and practices of them. 
Lastly, we criticize the neo-liberal value-free economic methodology, examined 
in Chapter 4, from the perspective of a Christian epistemology, and also talk 
about the dichotomy between economics and Christian faith, which is 
accompanied by the value-free economic methodology. 
 
5.1. The Christian Alternative Views of Markets, Economics and 
Globalization 
 
The value-free methodology of neo-liberal economics, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, and its antinomian philosophy of subjectivism and 
utilitarianism, as discussed in 2.5., lead us to understand the economic 
developments around us as „non-ethical‟ or „morally neutral.‟ Against the value-
free understanding of economy, Christian scholars attempt to suggest a set of 
alternative value-impregnated concepts of the economic world. Here we discuss 
the neo-liberal concepts of market, economics and globalization, which were the 
main components of the principles of global capitalism in 2.1-2.2. 
First, let us start with the value-free view of markets. The view of market 
as a self-regulating mechanism, as discussed in 2.1., does not allow us to 
consider it ethically. Just as we have traced the idea of a self-regulating free 
market back to them in 2.3., Ulrich Duchrow and Franz Hikelammert trace the 
idea of a „non-ethical‟ or „unethical‟ market to Bernard Mandeville and Adam 
Smith. Both of them are Scottish Enlightenment thinkers and inherit the idea of 
the „unintended or spontaneous order,‟ which bring about the idea of automatic 
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market mechanism. On the basis of their thoughts Max Weber develops his 
view of a „non-ethical‟ market. Duchrow and Hinkelammert describe, “He [Max 
Weber] claimed … that the capitalist market was „non-ethical‟; I couldn‟t have 
anything to do with ethics because it simply followed the competition laws of 
the market that led to „lordless slavery.‟”528 
Goudzwaard takes a Reformed view of market. Although the government 
needs to control harmful effects of market, market has to be recognized as an 
independent institution and operate owing to its own calling. In his own words: 
“All these gifts have their own intrinsic calling and dignity before the Lord. 
John Calvin, who has been seriously misinterpreted and misunderstood, was, for 
instance, quite convinced that markets should be seen as good gifts of the 
Creator because they are vehicles for human beings to serve one another in true 
solidarity. In equally exalted language, he praised civil government as the 
institution by which God offers a peaceful life to all. That is the purpose for 
which government may use the far-reaching power of the sword to uphold 
public justice.”529 His opinion of market has moral connotations as we find in 
the expressions like „solidarity‟ and „justice.‟ 
Herman Daly and John Cobb, Jr. also provide us with a fresh outlook of 
market. They distinguish between „market‟ (an original and positive one as the 
basic organizing principle of the economy) and „Market‟ (a gigantic and 
destructive one as the basic organizing principle of society), based on 
Polanyi.
530
 In the former mutual exchanges and gifts take place in order to 
fulfill the various needs of communities according to the principle of 
„reciprocity.‟   
Second, we talk about the value-free definition of economics. We name 
neo-liberal economy as a „fictitious economy‟ in 2.2. The fictitious economy is 
connected with „formal economy,‟ indicating the activity for making profit in 
the market and being formally recorded as statistics of economic achievements 
like GNP rather than with „substantial economy,‟ indicating the activity of 
producing and distributing real goods and services, which includes housework, 
non-market exchange and volunteer work, and so on. The fictitious economy, 
that is to say, is concerned more about making maximum results and profits 
from minimum resources and costs than about satisfying our real wants. So it 
prefers to regard economy as a technical mechanism which is not related to 
moral issues such as what the real human needs are and how to meet them.  
Christian scholars, in contrast, lay stress on the latter „substantial economy‟ 
and pay attention to its moral aspects. Goudzwaard looks into the Greek word 
oikonomia that corresponds to the economics and reveals its moral implications: 
“Oikonomia is a well-known word found in the New Testament for instance in 
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Luke 16:2 and 4 in the parable of the unjust steward. The steward is called 
oikonomos and is called to render account of his oikonomia (his management of 
the household-oikos) by his lord …… Firstly, the word is clearly used in a 
context of responsibility. Secondly, it has a connotation of not being in ultimate 
control: the landlord is the owner. And thirdly, it is related etymologically to the 
word nomos meaning rule or law. There are rules which must be observed so 
that the household may be upheld and preserved …… Responsibility, acting on 
another‟s behalf, and care: three notions which we look for in vain in the 
foundations of modern economics.”  
He continues to mention Aristotle‟s distinction between Oikonomia (“the 
art and science of good household management”) and Chrematistike (“the art of 
acquiring and accumulating money”) in order to highlight the moral traits of the 
former biblical term of economics: “So chrematistike comes in existence as 
standing in direct opposition to oikonomike … For chrematistike does not 
recognize limits …… The limitless quest for wealth in terms of money 
characterizes modern economics, rather than the maintenance of a restricted 
stock of necessary, useful goods.” Similarly, when he begins to criticize the 
present neo-liberal economy, Ulrich Duchrow uses the same distinction between 
the two terms: “Aristotle analyzed the difference between the need-oriented 
household economy and the money-accumulation economy.  
The basic point is that Aristotle regarded the „oikonomia‟, the household 
economy, as being designed to supply the basic needs of the household and of 
the community as a whole. This means that the prime goal of a natural economy 
is to meet basic human needs. In other words, property and goods can be 
regarded in a strict sense as a means of sustaining life, i.e. intended for practical 
use …… Aristotle recognized two forms of this money-accumulation economy: 
trade for the sake of profit … and business to earn interest … The goal of the 
first is the creation of monopoly and price speculation, and that of the second is 
usury. Aristotle regarded both as unnatural and dangerous to households and the 
community at large.”531 
Lastly, let us discuss the value-free concept of globalization itself. We 
point out dark sides of the current globalization in 2.1. It has an imperialistic 
aspect of being fundamentally built on the American military power and dollar 
seigniorage. It also has a destructive aspect of expanding inequality, poverty and 
ecological degradation internationally and even in the United States. The dark 
sides of the current global capitalism require us to rethink of the common value-
free view of globalization.  
Goudzwaard presents the common view of globalization, “The dominant 
view … is that globalization is a factual process of worldwide economic and 
technological development and increasing international trade … Even more 
often, globalization is described as an inevitable and therefore neutral process of 
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ongoing worldwide modernization to which there are simply no alternatives.”532 
Against the common view, the writers of the booklet “Economic Globalization: 
A Critical View and an Alternative Vision” distinguish between globalization in 
general and economic globalization, and criticizes the latter: “While 
globalization understood as increasing internationalization of ideas, science, 
communication and technology is considered a fact of life, there is a concerted 
effort by a few countries and corporations to enforce a kind of economic 
globalization which favours a few and impoverishes millions of people in the 
world…The ecumenical family considers economic globalization as an 
institutional expression of a powerful ideology – a system of beliefs and 
practices which, although claimed by its proponents to be universal, reflect a 
particular web of values dominated by western societies. Its values are western, 
not Christian.”533 
    However Goudzwaard warns us not to oppose globalization 
undiscriminatingly. He reminds us that “the Christian church…was, from the 
start, also meant to become a global community,”534 taking her members as not 
only Jews but also the people of all the other nations of world. He also claims 
that the Bible contains the unique idea and word of globalization, “In his letter 
to the Ephesians, Paul writes about the last mystery that God is unveiling, 
namely, „to bring all things in heaven and on earth together under on head, even 
Christ‟ (1:10) …The Greek word for administration, which is used here, has the 
same root as the word economy. Thus, we might say that God‟s economy entails 
its own style of globalization, oriented to the coming of his Messiah King.”535 
He asserts that the good question is not “Whether Christians should be for or 
against globalization,” but “What kind of globalization should we be 
supporting?”536 
 
5.2. The Christian Ideas and Practices in reference to the Previous Case 
Studies 
 
Here we evaluate the previous case studies – tax havens, labor-management 
relations and real estate – in Chapter 3 and propose the Christian alternative 
ideas and practices of them. In the case studies we examined neo-liberal 
practices and its background ideas in the three selected areas which correspond 
respectively to the three factors of production – capital, labor and land. Neo-
liberal self-regulating market economy requires the „commodification‟ of all the 
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factors of production. Our evaluations of those case studies are founded on the 
analyses of the „commodification‟ and the subsequent „instrumentalization‟ of 
capital, labor and land. 
In the first case study of „3.1. Tax Havens‟ tax havens allowed uncontrolled 
„commodification of money‟ by means of the fiction of „secrecy space,‟ and 
facilitated the extreme separation between finance and production or between 
formal and substantial economy, and the most serious separation between 
economy and society as well. We appraise the uncontrolled „commodification of 
money‟ or its unlimited accumulation by exploiting the fiction of secrecy space 
of tax havens and its socially harmful effects on the basis of Biblical teachings 
of „Mammonism‟ and its enslaving power.  
In the second case study of “3.2. The Labor-Management Relations in 
South Korea” the „commodification of labor‟ was related to the idea of „labor 
market flexibility‟ since the 1997 crisis, and the idea led to deepening the 
antagonistic labor-management relations. In opposition to the commodification 
of labor and the idea of „labor market flexibility‟ we discuss the „intrinsic value 
of human labor.‟ We also introduce the Dutch Protestant church‟s cooperative 
views and experiences as a reference to overcoming the antagonistic labor-
management relations.  
In the third case study of “3.3. The Real Estate in South Korea‟ the 
„commodification of real estate,‟ which was accompanied by the „liberalization 
of the real estate market‟ since the crisis, brought about disparity of real estate 
between rich and poor and ecological destruction. The disparity of real estate 
was connected to the idea of „the absolutism of the Private Property Right,‟ and 
the ecological destruction to the ideas of (neo-) developmentalism and the 
Descartian dualism between man and nature. We suggest „the public concept of 
real estate‟ in opposition to the former idea and the view of „the intrinsic value 
of nature‟ in opposition to the latter ideas. 
 
5.2.1. Tax Havens 
 
5.2.1.1. Tax Havens: For Absolute Freedom or For Slavery? 
 
Capitalism‟s dream has always been total detachment from the social world. It 
is no surprise that the vision of an „offshore republic‟ emerged in the 1970s, for 
then the burdens imposed on capital by the industrialized nations had never 
been higher. Tax rates soared throughout the member states of the Organizations 
for Economic Cooperation and Development. National restrictions and 
regulations on the movement and exchange of money kept capital locked into 
individual states, hobbled by fiscal and monetary instability, rocketing inflation, 
and political crises. Capital‟s call on liberalization and deregulation began to 
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appeal to mainstream politics, desperately to dig itself out of the hole of 
economic depression.
537
 
    Tax havens regenerate Western capitalism and imbue it with the revengeful 
spirit of a creature long repressed, sick of mere survival. The offshore illuminati 
had long known the survival value to capitalism of the secret haven, safe from 
the rest of the world, where fortunes could be hidden and business turned 
around free from state diktat. The ancient order of capital had long known 
Switzerland. But new islands and countries competitively availed themselves 
and offered capital the absolute detachment it craved. Their slogan is like this: 
“No taxes of any kind. No reports to any government. Confidential accounts 
with complete privacy.” Capital‟s desire for absolute global freedom was now a 
distinct possibility, not a distant hope.
538
  
    But Bob Goudzwaard admonishes us of money‟s enslaving power in 
commenting upon Luke 16:13 [“No servant can be the slave of two masters 
…… You cannot serve God and Money (Mammon), NEB (New English 
Bible)]”: “Already Adam Smith spoke of money in terms of the power to 
command goods, and Milton Friedman related money used in a market 
economy primarily to the „freedom to choose‟ …… Money gives its users the 
impression that they have the power to command or control, but the more they 
come to trust it, the easier they are deprived of their real freedom and dignity 
…… For money has the inbuilt power to enslave.”539 And he reveals money‟s 
empire-building quality and contrasts „the Kingdom of God‟ with „the Kingdom 
of Mammon‟: 
 
Money may look to us like a simple facilitating device for human economic interaction, 
but for Jesus its primary characteristic is obviously its empire-building quality or 
potential. It is an empire which grows and expands primarily in the human heart, but 
which, if it becomes fully grown, comes out and reveals itself in all of its features as a 
kind of anti-Kingdom … For then it begins … to suggest to the human mind its own 
type of endlessness … Money within that realm is changing from a modest means into 
… the goal for life …… The human subject ends as a slave who obediently follows all 
the rules of a never-ending accumulation of money or capital …… 
    Jesus makes crystal clear that money, because of its enormous potential to seduce 
people and nations, can also take the lead in the creation of overmastering empire: the 
Kingdom of Mammon. It is a kingdom or empire which functions in all its traits as a 
kind of opposite to the Kingdom of God: in its view of life, in its view of the other, in its 
view of the self, of wealth, of righteousness, of liberty, and of the reality of nature. So 
there is indeed no „freedom to choose‟ for both: you can never be a loyal citizen of both 
kingdoms.
540
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  In the present world economy the expression of „the Kingdom of Mammon‟ 
carries for us an association with tax havens. We may say that tax havens 
symbolize „the Kingdom of Mammon.‟ See William Brittain-Catlin‟s 
description of the Cayman Islands, one of the well-known tax havens in the 
footnote below
541, which illustrates tax haven‟s high status and controlling 
power.  
    The association of Mammonism with tax havens is in line with Karl 
Marx‟s analysis of interest-bearing capital.542 He thinks that capital‟s fetishism 
reaches its height in interest-bearing capital, which expands its own value 
independently of real production. Today the interest-bearing capital has its 
strongest foothold in tax havens. Let‟s look at Marx‟s words: 
 
In interest-bearing capital, therefore, this automatic fetish, self-expanding value, money 
generating money, are brought out in their pure state; and in this form it no longer bears 
the birthmarks of its origin …… It is the capacity of money, or of a commodity, to 
expand its own value independently of reproduction-which is a mystification of capital 
in its most flagrant form …… In its capacity as interest-bearing capital, capital claims 
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the ownership of all wealth which can ever be produced, and everything it has received 
so far is but an installment for its all-engrossing appetite. By its innate laws, all surplus-
labour which the human race can ever perform belongs to it, Moloch …… The concept 
of capital as a fetish reaches its height in interest-bearing capital.
543
 
    
    Raymond Baker compares today‟s supporters of tax havens544 with the 
supporters of the slave trade in the 18
th
 century and quotes William Snelgrave‟ 
[A New Account of the Slave Trade]: “The traders herein have as much to plead 
in their own excuse as can be said of some other branches of trade, namely the 
advantage of it. From this trade proceeds benefits far outweighing all mischiefs 
and inconveniences, and let the worst that can be said of it, it will be found with 
a mixture of good and evil”.545 According to his estimate about $1 trillion of 
dirty money crosses borders annually through tax havens, and half of it transfers 
out of poor countries into rich countries. Tax havens are one of the main sources 
of the increasing disparities between poor and rich nationally and internationally, 
which debases our humanity. 
 
5.2.2. Labor-Management Relations 
 
5.2.2.1. The Intrinsic Value of Human Labor 
 
In 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 we showed that the neo-liberal industrial relations since the 
1997 financial crisis are characterized by labor market flexibility and re-
strengthened antagonism. In this section we evaluate the former, and in the next 
one the latter.      
    The argument of „labor market flexibility‟ might trace back to Mises. He 
says that if workers “did not act as trade unionists, but reduced their demands 
and changed their locations and occupations according to the requirements of 
the labor market, they could eventually find work”; and “unemployment in the 
capitalist countries is due to the fact that the policy both of the government and 
of the trade unions aims at maintaining a level of wages which is out of 
harmony with the existing productivity of labor.” He mentions not only the 
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flexibility of worker‟s demands, but even of their locations or occupations. 
Furthermore, he asserts government or trade union‟s non-intervention into labor 
market.
546
 
In Polanyi‟s opinion, Mises‟ statements of labor market flexibility 
presuppose a system based on the postulate of „the commodity character of 
labor‟. Such a postulate implies for the worker extreme instability of earnings, 
utter absence of professional standards, abject readiness to be shoved and 
pushed about indiscriminately, complete dependence on the whims of the 
market. For labor is considered to be merely one factor of production known as 
labor power.
547
 But, as we have already discussed in section 2.2., labor is not a 
commodity. Labor is simply another name for a human activity which goes with 
life itself, which in its turn is not produced for sale but for entirely different 
reasons, nor can that activity be detached from the rest of life, be stored or 
mobilized.    
    To take human labor as a commodity means to see and value it 
„instrumentally,‟ as if it had no more than an economic value because of its 
eventual economic results. In opposition to this view Max Weber coined the 
expression „intrinsic value of human labor‟ (Eigenwert der Arbeit ). For in the 
context of a healthy, careful life every human being needs to be honored as a 
living, sensitive, creative economic subject. A careful disposition of human 
labor, therefore, presupposes that restraints are formulated and observed to 
prevent mental and physical harm to the persons involved – restraints in the 
intensity, the duration and the nature of use (for instance dull and soul-
destroying labor).
548
    
    By referring to the Jubilee law of Leviticus 25 (especially, v. 53 “do not 
drive your laborer with ruthless severity”), Goudzwaard criticizes the view of 
taking labor as merely instrumental factor:   
 
If we consider labor, nature, land and capital as just instrumental factors, then they are 
only seen and valued in terms of what they can offer us by more output (or exports). 
And so, we are then in fact placing them outside of the context of real life. Then factor-
markets indeed become chill „mechanisms of allocation‟, which are allowed to deal with 
living persons as objects, including them and excluding them from economic life 
according to the „necessity laws‟ of increasing efficiency and profitability …… Each 
factor-price should in principle include the cost of the necessary care for the human 
quality of labor and the sustainability of labor and be adapted to the living conditions of 
the needy …… The highest external growth or output of our economies should in any 
case never be allowed to be, or become, a tyrannous god.
549
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In another article Goudzwaard cites more Biblical regulations that intend to 
protect the dignity of even a slave: 
 
Try to visualize the positions of an Israelite who became so deeply entangled in debt 
that he had to sell himself and his family to his neighbor to work his neighbor‟s field. 
We should note that such a slave had a number of God-given rights. He had the right to 
the Sabbath rest during which he could not be given slave‟s work. He also retained the 
right of redeeming himself…When a slave lost but a single tooth, he was immediately 
set free. And when he ran away from his master, it was assumed that his master had 
treated him cruelly. Therefore he did not have to be returned. 
What happened to the slave who was not liberated in either of these ways? …The 
dawning of the year of Sabbath meant that the slave and his children were set free, and 
his debts were considered paid. Moreover, in the year of Jubilee the land that he first 
possessed through his family line was returned to him. This was not all. The master for 
whom the slave worked was obligated to give the former slave young livestock and food 
for a whole year…He could make a new beginning.
550
 
 
In his opening address of the 1891 First Dutch Christian Social Congress 
Abraham Kuyper has already made a sharp criticism of mistreating workers as 
an instrument and associated his dignity with „God‟s image‟: 
 
The divine ordinance, „in the sweat of your brow shall you eat your bread,‟ stands out 
specifically with respect to that physical labor which is always a primary component of 
the social question. And next to it stands also this: „The worker is worthy of his hire‟; 
you shall not defraud him of his wage, much less withhold it. (See Luke 10:7, James 5:4, 
Deut. 24:5). The Lord says specifically through Moses (Deut. 24:14): „Thou shalt not 
oppress a hired servant that is poor,‟ nor hold back his wage (Lev. 19:3). You shall in 
the laborer honor a fellow man, of one blood with you, so that debasing him to a mere 
instrument will be alienating your own brother (Mal. 2:10). The worker must be able to 
live as one created in the image of God…To mistreat the workmen as a „piece of 
machinery‟ is and remains a violation of his human dignity. Even worse, it is a sin going 
squarely against the sixth commandment, thou shall not kill, and this includes killing the 
worker socially.
551
     
 
5.2.2.2. The Dutch Protestant Church’s Cooperative Views of Labor-
Management Relations 
 
Antagonistic labor-management relations have continued from the period of the 
military dictatorial regimes until after the financial crisis. The status of work has 
greatly risen since the 1987 Great Workers‟ Struggle. But because workers 
faced a life-or-death situation again after the financial crisis, it still seems 
                                                          
550
 Bob Goudzwaard, Aid for the Overdeveloped West, 25-6. 
551
 Abraham Kuyper, Christianity and the Class Struggle, trans. Dirk Jellema (Grand 
Rapids, Michigan: Piet Hein Publishers, 1950), 56-7.  
146 
 
impossible to form the labor-management relations of dialogue and cooperation. 
We researched into the Dutch Protestant Church‟s view as a reference to renew 
the antagonistic relations. That view was precisely developed to counteract the 
antagonistic character of Dutch labor-management relations in the late 19
th
 
century. Even though the Dutch Protestant circle doesn‟t have a completely 
unified opinion, we simplify it to compare it with the Korean case. We leave the 
more detailed research covering the differences within the Protestant church and 
the critiques of the Catholic and Socialist circles for a future project. 
 
(1) Abraham Kuyper: An Organic View of Human Society and the 
Principle of Sphere Sovereignty 
 
Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) provides a crucial theoretical framework of the 
Dutch Protestant social movement - including the labor movement.
552
 
Regarding the development of cooperative labor-management relations, we may 
mention two core elements of his social vision. We can find them in his opening 
address of the 1891 Christian social congress, which his Anti-Revolutionary 
Party held with Patrimonium,
553
 the first of the great Protestant worker‟s 
organizations in the Holland. 
    First he presents an organic view of human society: 
  
Our national society is … „not a heap of souls on a piece of ground,‟ but rather a God-
willed community, a living, human organism. Not a mechanism put together from 
separate parts; not a mosaic … inlaid with pieces like a floor; … we are members of 
each other, and thus the eye cannot get along without the foot, nor the foot without the 
eye. It is this human, this scientific, this Christian truth, by which the French Revolution 
was most deeply misjudged, most stoutly denied, and most grievously assailed; and it is 
profoundly against the individualism of the French Revolution, born from this denial, 
that the whole movement of society in our times is turned.
554
 
 
If the question is raised whether our human society is an aggregate of individuals or an 
organic body, all those who are Christians must place themselves on the side of the 
social movement and against Liberalism, for … God‟s Word teaches us that we are all 
of one blood and all joined in a single Covenant through God. And no less because both 
the solidarity of our guilt and the mystery of the Atonement on Golgotha, as completely 
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incompatible with such individualism, vie with each other pointing to the interconnected 
wholeness of our own society [emphasis added].
555
           
 
In the footnote of the former quote he cites biblical references to support his 
argument, “The beautiful picture which the holy apostle Paul gives us of the 
social character of the church (I Cor. 12:12-27, Eph. 4:16) is, making the 
necessary allowances, applicable also to our human society.”556 
    He sets forth his view to confront mainly the individualism of liberalism, 
as the latter quote implies. In another place, he parallels the French Revolution 
with liberalism, “The French Revolution, and so, too, present-day Liberalism, is 
anti-social, and the social need which is now disturbs Europe is the evil fruit of 
the individualism which was enthroned with the French Revolution.” 557 
However, he asserts that socialism is also individualistic in the point that it 
denies God and wants to erect on the human will, “It is the ancient problem of 
the One and the Many which recurs here. The starting point of the Social 
Democrats as well as of the Liberals is individualistic, in the individual person, 
and thus in Pelagian free will.”558 From this Christian third way understanding 
of human society, the Dutch Protestant harmony model of labor-capital relations 
could have developed in contrast to the conflict model of both capital-centered 
liberalism and labor-centered socialism.
559
 
    The second core element of Kuyper‟s social vision, which has influenced 
the cooperative view of industrial relations, is the „principle of sphere 
sovereignty.‟ In the same address, he explains it: 
 
And whoever … would, like the State Socialists, allow society to be absorbed in the 
state, bears incense for the deification of the state; the state in place of God, and the free 
society ordained by God now destroyed for the sake of deifying the state … we as 
Christians must hold that State and Society each has its own sphere, or, if you will, its 
own sovereignty; and and that the social question cannot be solved rightly unless you 
recognize this duality, and so honor Authority as clearing the way for the free initiative 
of Society.
560
 
 
According to this principle, a basic equality exists among the different 
spheres of life – state, church, school, business enterprise and so on - in which 
human beings live and work together. Any institution is precluded from seeing 
itself as the encompassing institution of society, to which the other „spheres‟ of 
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life are subordinated.
561
 It is remarkable that he acknowledges labor‟s 
independent organization as a unique sphere, based on this insight: 
 
But as soon as there develops collision from the contact of the different spheres of life, 
so that one sphere trespasses on or violates the domain which by divine ordinance 
belongs to the other, then it is the God-given duty of government to validate justice as 
over against arbitrariness, and to restrain by the justice of God over the physical 
superiority of the stronger. What it may therefore do in no case is to grant such 
assurance of justice to one sphere and withhold it from another. A code for commerce 
… calls also for a code of labor. The government should help labor obtain justice, and 
also for labor there must be created the possibility of independently organizing and 
defending its rights.
562
   
 
Unlike both liberalistic and socialistic view, capital and labor have to hold a 
balanced power. If the balance destructs, the government should intervene to 
recover it. However, it doesn‟t mean that the government takes an initiative, as 
if she was the head of the organic body of society.
563
 The Dutch Protestant 
labor movement has allowed the State only a moderate intervention into 
industrial life.
564
 
 
(2) The Patrimonium: Klaas Kater and Willem Hovy 
 
The Dutch Protestant labor movement goes back to the Patrimonium 
(Nederlandsch Werkliedenverbond Patrimonium, „Dutch Workers‟ Association 
Patrimonium‟), which the bricklayer Klaas Kater founded in 1876 with the help 
of several bourgeois including his own employer Willem Hovy.
565
 Even though 
it is a workers‟ organization, it opens its membership to employers as associate 
members, and seeks for harmonious relations between employees and 
                                                          
561
 Bob Goudzwaard, “Christian Social Thought in the Dutch Neo-Calvinist Tradition,” 
in eds. Walter Blok and Irving Hexham, Religion, Economics and Social Thought: 
Proceedings of an International Conference (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1986), 
254. 
562
 Kuyper, Christianity and the Class Struggle, 58. 
563
 Bob Goudzwaard, “Christian Social Thought in the Dutch Neo-Calvinist Tradition”: 
261 
564
 Rolf van der Woude, “Beginsel en Belang”: 27; see the critique of Kees van 
Kersbergen, among others, asserting that the Kuyperian „principle of sphere 
sovereignty‟ led the orthodox Protestants to opt for “strong liberal social and 
economic policies” in his “Religion and the Welfare State in the Netherlands,” in 
eds. Kees van Kersbergen and Philip Manow, Religion, Class Coalitions and 
Welfare States (Cambridge [etc.]: Cambridge Univ. Press), 2009, 125-6, 132. 
565
 Wouter Beekers and Rolf van der Woude, Niet bij Steen Alleen: Patrimonium 
Amsterdam: Van Sociale Vereniging Tot Sociale Onderneming 1876-2003 
(Hilversum: Verloren, 2008), 21. 
149 
 
employers. It aims to promote the interests of not only workers, but also of 
society as a whole. Its tasks are broad: providing educational programs, various 
funds, libraries, housing corporations, etc.
566
       
    It is noticeable that three of its first five board members and twenty of its 
first twenty-four members were Willem Hovy‟s employees.567 Klaas Kater 
(1833-1916) was born in Amsterdam and raised in an orthodox-Protestant 
middle-class family. His mother died when he was four years old. He wanted to 
go to the maritime academy to become a navigational officer. But this was 
thwarted when his father passed away. He was sent to the orphan house of the 
Reformed diaconia. Kater, 14-years old, had to start working as a farm-hand. 
Besides a farm-hand, he worked as a Bible salesman, a stone and timber dealer 
and a factory laborer. Several times he resigned because he rejected Sunday 
work consequently. But he was never frustrated and finally trained as a 
bricklayer and soon became foreman.
568
  
    In 1874 Kater began a new life. He became a foreman-bricklayer in 
Willem Hovy‟s enterprise. Willem Hovy (1840-1915) came from an 
Amsterdam patrician family that was strongly linked with the Reveil. He was a 
deeply religious man and one of the orthodox leaders in the Reformed 
community of Amsterdam. Hovy tried to lead his enterprise in the Christian 
social spirit. On Sundays and Christian holidays they did only minimum work 
and regular Bible readings took place. Furthermore the enterprise had a sick 
fund as well as a pension fund. Hovy also built houses for his workers.
569
 
    How different Kater and Hovy were; they shared the same faith and had 
the same vision on society. They were convinced that the orthodox faith had not 
dismissed, but had to be brought back to life. They wanted to transform the 
anonymous and little militant Reformed church into a community of active and 
professing members. They shared this opinion with Abraham Kuyper. In the end 
they stood for the recovery of The Netherlands as a Protestant nation.
570
  
Kater understood that the ideal enterprise is a spiritual community. 
Primarily it is a work community with good social conditions and harmonious 
relationships. It must pursue class cooperation instead of class antagonism. The 
basis of everything should be a profound spiritual kinship. Kater‟s positive 
experiences in Hovy‟s enterprise were an important stimulus to establishing a 
Christian workers‟ association that sought for harmonious labor relations.571 
The Patrimonium‟s first Statute clearly points out its Christian identity and 
its pursuit of harmonious labor relations. The Statute begins with three Bible 
verses: Proverbs 22:28; 22:2; 14:34. Its name, Patrimonium („paternal 
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inheritance‟) comes from Proverbs 22:28: “Do not move an ancient boundary 
stone set up by your forefathers (NIV, New International Version).” Proverbs 
22:2 shows its inter-class character: “Rich and poor have this in common: The 
Lord is the Maker of them all (NIV).” Proverbs 14:34 reveals its search for 
righteous society: “Righteousness exalts a nation, but sin is a disgrace to any 
people (NIV).” Then the first Article states its name, basis and purpose, “There 
is a Dutch Workers‟ Association, under the name of Patrimonium (Paternal 
Inheritance), which, in the belief that God‟s Word and our people‟s traditions 
constitute the trustworthy foundations of a Christian society, sets itself the 
objective: to spread the knowledge of it to arouse the love of it, in order to 
promote on these foundations the interests of the society as a whole, those of the 
workers in particular, by all lawful means. It is based in Amsterdam.”572 
The founding of Patrimonium has also echoed outside Amsterdam. In 
Rotterdam, Utrecht, Arnhem and Groningen and several small places Christian 
workers‟ association were founded. Soon the need was felt to cooperate. In 1880 
the nationwide Patrimonium was organized and Kater was chosen as 
chairman.
573
 The growth of Patrimonium was spectacular. In 1884 its 
membership was more than 7,000 and in 1895 more than 10,000. In the 1890s it 
became the biggest workers‟ association of The Netherlands.574  
 
(3) From the Inter-class Patrimonium to the Separate Christian Labor 
Unions: Aritius Talma vs. Herman Bavinck and Johannes Sikkel 
 
In the opinion of Paul Werkman, the inter-class model of Patrimonium 
presupposes a pre-modernist society throughout which church and Christianity 
pervaded, and a small-scale class society based on traditional trades and 
agriculture with patriarchal labor relations. The Christian Social Congress of 
1891 had already given up the outdated Patrimonium model.
575
 It recognized 
the independent organizations both of workers and of employers, and also 
workers‟ right to strike as the last means.576 After the Congress separate interest 
groups emerged.   
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In 1892 Christian employers founded the „Dutch Employers‟ Union Boaz‟ 
(Vereeniging van Nederlandische Patroons „Boaz,‟). In 1918, out of Boaz three 
independent associations developed: the „Dutch Christian Farmers and 
Gardeners‟ Union‟ (Nederlandsche Christelijke Boeren en Tuindersbond), the 
„Union of the Christian Traders and Industrialists‟ Middle class‟ (Vereeniging 
van den Christelijken Handeldrijvenden en Industrieelen Middenstand) and 
the‟Christian Employers‟ Union‟ (Christelijke Werkgeversvereeniging).577  
On the other side, in 1894 the first Dutch Christian national labor union 
emerged: the „Dutch Association of Christian Office and Trade employees‟ 
(Nederlandse Vereninging van Christelijke Kantoor- en Handelsbedienden). In 
1896 the „Twente Christian Cotton Workers‟ Union Unitas‟ (Twentsche 
Christelijke Katoenbewerkersbond Unitas,) was launched and grew to become 
the second biggest national union of The Netherlands with 5,500 members in 
1907. In 1901 the „Christian Metal Workers‟ Union in the Netherlands‟ 
(Christelijke Metaalbewerkersbond in Nederland) was founded, in 1914 the 
„Dutch Christian Land Laborers‟ Union‟ (Netherlandse Christelijke 
Landarbeidersbond), in 1916 the „Dutch Union of Christian Factory and 
Transport Laborers‟ (Nederlandse Bond van Christelijke Fabrieks- en 
Transportarbeiders) and so on.
578
 In the meantime, on Aritius Talma‟ proposal 
and insistence, the „Christian Labor Secretariat‟ (Christelijke 
Arbeidssecretariaat) was established to promote the cooperation of various 
Christian labor unions in 1900.  
Finally, on the initiative of the Unitas, the „Christelijk Nationaal 
Vakverbond in Nederland‟ (CNV, „National Federation of Christian Trade 
Unions in the Netherlands‟) was founded in 1909. After the Catholic members 
were prohibited to join general Christian organizations by the bishops in 1912, 
the CNV became in practice a union of the Protestant laborers. In 1909 its 
membership was 6,452 with the 12 affiliated organizations. In 1920 and in 1940 
its membership was respectively 70,262 and 120,344 with many more affiliated 
organizaions.
579
  
After the establishment of the CNV, the Patrimonium had to reorient its 
direction to be a general Christian social movement rather than a Christian labor 
movement. It struggled with the broad current issues such as social legislation, 
competition, housing situations, cooperative and landed estate.
580
 But today 
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only a few social housing corporations by the name of Patrimonium, that the 
local branches founded, still exist.  
During the transition from the inter-class Patrimonium to the various 
Christian labor unions, Aritius Talma (1864-1916) played a decisive role.
581
 He 
had modern ideas over the place and task of the Christian labor movement in the 
society. His two debates with other dominant Christian figures were important 
and influential. 
The first debate was on the status of the worker in his relation to the 
employer. Talma convinced many that if they wanted to achieve social reforms 
and improve the position of the workers, it should be recognized that the 
working class was free. He said to the Christian employers on October 10, 1900, 
“The worker is free, and is responsible only to God for the use of his power.” 
And he added: “The admonitions, addressed to the servants in the New 
Testament, which seem to exclude the right to strike, may not be applied to the 
relations between employers and workers, as being addressed to the slaves.”582 
This view was certainly not commonplace in the Protestant World, where 
apostolic exhortations - “Ye servants, obey your earthly masters in everything” - 
was better known.
583
  
Herman Bavinck, the famous dogmatist and Free University professor, 
expressed his surprise over Talma‟s selective interpretation of the Bible. Why 
would the exhortation to the workers expire and those to the masters remain? 
And, continued Bavinck, if the changed historical circumstances were sufficient 
reasons to draw the validity of the apostolic teaching into question, then would 
not the validity of the Bible in its entirety expire?
584
 
Talma launched a series of articles to explain and to underpin his vision. 
The worker is, like the employer, a free man according to Dutch law. But this 
„legal freedom,‟ in practice, doesn‟t mean much, because there is no „economic 
freedom.‟ The worker has to seek work to make his living. The worker is forced 
into a subordinate position by economic reasons. Talma said in this context 
„wage slave.‟ It is the task of the labor movement to also fight for economic 
freedom, in other words, to remove the economic oppression of the workers.
585
   
Talma feared that the labor movement would also be obliged to obey the 
apostolic exhortation. Strike is then a revolt against the authority that God had 
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given to the employer. Moreover, the conclusion of labor agreements becomes 
unnecessary; the employer will be able to refuse just negotiations with the 
workers, because they are indeed dependent and subservient to him. Talma 
suggested replacing the words „authority‟ and „obedience‟ by „leadership‟ and 
„subordination‟. Herewith the „divine authority‟ of the employer is desacralized 
and it obtains instead a functional character.
586
 
This proposal evoked a great response. Pastor B. Wielenga joined in the 
debate. Neither Wielenga nor Bavinck denied that legal freedom and economic 
bondage coexisted, but contested Talma‟s interpretation of the Bible. The 
changed legal relationship - then slave, now free laborer - doesn‟t affect the 
validity of the apostolic exhortation, because it regulates the „moral‟ 
relationship between worker and employer, regardless of the prevailing legal 
system. Still, Talma remained to contest that the employer is clothed with 
authority. Authority given by God, he suggested, applied to the government, 
church and family. An employer has no power over the free worker outside the 
factory. In other words: the word „authority‟ might not be used in the 
relationship between employer and worker, because there is only a question of a 
labor agreement. A contract could not serve as a source of authority.
587
     
Whatever the contractual relationship between worker and employer, it 
does not alter the principle that the employer is clothed with authority, Talma‟s 
opponents argued. They recognized that this authority was not unlimited. Only 
God‟s authority is recognized as absolute. All authority acquired from Him has 
limitations. The government also has no absolute authority. A Christian ought to 
reject government rules that are contrary to God‟s word. Thus, in the course of 
history the authority of employers is also subject to limitations. The workers 
could put themselves on the basis of a labor agreement voluntarily under the 
authority of an employer, without attacking their freedom.
588
 
Talma‟s merit was that by the discussion the emphasis came to lie more on 
the functional link between worker and employer, which led to a break with the 
idea that the Christian worker would have no right to stand up for better 
working conditions. If the worker is free then he has the freedom to strike, but 
also the freedom to negotiate working conditions without an infringement on the 
authority of the employer. With these modern concepts Talma fought a battle 
against conservatism within the Protestant world, which accepted slowly and 
with difficulty that the rise of the working class changed the social relations 
fundamentally.
589
      
    The second debate was on the justification for the existence of Christian 
labor unions. The fierce railway strikes in the beginning of 1903 under the 
Kuyper Cabinet induced hostility against the labor movement within the 
                                                          
586
 Arno Bornebroek, De Strijd voor Harmonie, 77. 
587
 Arno Bornebroek, De Strijd voor Harmonie, 77. 
588
 Arno Bornebroek, De Strijd voor Harmonie, 77. 
589
 Arno Bornebroek, De Strijd voor Harmonie, 78. 
154 
 
Christian circle. Even Pastor Johannes Sikkel (1855-1920), who built a 
reputation among the Christian workers as a writer of various articles in the 
magazine Patrimonium, expressed the opinions which shook the foundations of 
the Christian labor movement. It took place in his speech for the Christian 
employers‟ association Boaz on June 17, 1903.590  
    In contrast to what the Christian labor movement argues, it is not against 
the consequences of the French Revolution, namely the reconstruction of the 
relations between workers and employers, but follows the trail of the revolution. 
This leads therefore to disorganization and is of material principle and an 
anarchistic spirit. Indeed the organization of workers alone tears apart the 
organism. Hereby the workers come to stand against their boss and thus 
organize themselves according to the principle of class struggle, what means 
nothing more than a revolt against the ordination of God.
591
 
    Sikkel advised the entrepreneurs to oppose the emerging workers‟ power. 
They were to refuse to talk with the labor organizations over the position of the 
workers. What Sikkel had in mind was a labor contract and labor conditions per 
firm because the firm is regarded as a separate organism like family, church and 
government. With this view he ignored not only the competitive position where 
firms experienced conflicts, but also over ten years of development within the 
Christian workers‟ movement. Sikkel held back to the ideas of Kater and 
Patrimonium of before 1891.
592
  
    Talma responded again. The association of workers and employers did not 
fit the social reality. Sikkel underestimated the power of egoism. Selfishness is 
always at the expense of another. Thus the struggle for the protection of the 
right is required. The Christian labor union aimed not at the „class struggle,‟ but 
at this „struggle for the protection of right.‟ He denied that the Christian union 
was merely materialistic. It was not simply a conflict of interests; right there, in 
the non-material, but the binding force that enabled it to bring the union to a 
higher development.
593
  
    Talma disagreed with Sikkel‟s proposition that the employers had not to 
negotiate with unions over working conditions, but to speak only with their own 
workers and to find an arrangement. It is a fundamental right of the labor union 
to represent the workers, like every other club has the duty to defend the rights 
of its members, said Talma.
594
 
    In the 1905 Christian Social Conference Sikkel and Talma debated again 
about the issue of the labor union, and their confrontation became loose. Talma 
opened the discussion with a clear argument about the origin of the labor union 
movement and the subsequent task of the unions. In the time of the guilds the 
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workers and the patrons, as was the case with a pastor and a theology student, 
belonged to the same class: the one obtained the function of the other after a 
learning period. This was changed by the industrial revolution. The separation 
between labor and capital is definitive. How could a laborer ever come to the 
capital to start a business, he asked. Besides, by the massification, the relations 
between worker and employer became more detached and loosened. All that 
remained for the worker - and decisive for him - were the labor conditions. He 
had no influence on them and this was the task of the labor unions.
595
  
    On the other hand he said that the cooperation between worker and 
employer was a duty. For the worker there was a divine calling to exert his full 
strength in the company. The employer also had the duty to do everything in 
order to protect and to serve the interest of the worker. However, he recognized 
that the cooperation could never be complete, because it was not a cooperative 
production.
596
            
    Sikkel was found to be much closer to Talma in his thinking than was 
hitherto assumed. He made a plea for the Christian labor union, “for it I have no 
narrow-minded soul, but a warm heart.”597 “All Christians have the duty to 
organize free of political and ecclesiastical divisions,” said Sikkel: “The labor 
union is still neither an ecclesiastical nor a political but a social union. She has 
her role in social life, in the labor circle.”598 The Catholics were excluded, 
because their principle claimed simply ecclesiastical leadership.
599
 
    Central in Sikkel‟s speech was the lack of a legal constitution in the work 
communities, a sort of basic statute which would prescribe the duties and rights 
both of workers and employers. The difference of opinion between Sikkel and 
Talma over the right of the unions to conclude a contract on behalf of the 
workers was attributed to this lack of a legal constitution. With the constitution 
the labor union could have the legal basis to negotiate or contract.
600
 
    In the atmosphere, wherein the conclusions were unanimously adopted, the 
balance could be made up. The most important was undoubtedly that there was 
no difference of opinion over the necessity of Christian labor unions. The 
formation of Christian trade unions was no longer under discussion.
601
 
 
    (4) The Consultative Trade Organizations as the Alternative to the 
Separate Workers’ and Employers’ Organizations: Marinus 
Ruppert vs. Herman Dooyeweerd  
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This acknowledgement of separate Christian trade unions has never meant that 
the Christian labor movement gave up her harmonistic ideal between labor and 
capital. She has searched for the alternative in constituting „consultative trade 
organizations‟ (bedrijfsorganisaties) within the so-called Dutch „consultative 
economy‟ (overlegeconomie). 602  Mainly through the consultative trade 
organizations she could have realized her cooperative vision of labor-
management relations since the foundations of the separate trade unions.
603
 
    In the 1891 Christian Social Conference the „Chambers of Labor‟ (Kamers 
van Arbeid) had already been recommended as a means to reconcile the classes. 
It was taken to be a prelude to the far-reaching consultative trade 
organization.
604
 The conclusion of the 1891 Christian Social Conference on the 
Chambers of Labor is as follows:  
 
I. The establishment of Chambers of Labor, with good foundations, is the best way to 
bring the existing disorganized situation of labor to an end.     
II. These Chambers of Labor should be established wherever it is considered useful. 
III. It is desirable that in the Chambers of Labor the interests of employers and workers 
can assert themselves freely, independently and equally. 
IV. To the Chambers of Labor the following activities among others can be assigned: 
First, the provision of information to the Government, either spontaneously or 
requested by the Government, on questions that arise in the field of labor;  
Second, mediation in cases of conflicting interests; 
Third, the arbitration of disputes about existing rights, where parties wish the 
arbitration.
605
  
 
The Chambers of Labor were legally regulated in 1897. They were 
bipartite bodies organized per region and industry, and each Chamber consisted 
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of five representatives of workers and five representatives of employers. There 
were 112 Chambers of Labor at its peak.
606
 But, owing to limited powers, 
regional setup, voluntariness and their creation outside of the organizations of 
employers and workers, these became lifeless and dissolved in 1923.
607
  
On the other hand, in 1919 the „High Council for Labor‟ (Hoge Raad van 
Arbeid) was established. It was a tripartite body that consists not only of 
representatives of employers‟ and workers‟ organizations, but also of 
government officials and experts with its chairman being the Minister of the 
Department of Labor. The CNV received a place in the High Council of Labor. 
It obtained legal regulations in 1927. It structurally promoted substantive 
discussions among different actors who were occupied with the social 
legislations until before the Second World War (1939-45). After 1945 it no 
longer met and was dissolved officially in 1950. It can be considered as the 
beginning of the Dutch consultative economy
608
 and as the most important 
forerunner of the „Social and Economic Council‟ (Sociaal-Economische 
Raad).
609
  
More full-blown consultative trade organizations have appeared since the 
Second World War. During the War the underground consultations between the 
social partners about the reorganization of post-war society developed. In 1944 
the three national labor unions - the CNV, the „Roman-Catholic Federation of 
Workers‟ („Roomsch-Katholiek Werkliedenverbond‟) and the socialist „Dutch 
Federation of Trade Unions‟ (Nederlandsch Verbond van Vakvereenigingen) - 
presented their joint blueprint, that is, „Memorandum on Socio-Economic Order‟ 
(Nota inzake Sociaal-Economische Ordening), which laid down the collective 
demands with regard to a „public-law trade organization‟ and workers‟ social 
and economic participation on the industrial and national level.  
Their united consultations with employers resulted in the establishment of 
the „Labor Foundation‟ (Stichting van de Arbeid) in May 1945.610 The Labor 
Foundation was shortly recognized as its official advisory body by the Cabinet, 
even though it was a „private-law trade organization.‟ Finally in February 1950 
the Social and Economic Council, which was a public-law trade organization, 
and developed into the most important advisory institution in the social and 
economic field, came into being.      
Earlier in 1943 the CNV drew up its own blueprint, „Directives for the 
trade organization‟ (Richtlijnen voor de bedrijfsorganisatie), under the 
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responsibility of Marinus Ruppert (1911-1992)
611
. The report was a guideline in 
the underground negotiation with the other labor unions. In it the CNV offered a 
fully worked-out model of a public-law trade organization (publiekrechtelijke 
bedrijfsorganisatie). It included the right for union leaders to take part in the 
decision-making process in the social and economic field on the industrial and 
national level.
612
 
But not everyone agreed with the report in the Protestant circle. Prof. 
Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977), among others, reacted to the report with the 
sharp words like: „dangerous illusion‟, „life-threatening‟, „mistake,‟ and „a 
dangerous first step on the totalitarian road.‟ And then he tried to criticize it 
primarily on the basis of the „principle of sphere sovereignty.‟613 
First, he suggested that an industry was no sovereign community given at 
creation, as was claimed in the „Directives.‟ In contrast, the private company is 
the sovereign community like the church, school, family and such. And their 
sovereignty should be defended against all sorts of false claims of community. 
Characteristic of an industry were, in his view, the free entrepreneurship and the 
competition and power relations. They are not sinful, but beneficial. A public-
law trade organization would undermine the sphere sovereignty of a company 
and restrict or stifle the necessary competition, with serious consequences for 
the public interest. 
Second, he stated that regulatory power of trade organizations was 
incompatible with a pure interpretation of the principle of sphere sovereignty. 
He argued that legislation was an original and exclusive state function. Agencies 
with regulatory powers, including the proposed public-law trade organizations, 
were therefore of themselves functional state bodies with a large degree of 
autonomy, but with no sphere sovereignty. He noted that the ideas of the CNV 
were apparently infected by the socialist concept of functional decentralization 
and/or the Catholic principle of subsidiarity. He, however, considered the 
„private-law trade organization‟ (privaatrechtelijke bedrijfsorganisatie) as 
acceptable and desirable, which was based on voluntariness and would leave the 
private entrepreneur free. 
In his reply Ruppert said, referring to several Protestant authors, that 
Dooyeweerd was the one who placed himself outside the tradition of the 
Protestant social thought. According to Ruppert no one had questioned so far 
                                                          
611
 He started his career as a „gardener servant‟ (tuindersknecht). He joined the Dutch  
Christian Land Laborers‟ Union („Nederlandse Christelijke Landarbeidersbond‟), 
which was a member union of the CNV, and was chosen as its chairman in 1940. 
When Second World War broke out, he participated in the Resistance. He was the 
chairman of the CNV from 1947-59. He also served as a member of the Senate and 
as a vice president of the „Council of State‟ (Raad van Staat) and a „minister of 
State‟ (minister van Staat). 
612
 Werkman, „Laat Uw Doel Hervorming Zijn!‟, 92-4, 390-1, 394. 
613
 Werkman, „Laat Uw Doel Hervorming Zijn!‟, 95-7. 
159 
 
that industries were communities or that they were, in the end, entitled to 
regulatory power. And he refused the rigid distinction between private law and 
public law. The labor law knew indeed transitional forms such as the legal 
extension of „collective labor agreements‟ (collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten) 
and „employer agreements‟ (ondernemersovereenkomsten), which have already 
long been accepted in the Protestant circle.  
Moreover he thought that obtaining public-law power really meant a 
restitution of what the government had drawn to itself. Thus there was no 
problem of incorporation in the state; on the contrary, through the incorporation 
the sphere sovereignty was restored and confirmed. He disagreed to an 
ideological interpretation of the „principle of sphere sovereignty.‟ In this context 
he spoke of „sphere responsibility‟ instead of „sphere sovereignty.‟614 
 
(5) The Labor Foundation and the Social and Economic Council: The 
Agreement of Wassenaar, the Agreement of Flexibility and Security 
and the Report of Convergence and Consultative Economy  
 
Let us examine further the two representative trade organizations - the Labor 
Foundation and the Social and Economic Council - which have supported the 
Dutch consultative economy and cooperative industrial relations since World 
War II, and whose memberships the CNV has kept for the same long period. 
After the Social and Economic Council was founded as a new advisory body in 
1950, the Labor Foundation handed over its most advisory tasks on social and 
economic issues to the Council and focused on consultative tasks to discuss 
current issues in the fields of trade and industry, in particular those regarding 
employment terms and industrial relations. Its consultations partly result in 
advice or recommendations to the government or employers and employees.  
   According to its present articles the Foundation is a consultative body in 
which representative employers‟ federations and trade union confederations 
participate. It is the aim of the Foundation to promote satisfactory industrial 
relations between these parties, which it does by: “1) encouraging consultations 
between employers and employees and their respective representative 
organizations; 2) offering information and advice to employers‟ federations and 
trade union confederations; 3) expressing its views to the government and other 
parties, either voluntarily or by request; 4) consulting with the government and 
other parties; 5) executing the tasks assigned to it by law or arranging for others 
to do so; 6) using all other lawful means to achieve its aims.”615 
The Labor Foundation has a board with two chairpersons, one representing 
the employers and the other the employees. Formally all decisions are taken by 
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the board. The seats of the board are distributed equally among the employers 
and the employees. Three major employers‟ organizations are currently 
represented in the Labor Foundation: Vereniging VNO-NCW
616
 (4 seats); 
Koninklijke Vereiniging MKB-Nederland
617
 (2 seats); Vereniging Land- en 
Tuinbouworganisatie Nederland LTO
618
 (2 seats). And three peak trade unions 
are represented: Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging FNV
619
 (4 seats); 
Christelijk Nationaal Vakbond CNV
620
 (2 seats); MHP Vakcentrale voor 
Middengroepen en Hoger Personeel
621
 (2 seats).
622
 
We could take the so-called „Agreement of Wassenaar‟ as the most 
remarkable example that the Labor Foundation has recently contributed to the 
Dutch consultative economy and cooperative industrial relations. The long 
tradition of consultative economy bolstered to recover the Dutch economy 
speedily from the perils of World War II and to develop the „welfare state‟ in 
the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s, however, the Dutch consultative economy 
went into crisis. The symptoms of what commonly became known as the „Dutch 
Disease‟ appeared.  
The discoveries of vast natural gas deposits in the North Sea led to the 
overvaluation of the Dutch guilder, which in turn, made manufactured goods 
internationally less competitive, resulting in increasing imports and decreasing 
exports of Dutch manufacturing goods. The expectations of higher national 
income led to higher demand of domestic goods and increased production, and 
increased competition for a limited labor force. Consequently higher labor costs 
were brought about. The social benefits payments also enlarged. Moreover the 
two Oil Crises fuelled inflations and thereby strengthened the wage-price spiral.  
By the end of the 1970s unemployment rose by 9% in a decade; the higher 
social expenditures caused a fast rising budget deficit. The question arose if the 
Dutch economy was able to carry the weight of the welfare state. The 
government frequently intervened in the wage setting in order to control prices, 
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but to no avail. Under the pressure of labor shortages the polarization of labor 
relations occurred and the model of cooperation and coordination collapsed.
623
  
The Agreement of Wassenaar was a turning point that revitalized the 
consultative economy and created the basis of the economic improvement in the 
next two decades. In November 1982 the two chairmen of the Labor Foundation, 
Wim Kok and Chris van Veen, met first at the latter‟s house in Wassenaar, a 
small town near The Hague, to draw up the draft of the Agreement, and then all 
the representatives of the Labor Foundation signed it. For the first time in ten 
years, social partners could reach an agreement on the national level. The 
official name of the Agreement is „General recommendations on aspects of an 
employment policy‟ (Centrale aanbevelingen inzake aspecten van een 
werkgelegensbeleid). The Agreement combined wage moderation with 
redistribution of employment through methods such as working time reduction, 
part-time work, combating (youth) unemployment and enhance competitive 
power.
624
  
Even though the text of the Agreement was not longer than one and a half 
A4 pages, it had a huge impact upon the Dutch economy. The trust between 
employers and employees was restored and their dialogues revived. Within two 
years about two-thirds of all collective labor agreements were renewed. By 1985, 
fully paid cost-of-living clauses disappeared from 90 percent of the labor 
agreements. Average real wages fell by 9 percent. In exchange for wage 
restraint, the unions negotiated agreements to reduce the working week in order 
to share work. This set in motion a „virtuous circle‟ of good international 
competitiveness, high profitability, strong investment and rapid job creation 
with the peaceful labor relations in which the strikes were less than any other 
European country.
625
  
The Dutch economy scored on all aspects - such as GDP growth, 
unemployment, government budget deficit, investment - better than the 
economy of the European Union. Especially the unemployment rate dropped 
triply from almost 13-plus percent in 1983 to 4 percent in 1998 while the EU 
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average remained at 11 percent.
626
 Those accomplishments were internationally 
praised as the „Dutch miracle‟ and called the „polder model.‟627  
The contribution of the CNV to the Agreement of Wassenaar traces back to 
the so-called „almost agreement‟ (bijna-akkord) in 1979 which contained the 
similar proposal of combining wage moderation with working time reduction. 
The CNV provided the contours of the later agreement through initiating the 
„almost agreement‟ with the NCW in the Labor Foundation.628 In 1979 Wim 
Kok, the leader of the biggest trade union, the FNV, withdrew his signature for 
the draft at the last minute.
629
 
Another important example that the Labor Foundation has recently 
contributed to the Dutch consultative economy and cooperative labor-
management relations is the so-called „Agreement of Flexibility and Security‟ 
(Nota Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid) in 1996.
630
 They closed a new deal between 
more flexible labor market and more social protection for flexible workers to 
meet the socio-economic changes. More and more employees wanted to work 
on a part-time basis and many wanted to combine a paid job with other areas of 
life. Under the impact of information technology and the ongoing 
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internationalization, enterprises were confronted with ever-increasing demands 
on their flexibility.  
The proposals in the agreement were almost completely accepted by the 
government and legalized in the Act on Allocation of Workers by Intermediates 
in 1998, the Act on Flexibility and Security in 1999 and the Working Hours Act 
in 2000. Temporary employment agencies no longer needed a special permit to 
run their business. Maximum temporary employment periods extended from 6 
months to 3 years. The notice periods were shortened to make the dismissal 
procedure faster. In exchange, temporary workers came to have equal rights in 
all negotiated areas - wage, promotion, basic social security, training and 
education, subsidized care provision, holiday pay, second-tier pension. 
Temporary workers were entitled to permanent contracts in case of third 
consecutive temporary contracts with the same employer.
631
  
Thanks to this „flexicurity‟, that is, a combination of flexibility and security, 
the growth of temporary workers in the Netherlands was less associated with a 
sharp increase in wage dispersion and income inequality. Inequality increased 
but the Netherlands was able to maintain a middle rank between Germany and 
Scandinavian countries on the one hand, and Great Britain and the US on the 
other. Furthermore, Dutch workers could enjoy more balanced lives between 
work and leisure with one of the shortest working weeks in the world.
632
 
Interestingly, Dutch workers opted voluntarily for part-time jobs. In 2001, for 
example, only 2.5% of part-time workers were involuntary, while 42.2% of 
workers worked part-time.
633
 The Dutch polder model reformed the economy 
and labor relations, while maintaining overall social security. So it was widely 
recommended as one of the cases of the third way to the neo-liberal and social 
democratic systems.
634
  
The Social and Economic Council, compared to the bipartite Labor 
Foundation, is a tripartite body that is composed of not only representatives of 
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employers and workers but Crown or independent representatives appointed by 
the government. The three parties all have 11 members in the Council (in total 
33 members). Three major employers‟ organizations are currently represented in 
the Council: VNO-NCW (7 seats); MKB-Nederland (3 seats); LTO-Nederland 
(1 seat). Three trade union federations are represented: FNV (8 seats); CNV (2 
seats); MHP (1 seat). The Crown representatives are often university professors 
of economics or social sciences and include representatives of the Dutch Central 
Bank (Nederlandsche Bank) and the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic 
Policy (Centraal Planbureau). The chairman is appointed by the Crown, on the 
Council‟s advice.635 
    Although the Social and Economic Council (SEC) is a public-law trade 
organization regulated by the „Trade Organization Act‟ (Wet op de 
Bedrijfsorganisatie), it is not a government body and is financially independent 
of the government. Its main task is to give advice to the government and 
parliament upon request or at its own initiative. It deals with a wide range of 
social and economic issues: the economic structure, environmental planning and 
traffic accessibility, sustainable development and environment policy, social 
security and pensions, the labor market and its relations to education, employee 
participation and labor and industrial law, consumer affairs, European 
integrations and so on.
636
  
Even though the government is not obliged to follow the SEC‟s advice, any 
unanimous agreement between the three parties serves as a powerful signal to 
government. According to the current regulations, the government must issue a 
response to the SEC‟s advice within three months. In this response, if the 
government chooses to deviate from the SEC‟s advice, it must state the reasons 
for doing so. Its advisory reports are usually published in book form and on the 
Internet and are available to the public. The arguments and opinions expressed 
in the SEC‟s advice often play a role in public debates outside parliament as 
well. 
The Social and Economic Council supported the consultative economy that 
has been recovering since the Agreement of Wassenaar in 1982 through issuing 
various advisory reports. Their issues included youth unemployment (1984, 
1986), training (1986, 1987), long-term unemployment (1986, 1987), minimum 
wage costs (1988), part-time work (1989), female labor (1990, 1991), 
reintegration of disabled people (1990) and reduction in sick leave (1991). In 
1992 it dealt with the issue of consultative economy itself and drew up a 
unanimous report with the title „Convergence and Consultative Economy‟ 
(Convergentie en Overlegeconomie). In the report the Council pleaded for a 
clearer division of labor between the government and the social partners. It was 
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agreed that collective bargaining on wage and employment terms policy was the 
responsibility of the social partners. Fiscal and monetary policies were the 
prerogative of the government. And labor market policies were the domain of 
both the government and the social partners.
637
  
Since then, a redevelopment of the consultative economy has taken place, 
in the sense that the advisory process has become more efficient and that 
government has achieved more effective coordination of financial and 
budgetary policy and cooperation with the social partners on wage and 
employment terms policy. It also influenced the „Agreement of Flexibility and 
Security‟ mentioned above.638 
 
(6) Appraisals and Lessons 
 
We found that the Dutch Protestant church had a long tradition of cooperative 
industrial relations. Based on its own unique vision of human society - „an 
organic view of society‟ - it has developed the harmony model which is 
compared to the conflict model of both capital-centered liberalism and labor-
centered socialism. And based on its own unique idea of government – „the 
principle of sphere sovereignty‟ – it has allowed the government only a 
moderate intervention into the business realm. 
At the beginning, the Protestant labor movement sought for inter-class 
organizations whose members included workers as well as employers. 
Corresponding to the changed industrial structures, however, it later gave up the 
Patrimonium model. It took the consultative trade organizations as the 
alternative in order to realize its vision of business life. The Christian trade 
union CNV has continuously participated in the representative consultative 
trade organizations – the Labor Foundation and the Social and Economic 
Council - since they were established after World War II.  
The CNV has thereby contributed to the Dutch consultative economy and 
peaceful labor relations. It has aided the rapid recovery from the perils after the 
war and the establishment of a welfare state. And one of the recent examples 
was the „almost agreement‟ in 1979 that the CNV initiated in the Labor 
Foundation. It paved the way to the „Agreement of Wassenaar‟ in 1982 that led 
to the revitalization of the consultative economy and to the economic 
improvement in the following two decades, the internationally praised „polder 
model.‟ 
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The Dutch Christian labor movement has mainly supported an idea of 
autonomous bipartite industrial relations between labor and capital, even though 
it has acknowledged the intervention of the government, for example, in the 
case of accepting a public-law tripartite trade organization like the Social and 
Economic Council
639
. It comes from the „principle of sphere sovereignty‟. 
Business area is an independent sphere and so the government can intervene in 
it, only if it does not function well by itself or if it works against the public good. 
If we look at the example of the Agreement of Wassenaar, it turns out that when 
labor and capital take mutual initiative, better results occur. 
As mentioned above, the Korean government has already tried to import 
the European corporatist model like the „Tripartite Commission‟ consisting of 
three representatives of labor, capital and government in order to overcome the 
chronically antagonistic labor-management relations, but it has not worked 
satisfactorily as expected. We could take some lessons through comparisons 
with the Netherlands. 
First, Korea hasn‟t developed the autonomous consultative culture between 
labor and management. Due to the Japanese occupation (1910-1945) and the 
Korean War (1950-53), one of products of the Cold War, Korea had to sever 
dramatically from her beautiful heritage such as „Doorae‟, labor communities in 
rural villages.
640
 During the military dictatorial periods (1961-1987), the 
government forced depressive industrial relations for the government-led 
compressive economic growth. The labor movement has organized itself chiefly 
on the basis of socialist principles and protested militantly against the 
depression, and has accomplished some success since the 1987 General Strike. 
But the labor movement met another impasse when the IMF imposed the neo-
liberal policy of „labor flexibility‟ after the 1997 financial crisis. The workers 
have continued to violently oppose the unilateral oppression of capital 
sometimes even at the risk of their lives.  
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In these situations, it is impossible for the tripartite organization to function 
appropriately. It is a presupposition that labor and management cultivate the 
consultative culture of mutual trust and solve the problems autonomously 
among themselves before the government intervenes. For this purpose, it is 
natural that Christians have to play a role on the basis of Christian principles, 
such as in the Dutch case. We cannot deny that Christians have the mission of 
reconciliation and recovery in the business area as well.  
Second, we could learn from the Dutch peak consultative institutions – the 
Labor Foundation and the Social and Economic Council. There have been self-
styled tripartite trade organizations – the „Tripartite Commission‟ established in 
1998 and its successor, the „Economic and Social Development Commission‟ 
re-established in 2007 in South Korea. However, when we look at their laws, we 
soon notice that it is no more than a government organization. It is regulated by 
Presidential decree. The President appoints all the board members including the 
chairperson and one standing member. Workers and employers represent only 
two persons respectively among ten board members. The other four members 
are two government members and two public interest members.
641
 Furthermore, 
one of the two biggest national trade unions has hardly participated in the 
Commissions.  
This shows that the real partnership with workers isn‟t recognized yet and 
the bargaining power of workers is still weak. This is contrasted with the 
tripartite SEC in The Netherlands, which is independent on the government. 
And their tasks have been limited to the labor policies and their related matters. 
The tasks are similar to the tasks of the Labor Foundation, which is an 
autonomous bipartite body between workers and employers. Because the 
autonomous consultative institution between workers and employers hasn‟t 
developed in Korea, the government has intervened in these areas. In 
comparison, in The Netherlands, workers and employers have solved their own 
tasks among themselves in the bipartite Labor Foundation and have further 
intervened in the broader social and economic issues in the tripartite SEC. 
Against the high status of workers all the main peak unions have participated in 
these peak consultative organizations. The high level of participation of workers 
has contributed to the high level of industrial peace.          
Third, one of the reasons that the Korean labor relations have been 
antagonistic is that workers were forced to sacrifice and didn‟t get 
corresponding compensation. When we look at the Agreement of Wassenaar 
and the Agreement of Flexibility and Security, the Dutch workers exchanged 
wage moderation and a flexible labor market with working time reduction and 
social protection of flexible workers. Those compensations, in addition to the 
already established general social welfare system, prevented workers‟ 
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radicalization in spite of less income and more part-time jobs. Instead, they were 
able to enjoy less working hours and to keep more balance between job and 
other aspects of life. 
 
5.2.3. Real Estate 
 
5.2.3.1. The Public Concept of Real Estate  
 
Henry George agrees with Locke that what a man produces by his labor is his 
own possession. He advocates the Private Property Right in similar logic and 
terms to Locke‟s: 
     
As a man belongs to himself, so his labor when put in concrete form belongs to him. 
And for this reason, that which a man makes or produces is his own, as against all the 
world … No one else can rightfully claim it, and his exclusive right to it involves no 
wrong to anyone else. Thus there is to everything produced by human exertion a clear 
and indisputable title to exclusive possession and enjoyment, which is perfectly 
consistent with justice.
642
  
 
But he differs with Locke that the principle is applied also to nature, that is, 
land
643
:  
  
Whatever may be said for the institution of private property in land, it is therefore plain 
that it cannot be defended on the score of justice. The equal right of all men to the use of 
land is as clear as their equal right to breathe the air … If we are all here by the equal 
permission of the Creator, we are all here with an equal title to the use of all that nature 
so impartially offers. This is a right which is natural and inalienable; it is a right which 
vests in every human being as he enters the world, and which during his continuance in 
the world can be limited only by the equal rights of others … There is on earth no power 
which can rightfully make a grant of exclusive ownership in land … For what are we 
but tenants a day? Have we made the earth, that we should determine the rights of those 
who after us shall tenant it in their turn? The Almighty, who created the earth for man 
and man for the earth, has entailed it upon all the generations of the children of men … 
    Let the parchments be ever so many, or possession ever so long, natural justice can 
recognize no right in one man to the possession and enjoyment of land that is not 
equally the right of all his fellows. Though his titles have been acquiesced in by 
generation after generation, to the landed estates of the Duke of Westminster the poorest 
child that is born in London today has as much right as has his eldest son. Though the 
sovereign people of the State of New York consent to the landed possessions of the 
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Astors, the puniest infant that comes wailing into the world in the squalidest room of the 
most miserable tenement house, becomes at that moment seized of an equal right with 
the millionaires. And it is robbed if the right is denied.
644
  
 
George applies the Private Property Right on the basis of human labor 
more strictly than John Locke does. He distinguishes between the raw land, the 
gratuitous gift of nature, and the works of man that have been wrought upon the 
face of the earth.
645
 He considers the Private Property Right to be confined to 
the latter: “To improvements, such an original title can be shown; but it is a title 
only to the improvements, and not to the land itself. If I clear a forest, drain a 
swamp, or fill a morass, all I can justly claim is the value given by these 
exertions. They give me no right to the land itself.”646  
In the same context, he objects the customary distinction between personal 
property and real estate, things movable and things immovable because it 
doesn‟t show the result of human labor or not. Instead, he proposes the 
distinction between land which is the gratuitous offering of nature and wealth 
which is the produce of labor. He acknowledges the Private Property Right only 
of the latter. He explains as follows: 
 
To affirm that a man can rightfully claim exclusive ownership in his own labor when 
embodied in material things, is to deny that anyone can rightfully claim exclusive 
ownership in land …… A house and the lot on which it stands are alike property, as 
being the subject of ownership, and are alike classed by the lawyers as real estate. Yet in 
nature and relations they differ widely. The one is produced by human labor, and 
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belongs to the class in political styled wealth. The other is a part of nature, and belongs 
to the class in political economy styled land.
647
 
 
He diagnoses that the Private Property Right of land is the central cause of 
“the paradox of the widespread poverty and trouble in the middle of an 
unparalleled progress” in our modern times. He prescribes that the only remedy 
is to restore land to „common [public] property.‟ He says:  
 
We have traced the want and suffering that everywhere prevail among the working 
classes, the recurring paroxysms of industrial depression, the scarcity of employment, 
the stagnation of capital, the tendency of wages to the starvation point, that exhibit 
themselves more and more strongly as material progress goes on, to the fact that the 
land on which and from which all must live is made the exclusive property of some. 
We have seen that there is no possible remedy for these evils but the abolition of 
their cause; we have seen that private property in land has no warrant in justice, but 
stands condemned as the denial of natural right- a subversion of the law of nature that as 
social development goes on must condemn the masses of men to a slavery the hardest 
and most degrading. 
    We have weighed every objection, and seen that neither on the ground of equity or 
expediency is there anything to deter us from making land common property by 
confiscating rent.
648
  
 
    As a concrete method of making land „public property,‟ he doesn‟t suggest 
either to purchase or to confiscate private property in land. He thinks that the 
first would be unjust and the second, needless. He suggests only confiscating 
rent of land by taxation. He considers rent to be „the price of monopoly‟649 
which doesn‟t originate from any contribution to production but originates 
merely from exclusive ownership of gratuitous nature, “Thus rent or land value 
does not arise from the productiveness or utility of land. It in no way represents 
any help or advantage given to production, but simply the power of securing a 
part of the results of production …… Rent, in short, is the price of monopoly, 
arising from the reduction to individual ownership of natural elements which 
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human exertion can neither produce nor increase.”650 Moreover, he takes rent to 
be influenced by other communal or social factors than efforts of an individual 
landowner himself - such as population growth, the improvement of industrial 
techniques and the progress of education, institution, or morals in a community 
as a whole.
651
  
However, he doesn‟t assert to confiscate all the rent from landlords. For 
practical reasons, he prefers the market mechanism of land distribution to a 
State-controlled system and allows landowners to get some portion of rent, “Nor 
to take rent for public uses is it necessary that the State should bother with the 
letting of lands, and assume the chances of the favoritism, collusion, and 
corruption this might involve …… By leaving to landowners a percentage of 
rent which would probably be much less than the cost and loss involved in 
attempting to rent lands through State agency, and by making use of this 
existing machinery, we may, without jar or shock, assert the common right to 
land by taking rent for public uses.”652 
He doesn‟t support the public concept of land in ownership itself but that in 
reality:  
 
In this way the State may become the universal landlord without calling herself so, and 
without assuming a single new function. In form, the ownership of land remains just as 
now. No owner of land need be dispossessed, and no restriction need be placed upon the 
amount of land any one could hold. For, rent being taken by the State in taxes, land, no 
matter in whose name it stood, or in what parcels it was held, would be really common 
property, and every member of the community would participate in the advantage of its 
ownership.
653
        
 
Abraham Kuyper looks to sympathize with Henry George on the issue of 
land ownership. While he clearly disagrees with the collectivistic idea of 
„community of goods,‟ that is, the overall public ownership of properties, he 
leaves room for further discussion of the public ownership of land, “What the 
Social Democrat calls „community of goods‟ never existed either in Israel or in 
the first Christian community; rather, such an absolute community of goods is 
excluded everywhere in Scripture …… If further, not only by the Collectivist 
but also by the advocates of nationalization of land, a separate issue has been 
made of the ownership of land; then it is proper that also here we as Christians 
should neither arrogantly ridicule such ideas nor, as though God‟s Word gives us 
no guidance here, shrug our shoulders at such a knotty problem.”654 In the 
footnote he urges Christians to have more concern about land ownership and 
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recommends them to refer to Henry George, “It does not follow from this that 
our salvation lies in nationalization of the land… but whoever superciliously 
mocks all such plans and ideas and brands them as socialistic is guilty of 
superficiality and unbelief …… Compare Henry George‟s Progress and 
Poverty.”655  
Kuyper, on the other hand, objects to the individualistic view of land. He 
thinks that any human being cannot claim absolute property right and he is 
merely a loaner or steward of God, “absolute property can be spoken of only by 
God; that all our property is only loaned; that our management is only 
stewardship.”656 He takes an example of the land monopoly of Scotland and 
criticizes the individualistic ownership of land directly, “When we hear how, in 
Scotland, three-fourths of the land is in the hands of fourteen persons, and how 
recently one of these fourteen, who bought an area in which forty-eight families 
lived, simply drove off the nearly three hundred persons who lived there in 
order to extend his game preserve … the identification of ownership of land 
with individualistic ownership must run counter to God‟s ordinances.”657 
The laws of Jubilee in Leviticus 25 can serve as a guide for Biblical land 
ownership. First, they deny the absolutism of private land ownership, but rather 
defend the common sharing of land. They focus on a theological statement 
declaring „God‟s ultimate ownership of land‟: “The land must not be sold 
permanently, because the land is mine and you are but aliens and tenants” (v.23, 
NIV [the same version for all the following Bible quotes]). This statement 
destroys the absoluteness of a particular person‟s ownership. All people - 
including the poor and vulnerable - have to have access to the primary resource 
of their existence. The common sharing of land has to have a priority over an 
exclusive ownership of land. When a countryman becomes poor and sells some 
of his land, either he or his nearest relative may redeem it. But even though both 
of them may not be able to do this, it should be returned to him in the Year of 
Jubilee, the fiftieth year after seven Sabbaths of years. In this Year of Jubilee 
everyone will return to his own land (vv. 25-28, 8-13).  
Second, land as such should be exempt from the workings of the market 
and thereby speculations; just the potential value of future harvest is bought and 
sold. The fiftieth year shall serve as a basis for calculating how many harvests 
(then to be paid for) a piece of land will still yield.
658
 „If you sell land to one of 
your countrymen or buy any from him, do not take advantage of each other. You 
are to buy from your countrymen on the basis for the number of years since the 
Jubilee. And he is to sell to you on the basis of the number of years left for 
harvesting crops. When the years are many, you are to increase the price, and 
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when the years are few, you are to decrease the price, because what he is really 
selling you is the number of crops. Do not take advantage of each other, but fear 
your God. I am the Lord your God‟ (vv. 14-17).  
Third, they imply that the Biblical concept of land ownership is 
„patrimonium‟ rather than „dominium‟. In Roman law, „dominium‟ refers to an 
absolute right for an owner not only to use his property, but also dispose 
arbitrarily (abuse or destroy) it as long as this is within the law, disregarding 
social acceptability. Dominium indicates individual and permanent 
characteristics of ownership as well.
659
 „Patrimonium‟, by contrast, refers to the 
property inherited from the father, which has to be passed on to the children. 
This excludes the possibility of an arbitrary use or disposal.
660
 It also indicates 
communal and temporary characteristics of ownership.
661
  
The Jubilee laws support the concept of „patrimonium.‟ Even though they 
acknowledge the private ownership of landed property, the unit of subject is not 
an individual but a family or a clan: „It shall be a jubilee for you; each one of 
you is to return to his family property and each to his own clan (v. 10). The 
regulation of redemption by the relative (v. 25) also highlights the communal 
characteristic. Human beings can claim merely relative and temporary 
ownership compared to God‟s. Land is not a product of human effort but a free 
gift of God.
662
 It is His trust in us that we will preciously preserve and hand it 
over from generation to generation. Land itself shares the rest of the Sabbath 
Year (vv. 1-5). Land is not an object of unconditional exploitation. 
Among other Biblical texts that uphold the concept of „patrimonium,‟ those 
regarding „land boundary‟ are especially important. As the story of Naboth‟s 
vineyard in 1 Kings 21 and the story of Nehemiah‟s reform in Nehemiah 5 
vividly show, lands are exposed to monopoly in the real world, which causes 
various social problems - poverty, alienation, conflict and so on. To resist the 
monopoly, the Bible teaches us again and again to maintain land boundaries. 
The main texts are as follows: 
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(1) Deuteronomy 19:14 - “Do not move your neighbor‟s boundary stone 
set up by your predecessors in the inheritance you received in the land 
the Lord your God is giving you to possess.” 
 
We give a special attention to the language of „inheritance.‟663 It reveals 
relational aspects of land ownership both to God and to predecessors. Boundary 
encroachment is not solely a crime against the neighbor but also against God 
himself. It is also destructive not just of a single individual and his immediate 
household, but of his whole inter-generational familial line.
664
  
 
(2) Hosea 5:10 - “Judah‟s leaders are like those who move boundary 
stones. I will pour out my wrath on them like a flood of water.”  
 
The previous Chapter 4 portrays the serious depravities prevailing in Israel. All 
people - including prophets and priests - have fallen into corruption. Moral and 
social crimes follow the religious apostasy, “There is no faithfulness, no love, 
no acknowledgement of God in the land. There is only cursing, lying and 
murder, stealing and adultery; they break all bounds, and bloodshed follows 
bloodshed” (vv. 1-2).  
    This verse focuses here on land encroachment of leaders, probably king 
and royal family (cf. 8:4; 13:10-11). The land encroachment becomes the reason 
for the severest judgment of God. The phrase „like a flood of water‟ is 
associated with Amos 5:2 which contains similar phrases, “But let justice roll on 
like a river, righteousness like a never-failing stream!”, even if the sentence as a 
whole implies a contrary meaning. In Amos, we can find more concrete 
references to land encroachment. Let us look first at Amos 8:4-6, “Hear this, 
you who trample the needy and do away with the poor of the land … boosting 
the price and cheating with dishonest scale, buying the poor with silver and the 
needy for a pair of sandals, selling even the sweepings with the wheat.”  
The poor and weak have to mortgage their fields, vineyards and homes to 
survive during the famine. When they cannot repay their debt, they lose their 
landed properties and may even become slaves. On the contrary, the rich and 
strong enjoy luxurious lives, “I will tear down the winter house along with the 
summer house; the houses adorned with ivory will be destroyed and the 
mansions will be demolished (Amos 3:15).”     
    Other notable prophetic texts that imply land encroachment are Isaiah 5:8 
and Micah 2:1-2: “Woe to you who add house to house and join field to field till 
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no space is left and you live alone in the land”; “Woe to those who plan iniquity, 
to those who plot evil on their beds! At morning‟s light they carry it out because 
it is in their power to do it. They covet fields and seize them, and houses, and 
take them. They defraud a man of his home, a fellow man of his inheritance.”  
 
(3) Proverbs 15:25 and 23:10-11 - “The Lord tears down the proud man‟s 
house but he keeps the widow‟s boundaries intact” and “Do not move 
an ancient boundary stone and encroach on the fields of the fatherless, 
for their Defender is strong; he will take up their case against you.” 
 
Orphans and widows are the most vulnerable class in communites who stand in 
the greatest need of the protection of the law. But the courts often deny justice to 
them but rather favor the powerful class. Amos 5:10-12 reports, “You hate the 
one who reproves in court and despise him who tells the truth. You trample on 
the poor and force him to give you grain. Therefore, though you have built stone 
mansions, you will not live in them; though you have planted lush vineyards, 
you will not drink their wine … You oppress the righteous and take bribes and 
you deprive the poor of justice in the courts.” God, however, assists and defends 
the vulnerable. He allies with them against those who would seek to take the 
land from them. 
    Fourth, and finally, the Jubilee law gives a hint of the separate treatment of 
land and house. Henry George makes a distinction between land and house, 
according to whether it is the gratuitous offering of nature or the result of human 
labor, and considers only the former as „public property‟ but the latter as „private 
property.‟ It leads to the differentiation of them in taxation. He asserts imposing 
a tax only upon the former, for the rent of land is unearned income, but, by 
contrast, to exempt houses from taxes. He thinks that tax upon houses is „an 
artificial obstacle to the creation of wealth‟ as all other taxes are upon the 
processes of production. To take a further step, Georgists attempt to prove that 
the distinction between land and house makes positive results in actual tax 
policies. For example, Fred Harrison compares cities taxing only land with 
those taxing both land and house in the Australian state of Victoria between the 
years 1966 and 1978. He shows that more new dwellings were built in the 
former than in the latter.
665
 
    However, the Jubilee laws give us another perspective. They don‟t 
distinguish between land and house unconditionally. In Leviticus 25:29-34 
„houses‟ aren‟t generally taken as „private property‟ except for those in walled 
cities. Houses in villages without walls can always be redeemed and returned to 
the original owner in the Jubilee, just as could land. So can the Levites‟ houses. 
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Even houses in a walled city can be redeemed until one year after their sales. 
After one year the houses belong permanently to the buyer. 
Underlying the Jubilee laws on land and house might be „the concern for 
protecting the basic livelihood of all people‟ and, in particular, the poor and 
vulnerable just as with other socio-economic laws in the Bible.
666
 Land is the 
most important means of production in agricultural ages. So land as a whole is 
not treated as an object of exclusive private ownership. House is also a 
necessary element of livelihood as a residential space. So houses also are not 
subject to the mechanism of market. Urban houses are exceptional, for they 
were possibly less vital to the people‟s livelihood in agricultural ages.667 It is 
interestingly opposed to in modern industrial and commercial ages. The Levites‟ 
houses, even though they are located in cities, are not subject to the mechanism 
of market, for they are perhaps their only property along with their pasturelands 
(cf. Deut. 14:27; Josh. 21:3). Their pasturelands are not allowed even to be sold. 
Hans Binswanger, a Swiss economist, suggested good proposals for real 
estate ownership
668
: 
 
(1) Turning real estate into public property, be it that of the 
municipality or the state. 
(2) Distinguishing between property for use and for disposal, and 
turning the latter over to the local authority or the state; property 
for use would be subject to public regulations. 
(3) Property would be divided up in this way in urban settlements and 
property for disposal would be turned over to newly formed public 
owners‟ associations, consisting either of all inhabitants or of the 
owners but allowing the inhabitants a say. 
(4) Excluding the right to build on property. 
(5) Retaining a comprehensive concept of property but having the 
state or local authorities restrict the freedom of use. 
(6) Maintaining the guarantee of ownership but restricting the freedom 
of disposal by the local authorities or the state. 
(7) Introducing state taxes on the basic income from the landed 
property, which also gives direction to the market. 
(8) Adopting state regulations on ownership, e.g. so that legal entities 
can only be owners in the public interest and that only restricted 
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ownership of housing and building land is allowed - related to a 
proprietor‟s own use. 
 
According to Binswanger‟s vision „the public concept of real estate‟ does not 
necessarily have to accompany abolishing property concept or ownership of real 
estate by itself. It requires us merely to regulate its use and disposal. How and to 
what extent we regulate would depend on our cultural traditions and political 
feasibilities. However, the key point is that we recognize the nature of real estate 
as „public goods.‟ Land is an essential element of our livelihood but is limited in 
its supply. If it is only at the disposal of the free market, it is apt to be 
monopolized and speculated. Moreover it is not the product of human effort but 
the common gift of nature. So it ought to be controlled publicly for real life and 
common good.  
Housing is another essential element of our livelihood but is also inelastic 
in its supply, even though less so than land. Housing problems today occur 
commonly in urban areas worldwide. Housing problems look to be even more 
urgent and desperate than land problems. So it cannot be left entirely to the 
operation of free market. The public concept needs to be applied not only to 
land but also to houses. Houses have also to be regulated publicly. One of 
examples is to supply economic and high quality public rental houses 
extensively to urban low income families
669
. 
 
5.2.3.2. The Intrinsic Value of Nature 
 
In 3.3.3.2, we considered the Descartian dualism between man and nature 
as the theoretical origin of Korean developmentalism and the ecological 
degradation. In opposition to the Descartian dualism, Bob Goudzwaard 
emphasizes the similarity of human beings and nature in the context of treating 
both of them as objects of care, and uses the expression „intrinsic value‟ also for 
nature, which is parallel to Max Weber‟s „intrinsic value of human labor.‟ He 
means, by the expression, that nature may not be used as a scarcity without price 
and therefore without worth. He adds, “It is an economic duty for all mankind to 
preserve animal species and vegetable varieties; to keep to certain limits in the 
exploitation of animals and experiments performed on them, and to maintain the 
soil in its present and future fertility.” 670  
Biblical „rules of seven‟ - the Sabbath Day and the Sabbath Year - uphold 
the concept of „intrinsic value of nature.‟ The 4th Commandment requires the 
rest of human beings but also of animals on the Sabbath Day, “On it you shall 
not do any work, neither you, nor your son or daughter, nor your manservant or 
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maidservant, nor your animals, nor the alien within your gates.” (Exodus 20:8; 
cf. 23:12, “on the seventh day do not work, so that your ox and your donkey 
may rest ……”) The law of the Sabbath Year mentions the rest of soil, “For six 
years sow your fields, and for six years prune your vineyards and gather their 
crops. But in the seventh year the land is to have a sabbath of rest …… The land 
is to have a year of rest.” (Leviticus 25:3-5) 
    The intrinsic value of nature is implied also in the fact that God has a 
soteriological relation both to human beings and to nature. According to 
Genesis, God established a covenant not only with Noah and his descendants 
but also “with every living creature … on earth.” (9:9-10) Paul says that not 
only men but also the whole creation suffer from the consequences of human sin, 
and both of them wait eagerly for the day of glorious freedom (Romans 8:18-
25).
671
  
    Genesis 1:26-28 is commonly blamed for justifying men‟s destruction of 
natural environment. The text states that human beings alone were created in the 
image of God and that the purpose of their work is to „subdue‟ or „rule over‟ the 
rest of the creation (see NIV). However, a careful exegesis reveals that the text 
cannot be taken to sanction the destruction of creation.  
First, human beings received the task to subdue the earth as creatures made 
in the image of God. Therefore, in the exercise of this task, they function as 
God‟s stewards who are responsible to subdue the earth in a way that God rules 
over his world. As Psalm 104 shows, God does not violently ravish nature, but 
sustains it with providential care. Human beings may not „corrupt by abuse‟ the 
nonhuman creation.
672
 The purpose of human dominion over nature is the 
preservation of the integrity of the nonhuman creation, not simply the 
satisfaction of human needs and wants.
673
 
    Second, the Hebrew words for dominion used (rdh and kbš) don‟t have a 
harsh and aggressive tone in Genesis 1 and other biblical verses. Ruling (rdh) 
over animals excludes the option of killing them for food.
674
 Together with 
human beings, animals are given vegetation for food (Gen. 1:29). The use of the 
verb kbš elsewhere in the related texts (Num. 32:20-32; Josh. 18:1f; 1 Chron. 
22:18f.) suggests that its meaning in Genesis might not be for commoners „to 
trample under foot,‟ but „to use the earth for stock-farming and setttlement.‟675 
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It must also be kept in mind that through the command to subdue the earth the 
blessing of God will come to realization and consequently the words can never 
be used to defend the contemporary ecological devastation and its harmful 
effects on man.
676
  
    Third, Chapter 2 of Genesis helps us to understand this text. According to 
it, human beings were given the tasks of „working‟ and „taking care‟ of the 
Garden (v.15, see NIV). These are not two separate kinds of activities, but 
rather two aspects of all human work. Interpreting Genesis 2:15 in an 
agricultural setting, Luther said: “These two things must be done together; that 
is, the land is not only tilled, but what has been tilled is also guarded.” All work 
must have not only a productive but also a protective aspect.
677
 Therefore 
human dominion over nature in Genesis 1:26-8 also must include caring for 
nature.  
    The human dominion over the earth in biblical tradition is not simply a 
question of technological power, but of religion and morality. Luther stressed 
that the dominion stemming merely from human industry and skill is an inferior 
dominion. Only „upright‟ human beings can exercise true dominion over 
nature.
678
 This is the point of the statement that Jesus „was with the wild 
animals‟ during his temptation (Mark 1:13). His communion with the wild 
beasts anticipates the eschatological peace and harmony between human beings 
and creation that will be the fruit of righteousness (see Isa. 11:1-9; 65:25).
679
 
 
5.3. The Christian Views of Modern Value-free Economic Methodology 
 
5.3.1. A Critique of Value-free Economics from the Viewpoint of a Christian 
Epistemology 
 
Vickers counter-argues against the value-free economics on the basis of 
„Christian presuppositional epistemology.‟ 680  The presuppositional 
epistemology understands that we could not make sense of our human 
experiences without some presuppositions and believes that the Biblical 
revelations are among the presuppositions.
681
 He describes the inseparable 
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relationship between our economic views and our philosophical or religious 
presuppositions: “It might be said on one level that our economic thought and 
prescriptions are dependent on the philosophical structures in our consciousness, 
our life-view and our cultural Weltanschauung (ideology). On another level they 
are determined, as are our basic constructs of knowing and doing in all things, 
by our deeper religious commitment. For if there is ground for according 
legitimacy to our initial perspective of the creaturehood of man and his 
metaphysical dependence and ethical responsibility, then human motivations 
and the determinants of action are essentially religious.” 682  Here we find 
„creaturehood of man‟ as one example of the Biblical presuppositions, which 
accompany moral implications. In their economic contributions Christian 
scholars often share common terminology - such as God‟s creation, stewardship, 
cultural mandate, fallen world and eschatological restoration – which have 
moral implications as well. 
Vickers defines Christian presuppositional epistemology as a 
„transcendental one‟ which contrasts with „immanentistic ones,‟ and argues 
against the value-free methodology as follows: 
 
Economics … is not, and cannot be, a value-free inquiry. The economist necessarily 
brings to his task the same kind of pre-theoretical commitment, or pre-scientific 
philosophic persuasion, as is brought by every investigator to every field of human 
investigative inquiry. In our own subjective area, the pre-theoretical commitments … 
were carefully seen not to be those which may predispose the economist to an allegiance 
to forms of individualism rather than collectivism, or capitalism rather than socialism. 
For all such philosophical viewpoints, in and of themselves, and unless they are in turn 
informed by the deeper revelatory categories of the Word of God, are locked in a 
fruitless immanentism. They partake of the fallacy … of endeavoring to find an 
adequate explanatory orientation in some aspect of created reality itself, rather than 
recognizing that the only admissible principle of predicable meaning resides in God as 
the Creator and origin of all things, as the preserver of the now fallen and sinful world 
……
683
    
 
Vickers continues to criticize the immanentistic system by referring to 
Abraham Kuyper‟s „antithesis‟. He extends Kuyper‟s „ontological antithesis‟ 
between the Christian and the non-Christian to an „epistemological antithesis‟ 
between them: 
 
There are … simply two kinds of pre-theoretical commitment which the thinker brings 
to his chosen field of inquiry …… [T]he investigator does, or he does not, recognize, in 
the expressive language of Abraham Kuyper, that there are just two kinds of men-on the 
one hand, those who are regenerate by the grace of God set forth in Christ and who 
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would therefore be covenant-keeper, and on the other hand, those who are unregenerate 
and therefore remain implacably covenant-breakers; and that there are, as a result, „two 
kinds of science‟-that developed … from the confined perspective of immanentistically 
oriented thought forms, and that developed in conscious realization that the facts with 
which the investigator deals are God‟s facts, that the facts are what they are because 
God has already thought all the facts, and that the facts are observable in the coherences 
and constellations in which they exist because they cohere in accordance with God-
created laws.
684
     
 
The immanentism and its assumption of man‟s epistemological self-
sufficiency are seen to be founded primarily upon the enlightenment 
philosopher Kant‟s positivistic epistemology: “Man, for Kant, is autonomous, 
and the autonomy of man has been at the heart of all of the post-Kantian 
epistemologies. For Kant, the knowledge process takes place within, and by the 
very conceptualization of his system is confined to, the phenomenal realm. 
There is a place for God in Kant‟s scheme of things, or rather a place for 
autonomous assumption of a god, but He is consigned to the noumenal realm, 
where knowledge is not possible anyway.”685 
In the Christian transcendentalist epistemology, however, man‟s self-
sufficiency or self-reliability of human reason is denied: “The point at issue is 
that this world is God‟s estate. God the Creator and sustainer of all things is 
alone sovereign, autonomous, and purposively determinative of all eventuation. 
Man is created, derivative, dependent, and he therefore knows derivatively in 
the same way as he exists derivatively. All the facts of created reality cry out 
that God is, and man‟s true epistemological task is to reinterpret the entire range 
of fact situations that come to him already interpreted by God. Man‟s 
epistemological task is that of being not creatively constructive, but receptively 
and re-creatively reconstructive. Man, considered particularly in our present 
context in relation to his epistemological or knowledge capacity and processes, 
is not autonomous at all.”686 
 
5.3.2. A Critique of Value-free Economics regarding the Dichotomy between 
Economics and Christian Faith 
 
When he points out the current prevalent idea of the dichotomy between 
economics and Christianity, and discusses its common terminology and origin, 
Goudzwaard implies that it is linked to the development of the value-free 
[positive] economics: “There we find distinctions like rationalism and 
irrationalism, fact and value, positive and normative, nature and freedom, logic 
and faith. We are all more or less accustomed to those distinctions; but in fact 
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they are all rooted in the deep desire to create a separate area of undeniable 
certainty outside the insecure and conflict-oriented area of religious convictions 
… And so Economics, as a science, had to fall entirely within the bounds of this 
first world, while Christianity had to belong to the second.”687  
As the positive methodology of economics becomes our common sense 
through school or university lectures, books and so on, the separation of 
Christian faith from economics is inevitable. Now we look at the dichotomy 
between economic science and Christian faith which is directly influenced by 
the value-free methodology of modern economics, and which is the prerequisite 
issue that Christians face to apply their faith to their daily economic life. First, 
we talk about the parallel between the dichotomy of economics and ethics and 
the dichotomy of economics and Christian faith and their common root in 
Enlightenment thought. Second, we examine the cause of the dichotomy of 
economics and Christian faith. Third, we criticize the dichotomy from Christian 
epistemological and confessional viewpoints.    
The dissolution of ethics from economics is paired with the separation of 
Christian faith from economics because the post-Kantian positivism, which 
influenced the former as discussed in the previous chapter, presupposes the 
autonomy of man and the sufficiency of human reason.
688
 We, thus, can find 
that scholars paralleled Christian faith with morality as they dealt with the 
development of positive methodology and the consequent dissolution of ethics 
from economics. Terence Hutchison told in A Review of Economic Doctrines 
(1953) that the great architects of the theoretical system of economics at 
Cambridge “conceived their task as belonging not in the realms of theology and 
metaphysics, but in clearing a site, and providing an agreed foundation for 
„scientific‟ inquiry, and here … they drew no specially significant or dramatic 
distinction between the two broad groups of sciences included under the very 
rough headings of „natural‟ and „social‟ (or „moral‟) sciences.”689  
Similarly, William Letwin described in The Origins of Scientific Economics 
(1963), “There can be no doubt that economic theory owes its present 
development to the fact that some men, in thinking of economic phenomena, 
forcefully suspended all judgments of theology, morality, and justice, [and] were 
willing to consider the economy as nothing more than an intricate mechanism, 
refraining for the while from asking whether the mechanism worked for good or 
evil.”690 Joan Robinson also commented in Economic Philosophy (1962), “The 
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moral problem is a conflict that can never be settled. Social life will always 
present mankind with a choice of evils. No metaphysical solution that can ever 
be formulated will seem satisfactory for long. The solutions offered by 
economists were no less delusory than those of the theologians that they 
displaced…… It is necessary to clear the decaying remnants of obsolete 
metaphysics out of the way before we can go forward.”691 
We can turn to Douglas Vickers for a good explication of the principle of 
human autonomy of the Enlightenment. He refers mainly to Immanuel Kant, in 
whom the Enlightenment culminated: 
 
In making autonomous man and the assumed capacities of human reason his starting 
point, Kant was simply standing in a direct line of development from Descartes, whose 
„I think therefore I am‟ has already engaged our attention, It is of some interest to note, 
however, that in the matter of epistemology in general we find in Kant a confluence of 
the continental rationalism and the British empiricism of the preceding century. The 
rationalism of Leibnitz and the empiricism of Hume coalesce in Kant. Kant was 
disturbed by the skepticism that empiricism implied in its development in Hume, and he 
wished to argue out more thoroughly the way in which, while all our knowledge did in 
fact begin with experience, the mind also played a principal part in processing, by 
means of its own innate and, as it were, built-in concepts or categories, the data 
presented to it from outside. Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason was devoted to just this 
important examination …… This single fact of the function of the categories of the 
mind, or, we might properly say, the function of the mind itself, is so important, not 
only for the understanding of the heart of Kantian thought but also for the shape of the 
latter-day neo-Kantian thought …
692
 
 
He continues that the principle of human autonomy produced Kantian 
epistemology, which contrasted with Christian one:  
 
In short, the facts of the world … are not what they are because they were established in 
all their characteristics and interrelationships by God and are already interpreted by Him 
before their discovery by man. Rather, for Kant, the facts become what they are by 
virtue of the ordering, categorizing, defining, organizing, and classifying forms imposed 
by the autonomous mind on the raw materials of experience …… [I]t is … important to 
grasp this one overriding and basic feature… that in the knowledge process the 
autonomous human mind and reason is sovereign. The autonomous mind performs the 
final ordering activity that defines knowable knowledge. This, in a sentence, is the final 
exclusion of God from knowing, God having been impounded in the realm of the 
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noumenal, where knowledge is not possible anyway, and here is the triumph of the 
autonomy of man.
693
  
 
He concludes that the Kantian epistemology based on human autonomy 
contributed to the severance of Christian faith from economics, “The prominent 
economists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries … did not establish an 
interdependence or even a contiguity between their intellectual discipline on the 
one hand and theological or Christian thought on the other. Indeed, economics 
… has deliberately set aside the possible relevance of Christian presuppositions 
to develop, as it imagined, a value-free and „scientific‟ inquiry …… 
Epistemological neutrality is a myth fathered by the Kantian assumption of the 
autonomy of man.”694 He adds, “Christian practice and Christian influence were 
gradually confined in the nineteenth century to this level of pragmatic affairs, 
and the hold that Christian thought might once have enjoyed in the universities 
and in the scholarly professions was shaken fairly completely. In economics it 
became very much the case, and the neo-classical system … like the Keynesian 
and post-Keynesian systems that followed, had no formative contact with 
Christian thought at all. This development we have already seen to have been 
heavily influenced on the level of epistemology and investigative processes by 
the post-Kantian positivism and scientism, and by the assumptions of human 
autonomy on which they were erected.”695    
According to Christian epistemology, however, Christian faith is 
inseparable from economics, as it is true for every other field of knowledge. 
Christian faith plays a decisive role in economic enquiry. In contrast to all the 
“immanentistic interpretative postures such as socialism, individualism, 
collectivism, psychologism, mathematicism, positivism,” 696  Christian 
epistemology “should properly see man and his economic problem as subsistent 
within a derivative context in what is God‟s estate.”697 Christian economists 
shall observe economic facts and interpret them on the basis of their faith in 
God the Creator and His Word. 
Furthermore, Vickers, confessionally, defends the inseparable relations 
between economics and Christian faith according to the religious principle of 
Christ‟s Kingship: “Compartmentalization of Christian thought … is not 
permissible for the man whose whole life and thought is by the Spirit of God 
made subject to the reign of Christ. Economics and theology, that is to say while 
they are necessarily addressed to differently structured universes of inquiry, 
must necessarily proceed in terms of thought forms which derive from a 
common origin of intellection, and a confluence and harmonious relation must 
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necessarily be found to exist between them. For Christ is the Lord of all of life, 
and for the Christian His precepts and purpose are therefore determinative of all 
legitimate life structures.”698 
Goudzwaard, similarly, affirms that it is impossible to separate Christian 
faith and economic life or science, “Christianity, seen biblically, stands or falls 
with the willingness of human beings to follow Christ in all their ways. It stands 
for the commitment to confess Him as the Word of God by Whom the totality of 
life was created. This view precludes the very possibility of separating my 
economic life, or my way of economic thinking, from my Christian faith.”699 In 
his essay titled, „Socioeconomic Life: a Way of Confession,‟ we find his 
elaboration of it: 
 
As an illustration, take the early Christian community. When the Holy Spirit was poured 
out, Christians began to deal with one another differently. I refer not only to the fact that 
their faces beamed with joy and that they broke bread together in all simplicity, but also 
to the changes that occurred in their social and economic relations. 
    A new style of socioeconomic activity became apparent in that community. We 
would oversimplify the new character of their life if we were to make it merely a 
question of whether or not to hold possessions communally. A new ground rule for 
socioeconomic life appeared within the congregation, one which the Saviour himself 
had illustrated with his life: it is more blessed to give than to receive. When this rule 
functions as the basic norm of life, the economic relationships among men begin to 
change and economic life becomes an articulation of communal confession. 
    Let me sharpen the focus. Socio-economic life is always a kind of confession in the 
sense of making known, or even unconsciously betraying, what a person‟s life is all 
about, what he really lives for, and where the meaning of his life lies. Whether we want 
to or not, everyone – Christian and non-Christian – makes a confession in this way. No 
one can live without a lord, and no one can refrain from making confession. Jesus once 
said that no man can serve two masters. Man cannot serve both God and Mammon. This 
means that Mammon also can become the lord whom we confess in our lives.
700
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Chapter 6 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
Here we summarize the results of the research and check whether they answer 
its research questions, which were stated in the introduction. In the introduction 
and chapter 1 we described what has happened in the 1997 Korean Crisis and 
what negative social consequences have occurred, clarified its relations to neo-
liberalism and explained the definition and mechanisms of neo-liberalism. 
South Korean economy has continued to achieve a high annual growth rate 
averaging over 8 % since the 1960s. But in late 1997 it suddenly experienced an 
economic crisis and its growth rate in 1998 fell down to minus 6.7%, the worst 
in the modern Korean history. The economic crisis developed into a social crisis. 
While the rate of unemployment increased, the level of wages of employees 
decreased. The poverty rate soared and the gap between poor and rich widened. 
The psychological health of people worsened. The numbers of divorces, 
suicides, orphans, the homeless, crimes and so on rose rapidly. 
The Korean economic crisis cannot be explained by the existing theories 
that tend to focus on macroeconomic performance. The main macroeconomic 
indicators – fiscal spending, unemployment, inflation, economic growth and 
utilization rate of manufacturing facilities - were at reasonable levels. It was an 
investment-induced crisis due to the instability of global financial market. The 
accelerating financial liberalization since 1995, demanded as a precondition for 
the OECD membership, led to excessively growing foreign loans, especially 
speculative short-term foreign loans. The massive flight of foreign capital in late 
1997and Korea‟s exhaustion of foreign currency reserves led to the government 
requesting relief loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
agreeing on 3 December 1997 to the effective control of the IMF over South 
Korean economic policy. The IMF package of so-called „structural adjustments‟ 
– fiscal austerity, liberalization of cross-border capital, labor market flexibility 
and so on – expanded the foreign exchange crisis into an overall economic and 
social crisis. Despite good macro-economic records prior to the crisis, the IMF 
required the government to immediately implement austerity policies, including 
cutbacks in government spending, and increase in taxes, and a substantial rise in 
interest rates. They caused recession and bankruptcy, unemployment and 
income reduction. This forced Korean economic assets to be put up for an 
international auction in which all bargaining power lay with the buyers. The 
crisis-induced collapse of the won made Korean assets extraordinarily cheap in 
US dollars and other dominant currencies. 
The Korean crisis was not a unique, local phenomenon. Mexico in 1995, 
Southeast Asia in early 1997, and Brazil and Russia in 1998 all experienced 
foreign exchange crises. Thanks to innovations in finance that started in the 
1970s and accelerated in the 1980s, the Western economies had accumulated 
excess liquidity and sought suitable opportunities on the transnational financial 
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markets. The payment of interest to owners of financial assets is an integral 
feature of the global credit market. Such interest payments to the global money 
market force all the different nations of the world to adapt to one and the same 
system. Its ideological expression is neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism insists on 
deregulation in national economies and free trade in the world market. The 
dismantling of national barriers to capital flows increased the instability of 
financial market and thereby the danger of financial crisis. We can see the 
ideology of neo-liberalism as the cause of the Korean financial crisis in 1997 
and the following economic and social crises since then. 
What are neo-liberalism and its mechanisms? The capitalist crisis since the 
1970s, with its shrinking profit rates, inspired the corporate elite to revive 
liberalism, which was weakened by the Keynesianism since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. This is what makes it „neo‟ or new. Friedrich von 
Hayek, the father of neo-liberalism, providing continuity to the liberal tradition 
initiated by Adam Smith, advocated „a spontaneous order‟ of the market. 
However, his special contribution refers to the radical criticism to the idea of 
„social justice.‟ Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US put 
Hayek‟s theory into practice to legitimate the neo-liberal attack on „big 
government‟ and the bureaucratic welfare state. At the international level, the 
essence of the change since the neo-liberal regime is that production, trading 
and monetary capital can be trans-nationalized, while the political instruments 
of regulation remain either national or international. In addition, finance capital 
was assigned a preeminent role. Finance is separated from the factual 
production of goods and services. It has become an end in itself, and this is one 
reason to speak of neo-liberalism and not of liberalism. While the Keynesian 
approach gave priority to full employment and trade balance, the neo-liberal 
monetarist approach gave priority to the stability of monetary value. The owners 
of financial assets and the countries with strong currencies profit, and the 
workers and the countries with weak currencies lose out.  
In the following three chapters we looked respectively into neo-liberal 
principles, practices and methodology. In chapter 2 we examined the principles 
of neo-liberalism behind the Korean crisis. Its primary principle is „self-
regulating market‟ without political and public controls, which brought about 
the current socially and ecologically devastating effects. The second principle is 
„fictitious economy‟ based on the commodity fiction. The neo-liberal self-
regulating market system requires not only goods and services but also labor, 
land and money to be commodified and priced. Finance, especially, that is not 
related to real productions of goods and services has expanded rapidly. The 
volume of money related not to real productions is about 30 times bigger than 
the volume of money related to real productions. Another neo-liberal principle is 
„social evolutionism‟ that can be summarized into „the survival of the fittest‟ 
through competition. It defends the monopolistic or oligopolistic dominations of 
big businesses in the current neo-liberal economy. The other principles of neo-
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liberalism of „full faith in free markets,‟ „subjectivism and utilitarianism of the 
Austrian School,‟ and „anachronism of neo-liberalism in the Korean context‟ are 
not the proper principles of neo-liberal economy itself, but the evaluative 
principles of it from the social philosophical and comparative perspectives. The 
principle of full faith in free markets reveals the deistic and amoral 
characteristics of neo-liberal economy. The principle of subjectivism and 
utilitarianism, similarly, highlights its antinomian traits. The last principle of 
anachronism of neo-liberalism in the Korean context points out that unlike 
relatively more socialized Austrian or Western societies the Korean society had 
already been severely liberalized and deregulated before neo-liberalism began 
its influence. 
In chapter 3 we dealt with how the neo-liberal principles discussed above 
have worked in practice. We chose three issues to be presented as case studies: 
tax havens, labor-management relations and real estate, which represent the 
most serious economic problems the Korean society and people have faced 
under neo-liberalism. We gave attention to how the primary neo-liberal principle 
of „self-regulating market‟ has brought about socially and ecologically harmful 
effects since the crisis by means of the „commodification of the factors of 
production,‟ which is the essence of the second neo-liberal principle of 
„fictitious economy.‟ We also saw that the principle of social evolutionism has 
operated in all the three case study areas; that is, in all the areas the inequality 
between poor and rich was expanded and the powers of transnational companies, 
in particular, of chaebols in Korean context, were enlarged. In the first case 
study, tax havens allow uncontrolled „commodification of money‟ by means of 
providing the fiction of „secrecy space.‟ Because they are almost entirely off the 
radar screen of regulation and supervision, they create the conditions that lead to 
financial instability, and promote the global cross-border dirty money whether it 
is related to commercial tax avoidances and evasions, crimes, or corrupted 
politicians. Tax havens played an important part in the Korean crisis. The off-
shore banks acted as super-conduits both for the inflow of foreign investment 
into Korea and for the sudden massive capital flight from Korea before the crisis. 
Tax havens were also used to hide business losses and external debts, which 
disturbed appropriate managements. We confirmed that as financial 
liberalization around 1997 has progressed, tax haven money has increased 
through several statistics – regarding foreign direct investment, overseas direct 
investment and trade. We took some examples of Korean and American big 
enterprises that have used tax havens to avoid or reduce taxes. Multinational 
businesses squeeze out medium and small nationally based businesses that have 
an unfair higher cost structure than their larger rivals. 
In the second case study, the „commodification of labor‟ was related to the 
idea of „labor market flexibility‟ since the 1997 crisis. The labor movement that 
has been strengthened since „the 1987 Great Workers‟ Struggle‟ was again 
weakened and, for the first time in recent Korean history, layoff for managerial 
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reasons and use of a leasing worker were legalized. The result was permanent 
crisis of unemployment and increase in employment insecurity, extension of 
irregular employment and deterioration in income distribution. It led to 
worsening the chronically antagonistic labor-management relations given the 
very insufficient social welfare system. In the third case study, the 
„commodification of real estate‟ was associated with the „liberalization of the 
real estate market‟ since the crisis. The Korean government has carried out a 
series of policies to liberalize real estate market. It discarded the laws of the 
„public concept of land‟ that functioned to prohibit speculation: the ceiling on 
the housing site, super-normal capital gains tax and the developmental capital 
gains tax. It also lifted the price ceiling on apartments, freed the Green Belt and 
opened the real estate market extensively to foreigners. Lastly, it liberalized real 
estate finance - including the privatization of Korea Housing Bank. The series 
of neo-liberal policies of real estate brought about disparity of real estate 
between rich and poor and ecological destruction. The disparity of real estate 
was connected to the idea of the Lockean „absolutism of private property right,‟ 
and the ecological destruction to the ideas of (neo-)developmentalism and the 
Descartian dualism between man and nature. We took the recent „Yongsan 
Tragedy‟ as an example of the absolutism of private property right and the 
„Cheonggyecheon Restoration Project‟ and the „Four Major Rivers Restoration 
Project‟ as examples of neo-developmentalism. 
In chapter 4 we discussed the neo-liberal methodology of economic science. 
The general denial of the need for a theory of social justice or an ethics of the 
common good in neo-liberalism and the consequent criticism of government‟s 
control over market and social expenditure are related to the so-called „value-
free‟ or „positive‟ methodology of modern economics – including neo-liberal 
economics. The methodology distinguishes between the positive and the 
normative and tends to disregard the latter. We found its origin in 
Enlightenment philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and David Hume. Kant 
distinguished between the „phenomenal realm‟ and the „noumenal realm‟ and 
thought that the knowledge transaction completely occurs only in the former. 
Kant also presented the doctrine of categories through which we can obtain 
genuine knowledge. On the base of these Kantian insights, Max Weber, Richard 
Strigl, Lionel Robbins and so on developed the value-free economic 
methodology. Hume suggested an impersonal and non-moral new causality 
against the old causality that “every event must either be the act of some person, 
who was thus responsible for it, or it must be an „Act of God.‟” He also 
provided the so-called „Hume‟s dichotomy‟ between „is‟ and „ought‟, whose 
primary concern is to prevent us from basing moral judgments upon natural 
facts. On those Humean foundations, Adam Smith began to understand 
economic science as a mechanical system like natural sciences and John Neville 
Keynes, Lionel Robbins and so on formulated the standard positive economic 
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methodology. Paul Samuelson and Milton Friedman inherited their 
methodology. 
However, the well-known scholars such as Gunnar Myrdal and Amartya 
Sen disagreed with the mainstream value-free methodology. Myrdal stressed the 
impossibility of purely non-normative economics and claimed, furthermore, that 
value judgments play a vital role in socio-economic analysis: “Valuations enter 
into social analysis, not only when conclusions concerning policy are drawn, but 
already in the theoretical endeavour to establish what is objectively true - in the 
choice of a field of enquiry, the selection of assumptions, even the decision as to 
what is a fact and what is a value.” He explained that two main moral 
philosophies – natural law and utilitarianism - are behind economic doctrines by 
taking the examples of various concepts of value – „real value‟ or „labor value,‟ 
„subjective value‟ or „marginal utility,‟ and „social value.‟ Sen questioned the 
monopolistic status of „self-interest‟ in the standard economic explanation of 
human behavior and advised us to consider not only the normative assumption 
of self-interest but also the other normative assumptions of „sympathy‟ and 
“commitment.” He revisited Adam Smith and revealed moral aspects of Smith‟s 
works. 
In chapter 5 we pondered how Christians could respond to the neo-liberal 
principles, practices and methodology. First we presented the main neo-liberal 
concepts of market, economics and globalization which are composed of the 
principles of global capitalism in chapter 2, and suggested the Christian 
alternative views of them. Against the view of a non-ethical market as a self-
regulating mechanism, Bob Goudzwaard, quoting John Calvin, recognized the 
need of government to control the harmful effects of market for public justice or 
solidarity. Herman Daly and John Cobb Jr. distinguished between „market‟ (an 
original and positive one as the basic organizing principle of the economy) and 
„Market‟ (a gigantic and destructive one as the basic organizing principle of 
society). In contrast to the neo-liberal view of fictitious economy which is more 
concerned about making formally maximum results and profits but less 
concerned about satisfying our real needs, related to moral issues, Christian 
scholars paid attention on the substantial and moral aspects of economy. 
Goudzwaard looked into the Greek word oikonomia that corresponds to the 
economics in the Bible and revealed its moral implications. Both Goudzwaard 
and Ulrich Duchrow mentioned Aristotle‟s distinction between oikonomia („the 
art and science of good household management‟) and chrematistike („the art of 
acquiring and accumulating money‟). In chapter 2 we also revealed that the 
current globalization has both an imperialistic aspect of being fundamentally 
built on the American military power and dollar seigniorage and a destructive 
aspect of expanding inequality, poverty and ecological degradation 
internationally and even in the United States. Bob Goudzwaard reminded us that 
the Christian church was also meant to become a global community. But he 
claimed that the Bible contains its own style of globalization, oriented to the 
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coming of his Messiah King (Ephesians 1:10). He asserted that the good 
question is not “Whether Christians should be for or against globalization, but 
“What kind of globalization should we be supporting?” 
Second, we evaluated the previous case studies – tax havens, labor-
management relations and real estate – in chapter 3 and propose the Christian 
alternative ideas and practices of them. In the case studies we examined neo-
liberal practices and its background ideas in the three selected areas which 
correspond respectively to the three factors of production – capital, labor and 
land. Neo-liberal self-regulating market economy requires the „commodification‟ 
of all the factors of production. Our evaluations of those case studies were 
founded on the analyses of the „commodification‟ and the subsequent 
„instrumentalization‟ of capital, labor and land. The neo-liberal economy has an 
outspoken output-orientation, in which capital, labor and land have to be 
commodified and be used instrumentally as mere „factors‟ for the maximum 
contribution to the production-growth. But the economy of the Torah (in 
particular, Leviticus 25) has an outspoken input-orientation, in which interest-
free capital, labor and land are honored and respected as having their own 
values. We presented the Biblical ideas of „inherent value of labor and land‟ in 
contrast to the neo-liberal ideas of „labor market flexibility‟ and „dualism of man 
and nature,‟ which are respectively related to the commodification of labor and 
land. We also revealed that today interest-bearing capital has its strongest 
foothold in tax havens and criticized them on the basis of the Biblical analysis 
of „Mammonism‟ (Luke 16:13). Tax havens seem to be able to give us more 
freedom - „freedom to choose‟ in Milton Friedman‟s words - but, in reality, they 
enslave us and dehumanize our society.  
Moreover, in reaction to the deepening antagonistic labor-management 
relations due to the neo-liberal policies of the „labor market flexibility‟ we 
introduced the Dutch protestant church‟s cooperative views and experiences as a 
reference. Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) provided a crucial theoretical 
framework of Dutch Protestant social movement - including labor movement. 
First his organic view of human society motivated Dutch Protestant church to 
develop the harmony model of labor-capital relations in contrast to the conflict 
model of both capital-centered liberalism and labor-centered socialism. Second 
his „principle of sphere sovereignty‟ allowed the government only a moderate 
intervention into industry and promoted the autonomous bipartite industrial 
relations between labor and capital. Dutch Protestant labor movement goes back 
to the „Patrimonium,‟ which Christian workers and employers – the bricklayer 
Klaas Kater (1833-1916) and his own employer Willem Hovy (1840-1915), etc. 
- founded together in 1876. Even though it is workers‟ organization, it opens its 
membership to employers as associate members, and seeks for a harmonious 
relationship between employees and employers and aims to promote the 
interests of not only workers, but also of society as a whole. However, as the 
industrialization developed, the inter-class model of Patrimonium was given up 
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and separate organizations both of workers and of employers were recognized 
and formed. During the transitional period from the inter-class model to the 
various Christion labor unions, Aritius Talma (1864-1916) played a decisive role. 
He insisted on workers‟ equality with employers before God and justified the 
existence of Christian labor unions. He reinterpreted the apostolic admonitions, 
“Ye servants, obey your earthly masters in everything.” They were addressed to 
the slaves and may not be applied to the modern contractual relations between 
employers and workers. Talma suggested to replace the words „authority‟ and 
„obedience‟ by „leadership‟ and „subordination‟ and thereby to desacralize the 
„divine authority‟ of the employer. He thought that God-given authority applied 
to the government, church and family but not to the relations between workers 
and employers. Talma also defended Christian labor unions against the 
conservative critiques of them. He claimed that the inter-class organizations 
were unrealistic under the more detached relations between workers and 
employers in the modern mass production system since the industrial revolution, 
compared to that in a small-scale guild system of apprenticeship. He insisted 
that Christian labor unions sought not merely for materialistic interests and the 
revolutionary „class struggle,‟ but for higher non-material values and „struggle 
for the protection of right.‟ He taught that labor unions had a fundamental right 
to represent individual workers, who became powerless before a powerful 
capitalistic system. 
But, this acknowledgement of separate Christian trade unions has never 
meant that the Christian labor movement gave up her harmonistic ideal between 
labor and capital. She has searched for the alternative in constituting 
consultative trade organizations („bedrijfsorganisaties‟) within the so-called 
Dutch consultative economy („overlegeconomie‟). Mainly through the 
consultative trade organizations she could have realized her cooperative vision 
of labor-management relations since the foundations of the separate trade unions. 
The 1891 Christian Social Conference has already recommended the bipartite 
„Chambers of Labor‟ (Kamers van Arbeid) as a means to reconcile the workers 
and employers. It is taken to be a prelude to the far-reaching consultative trade 
organization. On the other hand, in 1919 the CNV (Christelijk Nationaal 
Vakverbond in Nederland, „National Federation of Christian Trade Unions in the 
Netherlands‟ founded in 1909) has taken a part in establishing the tripartite 
„High Council for Labor‟ (Hoge Raad van Arbeid), which could be considered 
as the beginning of the Dutch consultative economy and as the most important 
forerunner of the „Social and Economic Council‟ (Sociaal-Economische Raad). 
The consultations between the three national labor unions – including the CNV 
– and employers have resulted in the establishment of the „Labor Foundation‟ 
(Stichting van de Arbeid) in May 1945. The Labor Foundation was shortly 
recognized as its official advisory body by the Cabinet, even though it was a 
„private-law trade organization.‟ Finally in February 1950 the Social and 
Economic Council, which was a public-law trade organization, and developed to 
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the most important advisory institution in the social and economic field, came 
into being. In the defense of „public-law trade organization‟ within the Christian 
world, Marinus Ruppert (1911-1992), the leader of the CNV, played an 
important role. The conservative wing insisted, based on the „principle of sphere 
sovereignty,‟ that not industries but individual companies are sovereign 
communities and so the former should not be entitled to regulatory power, and 
that private-law trade organizations are allowable, but public-law organizations 
are not. Ruppert replied that industries were obviously communities and no 
Protestant major figure had opposed it so far. He also refused the rigid 
distinction between private law and public law which was based on an 
ideological interpretation of the „principle of sphere sovereignty.‟ Since the 
representative consultative trade organizations – the Labor Foundation and the 
Social and Economic Council have been established after the World War II, the 
CNV has continuously participated in them. She has thereby contributed to the 
Dutch consultative economy and peaceful labor relations. She has aided the 
rapid recovery from the perils after the war and the establishment of welfare 
state. And one of the recent examples was the „almost agreement‟ (bijna-akkord) 
in 1979 that she initiated in the Labor Foundation. It paved the way to the 
„Agreement of Wassenaar‟ in 1982 that led to the revitalization of the 
consultative economy and to the economic improvement in the following two 
decades, the internationally praised „polder model‟.  
We also presented the „public concept of real estate‟ against the idea of „the 
absolutism of the private property right‟ which was behind the widening 
disparity of real estate right due to its neo-liberal commodification since the 
Korean crisis. Henry George agreed with Locke that what a man produces by 
his labor is his own possession. But he differed with Locke that the principle is 
applied also to the raw nature or land, God‟s gratuitous gift, and developed the 
„public concept of land‟ or nature. By examining the Jubilee laws in Leviticus 
25 and a couple of other scriptures regarding „land boundary‟ and „patrimonium‟ 
we confirmed that the Bible taught „God‟s ultimate ownership of land‟ and 
„communal and temporary human ownership of land.‟ In contrast to George, we 
suggested to apply the public concept not only to land but also to houses. In 
Leviticus 25:29-34 „houses‟ aren‟t generally taken as „private property‟ except 
for those in walled cities. Urban houses are exceptional, for they are possibly 
less vital to the people‟s livelihood in agricultural ages, which is interestingly 
opposed to that in modern industrial and commercial ages. Housing is inelastic 
in its supply, even though less so than land. Housing problems, today, appear to 
be even more urgent and desperate than land problems. One of examples of 
practicing the public concept of housing is to supply economic and high quality 
public rental houses extensively to urban low income families. 
Lastly we criticized the neo-liberal value-free economic methodology, 
examined in chapter 4, from the perspective of a Christian epistemology, and 
also talked about the dichotomy between economics and Christian faith, which 
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is accompanied by the value-free economic methodology. Douglas Vickers 
counter-argues against the value-free economics on the basis of „Christian 
presuppositional epistemology.‟ The presuppositional epistemology understands 
that we could not make sense of our human experiences without some 
presuppositions and believes that the Biblical revelations are among the 
presuppositions. Vickers claims that our economic thoughts and prescriptions 
are dependent on the philosophical or religious world- and life views and pre-
theoretical commitments, which have moral implications as well. Vickers 
defines Christian presuppositional epistemology as a „transcendental one‟ which 
contrasts with „immanentistic ones.‟ He explains their difference by extending 
Abraham Kuyper‟s „ontological antithesis‟ between the Christian and the non-
Christian to „epistemological antithesis‟ between them. 
The value-free economic methodology leads to the prevalent idea of the 
dichotomy between economic science and Christian faith because the post-
Kantian positivism, which influenced the former as discussed in chapter 4, 
presupposes the autonomy of man and the sufficiency of human reason. 
According to the Christian epistemology, however, Christian faith is inseparable 
from economics, as it is true for every other field of knowledge. Christian 
economists shall observe economic facts and interpret them on the basis of their 
faith in God the Creator and His Word. Furthermore, Christian scholars, 
confessionally, defend the inseparable relations between economics and 
Christian faith according to the religious principle of Christ‟s Kingship over all 
spheres of our lives. 
Finally, we could add some remarks concerning what this research 
suggests to the contemporary churches and Christians under the neo-liberal 
world economy. Neo-liberalism that brings about financial crisis and 
subsequently economic and social crises has threatened not only Eastern, South 
American and Asian countries - Russia, Mexico, Brazil, Thailand, Indonesia 
and South Korea since the mid-1990s, but also Western countries – the United 
States since 2008 and the eurozone countries since 2009, which had designed 
neo-liberal financial systems since the 1970s to meet the crisis of capital 
accumulation in the 1960s. Neo-liberalism is not a neutral or value-free natural 
mechanism against which we cannot resist, but an ideological or value-
impregnated man-made product that is created to defend the interests of a small 
number of transnational firms and banks and a small percentage of the super 
rich who own financial assets. Neo-liberalism, however, accompanies 
permanent financial instability, social and ecological degradations due to its off-
shore residence, fiscal austerity and budget cuts in social expenditure, 
commodifications of real estate and nature and so on. Against neo-liberalism, 
churches and Christians, whether in Western countries or in other counties, have 
jointly or individually an urgent mandate to propose and practice alternative 
economic views and policies on the basis of the Biblical moral teachings – such 
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as social justice, cooperative harmony and ecological stewardship - as we have 
done here in the Korean cases. 
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
Neoliberalisme en de Koreaanse Economie sinds de Financiële  
Crisis van 1997: Een Christelijk-Ethische Analyse gericht op Fiscale 
Toevluchtsoorden, Werknemer-Werkgeverrelaties en Onroerend Goed 
 
 
In de inleiding en in hoofdstuk 1 hebben we beschreven wat er gebeurde tijdens 
de Koreaanse Crisis van 1997 en welke negatieve sociale gevolgen er optraden, 
hebben we de verbanden met het neoliberalisme toegelicht en de definitie en de 
mechanismen van het neoliberalisme besproken. Sinds de zestiger jaren van de 
vorige eeuw vertoonde de Zuid-Koreaanse economie een hoge jaarlijkse groei 
van gemiddeld meer dan 8%. Eind 1997 raakte zij echter onverwacht in een 
economische crisis en in 1998 daalde het groeicijfer tot min 6,7%, het laagste 
punt ooit in de moderne Koreaanse geschiedenis. De economische crisis groeide 
uit tot een sociale crisis. De werkeloosheid nam toe, de lonen daalden. De 
armoedecijfers stegen sterk en de kloof tussen arm en rijk werd groter. Ook de 
psychologische gezondheid van de mensen verslechterde. Dit was onder meer 
zichtbaar in de dramatische stijging van het aantal echtscheidingen, zelfmoorden, 
wezen, thuislozen en misdrijven. 
De economische crisis in Korea kan niet verklaard worden door de 
bestaande theorieën die zich doorgaans baseren op macro-economische 
prestaties. De belangrijkste macro-economische indicatoren – overheidsuitgaven, 
werkeloosheid, inflatie, economische groei en de bezettingsgraad van de 
productiemiddelen – waren op een redelijk niveau. Het betrof hier een crisis die 
teweeggebracht werd door investeringen bij een instabiele financiële 
wereldmarkt. De zich sinds 1995 snel ontwikkelende financiële liberalisatie, die 
vereist werd als preconditie voor het OESO-lidmaatschap, leidde tot 
buitensporige buitenlandse leningen, in het bijzonder speculatieve 
kortetermijnleningen. De enorme vlucht van vreemd kapitaal eind 1997 en de 
uitputting van Korea‟s deviezenreserves bracht de regering ertoe bij het 
Internationaal Monetair Fonds (IMF) aan te kloppen voor hulpleningen en op 3 
december 1997 in te stemmen met de controle van het IMF over het economisch 
beleid van Zuid-Korea. Het pakket aan zogenoemde „structurele hervormingen‟ 
van het IMF – overheidsbezuinigingen, liberalisatie van buitenlands kapitaal, 
flexibiliteit van de arbeidsmarkt enzovoort – had tot gevolg dat de valutacrisis 
zich verbreedde tot een algehele economische en sociale crisis. Ondanks de 
goede macro-economische positie vóór de crisis eiste het IMF van de regering 
dat het hervormingsprogramma met onder meer bezuinigingen in 
overheidsuitgaven, belastingverhogingen en een aanzienlijke verhoging van de 
rentevoet, onmiddellijk ingevoerd werd. Het gevolg was recessie, 
faillissementen, werkeloosheid en verlaging van het inkomensniveau. Dit 
maakte een internationale veiling van de Koreaanse economische activa 
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noodzakelijk, waarbij de kopers een enorm onderhandelingsvoordeel hadden. 
De door de crisis veroorzaakte ineenstorting van de won maakte de Koreaanse 
activa buitengewoon goedkoop in Amerikaanse dollars en andere belangrijke 
valuta. 
De Koreaanse crisis was geen uniek, plaatselijk fenomeen. Meer landen 
maakten een valutacrisis door: Mexico in 1995, Zuidoost-Azië begin 1997 en 
Brazilië en Rusland in 1998. Dankzij financiële innovaties die in de zeventiger 
jaren hun intrede hadden gedaan en in de tachtiger jaren snel aan aantal wonnen 
hadden de westerse economieën een overvloed aan liquiditeiten vergaard 
waarvoor ze op de transnationale financiële markten passende oplossingen 
zochten. De wereldkredietmarkt wordt gekenmerkt door rentebetaling aan de 
eigenaren van financiële activa. Deze rentebetalingen aan de financiële 
wereldmarkt dwingen alle wereldstaten zich aan te passen aan één en hetzelfde 
systeem. In ideologisch opzicht wordt hieraan uiting gegeven door het 
neoliberalisme. Het neoliberalisme kenmerkt zich door een deregulering van de 
nationale economieën en een vrije wereldhandel. Het opheffen van de nationale 
barrières voor kapitaalstromen vergrootte de instabiliteit van de financiële markt 
en daarmee het gevaar van een financiële crisis. De ideologie van het 
neoliberalisme kan beschouwd worden als de oorzaak van de financiële crisis in 
Korea in 1997 en de daarop volgende economische en sociale crisis. 
Wat is het neoliberalisme en wat zijn de achterliggende mechanismen? De 
kapitaalcrisis met haar dalende winstcijfers die sinds de zeventiger jaren heerste, 
bracht de corporatieve elite ertoe om het liberalisme, dat sinds de Grote 
Depressie van de jaren dertig te lijden had gehad van het Keynesianisme, 
wederom te introduceren. Dit maakt het „neo‟ oftewel nieuw. Friedrich von 
Hayek, die als vader van het neoliberalisme de liberale traditie voortzette die 
geïnitieerd was door Adam Smith, propageerde „een spontane orde‟ van de 
markt. Echter, met name zijn vergaande kritiek op het begrip „sociale 
rechtvaardigheid‟ is belangrijk geweest. In het Verenigd Koninkrijk bracht 
Margaret Thatcher Hayeks theorie in de praktijk teneinde de neoliberale aanval 
op het „big government‟ en de bureaucratische verzorgingsstaat te kunnen 
rechtvaardigen. In de Verenigde Staten deed Ronald Reagan hetzelfde. Op 
internationaal niveau kenmerkt de verandering sinds het regime van het 
neoliberalisme zich met name door het feit dat de productie, de handel en het 
monetair kapitaal getransnationaliseerd kunnen worden, terwijl de politieke 
reguleringsinstrumenten nationaal dan wel internationaal blijven. Daarnaast 
kreeg het financieel kapitaal een dominante rol. Financieel kapitaal wordt 
gescheiden van de feitelijke productie van goederen en diensten. Het is een doel 
op zichzelf geworden, en dit is een reden waarom we spreken van 
neoliberalisme en niet van liberalisme. Terwijl de Keynesiaanse benadering 
volledige werkgelegenheid en een evenwichtige handelsbalans voorstond, gaf 
de neoliberale monetaristische benadering de voorkeur aan een stabiele 
monetaire waarde. Daarbij profiteren de bezitters van financiële activa en de 
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landen met sterke valuta, en trekken de werknemers en de landen met zwakke 
valuta aan het kortste eind. 
In de volgende drie hoofdstukken hebben we achtereenvolgens de 
neoliberale basisprincipes bekeken, de toepassing ervan in de praktijk en de 
methodologie. In hoofdstuk 2 gingen we in op de neoliberale basisprincipes 
achter de Koreaanse crisis. Het belangrijkste principe is de „zelfregulerende 
markt‟ zonder politieke en publieke controle, die de huidige sociaal en 
ecologisch desastreuze effecten teweegbracht. Het tweede basisprincipe is de 
„fictieve economie‟ en is gebaseerd op de fictie van de handelsgoederen. Het 
neoliberale zelfregulerende marktsysteem vereist niet alleen goederen en 
diensten maar ook arbeid, land en geld, die gecommodificeerd worden en van 
een prijs worden voorzien. Met name het financieel kapitaal dat niet gerelateerd 
is aan de werkelijke productie van goederen en diensten is snel toegenomen. De 
hoeveelheid geld die niet gerelateerd is aan de werkelijke productie is ongeveer 
dertig keer zo groot als de hoeveelheid geld die wel gerelateerd is aan de 
werkelijke productie. Een derde neoliberaal basisprincipe is „sociaal 
evolutionisme‟, wat in het kort omschreven kan worden als „survival of the 
fittest‟ door middel van concurrentie. Het propageert de monopolistische of 
oligopolistische overheersing door zogenoemde big businesses in de huidige 
neoliberale economie. De overige basisprincipes van het neoliberalisme, 
namelijk „absoluut geloof in de vrije markt‟, „subjectivisme en utilitarisme van 
de Oostenrijkse School‟ en „anachronisme van het neoliberalisme in de 
Koreaanse context‟ zijn niet de uitgangspunten van de neoliberale economie zelf, 
maar evaluatieve principes vanuit het sociaal-filosofische en het comparatieve 
perspectief. Het principe van het absoluut geloof in de vrije markt laat zien dat 
de neoliberale economie deïstische en amorele kenmerken heeft. Het principe 
van het subjectivisme en het utilitarisme toont haar antinomische trekken. Het 
laatstgenoemde principe van het anachronisme van het neoliberalisme in de 
Koreaanse context geeft aan dat, in tegenstelling tot de relatief meer 
gesocialiseerde Oostenrijkse samenleving of andere Westerse samenlevingen, de 
Koreaanse samenleving al zeer geliberaliseerd en gedereguleerd was voordat het 
neoliberalisme invloed kreeg. 
In hoofdstuk 3 lieten we zien hoe de bovenstaande neoliberale principes in 
de praktijk hebben gewerkt. We hebben drie onderwerpen gekozen die we 
hebben uitgewerkt in een casestudy: fiscale toevluchtsoorden, werknemer-
werkgeverrelaties en onroerend goed. Op deze drie terreinen bevinden zich de 
grootste economische problemen waaraan de Koreaanse samenleving en haar 
burgers onder het neoliberalisme het hoofd hebben moeten bieden. We 
bespraken dat het eerste neoliberale basisprincipe, de „zelfregulerende markt‟, 
sinds de crisis schadelijke effecten tot gevolg had op sociaal en ecologisch 
terrein door de „commodificatie van de productiefactoren‟, hetgeen de essentie 
is van het tweede neoliberale basisprincipe, de „fictieve economie.‟ We zagen 
ook dat het principe van het sociaal evolutionisme op elk van de drie terreinen 
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van de casestudy‟s van toepassing is geweest: op elk terrein waren de 
verschillen tussen arm en rijk namelijk groter geworden en was de macht van de 
transnationale bedrijven toegenomen, in het bijzonder die van de chaebols in de 
Koreaanse setting. In de eerste casestudy laten de fiscale toevluchtsoorden 
ongecontroleerde „geldcommodificatie‟ toe doordat ze de fictie van „secrecy 
space‟ bieden. Omdat ze bijna geheel buiten het bereik van regulering en 
supervisie opereren creëren ze de voorwaarden die leiden tot de financiële 
instabiliteit en stimuleren ze het ontstaan van het wereldwijde en 
grensoverschrijdende dirty money, dat nauw gerelateerd is aan commerciële 
belastingvermijding of -ontduiking, criminaliteit en corrupte politici. Fiscale 
toevluchtsoorden hebben een grote rol gespeeld in de Koreaanse crisis. De off-
shore banken handelden als super-investeringsvehikels zowel voor de stroom 
van buitenlandse investeringen richting Korea als voor de plotselinge enorme 
kapitaalvlucht uit Korea vóór de crisis. Fiscale toevluchtsoorden werden ook 
gebruikt om bedrijfsverliezen en buitenlandse schulden te verbergen, hetgeen 
passend overheidsmanagement verstoorde. We toonden met verschillende 
statistieken (de directe buitenlandse investeringen, directe overzeese 
investeringen en handel) aan dat het geld in de fiscale toevluchtsoorden 
vermeerderde met het voortschrijden van de financiële liberalisatie rond 1997. 
We noemden als voorbeeld enkele grote Koreaanse en Amerikaanse 
ondernemingen die gebruik hebben gemaakt van fiscale toevluchtsoorden om 
belastingbetaling te verminderen of te vermijden. Multinationals verdrijven de 
kleine en middelgrote nationale bedrijven van de markt, omdat de 
laatstgenoemde twee groepen een onredelijke, hogere kostenstructuur hebben 
dan hun grotere concurrenten. 
In de tweede casestudy was de „arbeidscommodificatie‟ gerelateerd aan het 
principe van de „flexibiliteit van de arbeidsmarkt‟ sinds de crisis van 1997. De 
arbeidersbeweging, die juist aan kracht gewonnen had sinds de „Grote 
Arbeidersstrijd van 1987‟, was weer zwakker geworden. Voor de eerste keer in 
de recente Koreaanse geschiedenis werd ontslag wegens bedrijfseconomische 
redenen en inzet van leasing workers (vorm van detachering) wettelijk 
toegestaan. Het gevolg hiervan was een permanente crisis gekenmerkt door 
werkeloosheid en een groeiende baanonzekerheid, een toename van niet-
reguliere arbeidsvormen en een verslechtering van de inkomensverdeling. Dit 
leidde tot de verdere verslechtering van de reeds vijandige werknemer-
werkgeverrelaties bij een zeer ontoereikend socialezekerheidsstelsel. In de derde 
casestudy hield de „onroerendgoed-commodificatie‟ verband met de 
„liberalisering van de onroerendgoed-markt‟ sinds de crisis. De Koreaanse 
regering had middels een aantal beleidsmaatregelen de onroerendgoed-markt 
geliberaliseerd. Hiermee schoof ze de wetten met betrekking tot het „publieke 
concept van landeigendom‟, die speculatie moesten tegengaan, terzijde: het 
plafond op de onroerendgoed-markt, de supernormale-kapitaalwinstbelasting en 
de kapitaalwinstbelasting op projectontwikkeling. Ze hief ook het prijsplafond 
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van appartementen op, opende de Groene Gordel en gaf buitenlanders ruim 
toegang tot de onroerendgoed-markt. Tot slot liberaliseerde ze de 
onroerendgoed-financiering, onder meer door de privatisering van de Korea 
Housing Bank. Deze reeks van neoliberale onroerendgoed-maatregelen 
vergrootte de verschillen tussen arm en rijk in termen van onroerendgoed-bezit 
en was ook in ecologisch opzicht schadelijk. Het verschil in onroerendgoed-
bezit hield verband met de opvatting van Locke over het „absolutisme van het 
recht op privé-eigendom‟, de ecologische vernietiging hing samen met de 
ideeën van het (neo)developmentalisme en het Descartiaanse dualisme tussen de 
mens en de natuur. We hebben de recente „Yongsan Tragedy‟ genoemd als 
voorbeeld van het „absolutisme van het recht op privé-eigendom‟ en het 
„Cheonggyecheon Restoration Project‟ en het „Four Major Rivers Restoration 
Project‟ als voorbeeld van het neodevelopmentalisme. 
In hoofdstuk 4 bespraken we de neoliberale methodologie van 
economische wetenschap. Het feit dat het neoliberalisme in het algemeen geen 
belang hechtte aan een theorie van sociale rechtvaardigheid of een ethiek van 
het algemeen belang en het feit dat men overheidscontrole van de markt en de 
voorzieningen voortdurend bekritiseerde houdt verband met de zogenoemde 
„waardenvrije‟ of „positieve‟ methodologie van de moderne economische 
wetenschap, met inbegrip van de neoliberale economie. De methodologie maakt 
onderscheid tussen het positieve en het normatieve en hecht in het algemeen 
geen belang aan het laatste. De oorsprong ervan bleek te liggen bij filosofen van 
de Verlichting zoals Immanuel Kant en David Hume. Kant maakte onderscheid 
tussen de „fenomenale wereld‟ en de „noumenale wereld‟ en was van mening 
dat het verkrijgen van kennis geheel en uitsluitend plaatsvond in de 
eerstgenoemde wereld. Kant gaf ook uitleg over de doctrine van de categorieën 
die tot het verkrijgen van werkelijke kennis leiden. Op basis van deze 
Kantiaanse inzichten ontwikkelden onder meer Max Weber, Richard Strigl en 
Lionel Robbins de waardenvrije economische methodologie. Hume stelde een 
nieuwe, onpersoonlijke en amorele causaliteit voor in plaats van de oude 
causaliteit dat „elke gebeurtenis òf een handeling van een persoon was - wat 
deze persoon dus hiervoor verantwoordelijk maakte-, òf een „godshandeling‟ 
moest zijn.‟ Hij introduceerde ook de zogenoemde „Dichotomie van Hume‟, die 
onderscheid maakte tussen „is‟ en „behoort‟, en die ervoor zou moeten zorgen 
dat we morele oordelen niet baseren op natuurlijke feiten. Op basis van deze 
Humeaanse grondslagen ging Adam Smith de economische wetenschap zien als 
een mechanisch systeem zoals de natuurwetenschap en formuleerden onder 
meer John Neville Keynes en Lionel Robbins de standaardmethodologie van de 
positieve economie. Paul Samuelson en Milton Friedman namen vervolgens hun 
methodologie over. 
Vermaarde economen als Gunnar Myrdal en Amartya Sen maakten echter 
bezwaar tegen de heersende methodologie van de waardenvrije economie. 
Myrdal benadrukte dat een strikt niet-normatieve economie niet mogelijk was 
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en stelde voorts dat waardeoordelen een essentiële rol speelden in de socio-
economische analyse: “Valuations enter into social analysis, not only when 
conclusions concerning policy are drawn, but already in the theoretical 
endeavour to establish what is objectively true - in the choice of a field of 
enquiry, the selection of assumptions, even the decision as to what is a fact and 
what is a value.” Met behulp van voorbeelden van verschillende 
waardeconcepten - „reële waarde‟ of „arbeidswaarde,‟ „subjectieve waarde‟ of 
„marginale utiliteit‟, en „sociale waarde‟ - liet hij zien dat economische doctrines 
geschraagd werden door twee belangrijke morele filosofische concepten: de 
natuurwetten en het utilitarisme. Sen betwistte de monopolistische status van 
„eigenbelang‟ in de gebruikelijke economische verklaring van menselijk gedrag 
en pleitte ervoor, naast de normatieve assumptie van eigenbelang, ook de andere 
normatieve assumpties „sympathie‟ en „engagement‟ te hanteren. Hij 
bestudeerde de werken van Adam Smith en wees op de morele aspecten daarvan. 
In hoofdstuk 5 schonken we aandacht aan de vraag hoe christenen zouden 
kunnen reageren op de principes, de toepassing in de praktijk en de 
methodologie van het neoliberalisme. Allereerst stelden we de belangrijkste 
neoliberale concepten betreffende de markt, de economie en de globalisering 
aan de orde, die gekenmerkt worden door de principes van het wereldwijde 
kapitalisme uit hoofdstuk 2, en gaven we een aantal christelijke alternatieven 
hiervoor. Wat betreft de opvatting van een niet-ethische markt als 
zelfregulerend mechanisme, wees Bob Goudzwaard, met verwijzing naar de 
woorden van Johannes Calvijn, erop dat de regering de schadelijke effecten van 
de markt dient te beheersen uit het oogpunt van publieke rechtvaardigheid of 
solidariteit. Herman Daly en John Cobb Jr. onderscheidden „markt‟ (een 
oorspronkelijke, constructieve markt als basisorganisatieprincipe van de 
economie) van „Markt‟ (een gigantische en destructieve markt als 
basisorganisatieprincipe van de maatschappij). In tegenstelling tot de 
neoliberale opvatting over de fictieve economie, die meer gericht is op het 
bereiken van formeel maximale resultaten en winsten dan op het bevredigen van 
onze echte behoeften, namelijk die met betrekking tot morele zaken, schonken 
christelijke geleerden aandacht aan de wezenlijke, morele aspecten van de 
economie. Goudzwaard onderzocht de betekenis van het Griekse woord 
oikonomia, dat overeenkomt met de economie in de Bijbel, en liet de morele 
implicaties ervan zien. Zowel Goudzwaard als Ulrich Duchrow maakten gewag 
van het onderscheid dat Aristoteles maakte tussen oikonomia („de kunst en 
kunde van goede huishoudkunde‟) en chrematistike („de kunst van het 
verkrijgen en vergaren van geld‟). In hoofdstuk 2 lieten we tevens zien dat de 
huidige globalisering zowel een imperialistisch aspect heeft, gelegen in het feit 
dat zij in essentie gefundeerd is op de militaire macht en de dollarseigniorage 
van Amerika, als een destructief aspect, zichtbaar in de groter wordende 
ongelijkheid, armoede en ecologische achteruitgang internationaal, en zelfs in 
de Verenigde Staten. Bob Goudzwaard bracht ons in herinnering dat ook de 
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Christelijke Kerk bedoeld was om een wereldwijde gemeenschap te worden. Hij 
stelde daarbij echter dat de Bijbel haar eigen type globalisering heeft, namelijk 
een die gericht is op de komst van Christus (Efeziërs, 1:10). Hij gaf aan dat de 
juiste vraag niet is „of christenen voor of tegen globalisering moeten zijn‟, maar 
„welk soort globalisering moeten we steunen?‟ 
Vervolgens beoordeelden we de casestudy‟s uit hoofdstuk 3 - fiscale 
toevluchtsoorden, werknemer-werkgeverrelaties en onroerend goed - en stelden 
we alternatieve, christelijke ideeën en toepassingen voor. In de casestudy‟s 
onderzochten we de neoliberale toepassing en de ideeën daarachter op de drie 
gebieden die corresponderen met de productiefactoren - kapitaal, arbeid en land. 
De neoliberale zelfregulerende markteconomie vereist de „commodificatie‟ van 
alle productiefactoren. Onze beoordeling van deze casestudy‟s was gebaseerd op 
de analyse van de „commodificatie‟ en de daaropvolgende „instrumentalisering‟ 
van kapitaal, arbeid en land. De neoliberale economie heeft een uitgesproken 
output-oriëntatie, waarbij kapitaal, arbeid en land gecommodificeerd moeten 
worden en slechts ingezet dienen te worden als „factoren‟ zodat ze een 
maximale bijdrage kunnen leveren aan de productiegroei. De economie van de 
Torah (met name Leviticus 25), echter, heeft onmiskenbaar een input-oriëntatie, 
waarbij rentevrij kapitaal, arbeid en land geëerd en gerespecteerd worden als 
zaken met een eigen intrinsieke waarde. Wij stelden de Bijbelse ideeën over de 
„intrinsieke waarde van arbeid en land‟ tegenover de neoliberale ideeën wat 
betreft de „flexibiliteit van de arbeidsmarkt‟ en het „dualisme van mens en 
natuur‟, welke gerelateerd zijn aan de commodificatie van respectievelijk arbeid 
en land. Wij lieten tevens zien dat het hedendaagse rentedragend kapitaal met 
name voet aan de grond heeft gekregen in fiscale toevluchtsoorden en namen 
ten opzichte van deze fiscale toevluchtsoorden een kritisch standpunt in op basis 
van de Bijbelse analyse van „Mammonisme‟ (Lucas 16:13). Fiscale 
toevluchtsoorden lijken ons meer vrijheid te kunnen geven - „freedom to choose‟ 
in de woorden van Milton Friedman - maar in werkelijkheid maken ze ons tot 
slaven en ontmenselijken ze onze samenleving. 
Wat betreft de verdere verslechtering van de vijandige werknemer-
werkgeverrelaties ten gevolge van de neoliberale „flexibiliteit van de 
arbeidsmarkt‟ verwezen we naar de harmonieuze opvattingen en ervaringen van 
de Nederlandse Protestantse Kerk. Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) schiep een 
cruciaal theoretisch kader voor de Nederlandse protestantse sociale beweging, 
met inbegrip van de arbeidersbeweging. Ten eerste ontwikkelde de Nederlandse 
Protestantse Kerk onder invloed van Kuypers organische idee over de 
menselijke samenleving een harmoniemodel van arbeid-kapitaalrelaties, het 
tegenbeeld van het conflictmodel van het kapitaal-georiënteerde liberalisme en 
het arbeid-georiënteerde socialisme. Ten tweede gaf Kuypers „soevereiniteit in 
eigen kring‟ de regering slechts de mogelijkheid om in bescheiden mate te 
interveniëren in de industrie en stimuleerde het autonome bipartiete industriële 
relaties tussen arbeid en kapitaal. De Nederlandse protestantse 
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arbeidersbeweging gaat terug tot „Patrimonium‟, in 1876 opgericht door 
christelijke arbeiders en werkgevers (onder anderen de metselaar Klaas Kater 
(1833-1916) en zijn eigen werkgever Willem Hovy (1840-1915 )). Hoewel dit 
een organisatie voor arbeiders was konden werkgevers als geassocieerd lid 
toetreden. Patrimonium stelde zich ten doel harmonieuze relaties tussen 
werknemers en werkgevers te bevorderen en beoogde niet alleen op te komen 
voor de belangen van arbeiders, maar ook voor die van de samenleving als 
geheel. Met de voortgang van de industrialisatie gaf men echter het interklassen-
model van Patrimonium op en werden aparte werkgevers- en 
werknemersorganisaties opgericht. Aritus Talma (1864-1916) speelde in deze 
overgangsperiode een belangrijke rol. Hij benadrukte dat arbeiders in de ogen 
van God gelijkwaardig zijn aan werkgevers en rechtvaardigde het bestaan van 
christelijke vakbonden. Tevens herinterpreteerde hij de apostolische 
vermaningen, “Gij dienstknechten, zijt in alles gehoorzaam uw heren naar het 
vlees.” Volgens Talma waren deze vermaningen specifiek gericht tot slaven en 
mochten ze niet toegepast worden op de moderne contractuele relaties tussen 
werknemer en werkgever. Talma stelde voor de woorden „gezag‟ en 
„gehoorzaamheid‟ te vervangen door „leiding‟ en „ondergeschiktheid‟ en 
daarmee het „sacrale gezag‟ van de werkgever te desacraliseren. Hij was van 
mening dat het door God gegeven gezag uitsluitend van toepassing was op de 
overheid, de kerk en het gezin en niet op de werknemer-werkgeverrelaties. 
Talma kwam tevens op voor de christelijke vakbonden, die kritiek uit 
conservatieve hoek kregen. Hij stelde dat interklassen-organisaties niet 
realistisch waren nu de werknemer-werkgeverrelaties in het moderne 
massaproductiesysteem van de industriële revolutie zo veel losser waren 
geworden vergeleken met de werknemer-werkgeverrelaties in het gildenstelsel 
met zijn kleinschaliger productiewijze. Hij benadrukte dat de christelijke 
vakbonden niet slechts de materiële belangen en de revolutionaire klassenstrijd 
dienden na te streven, maar tevens hogere, niet-materiële waarden alsmede de 
„strijd voor de bescherming van het recht‟. Hij gaf aan dat de vakbonden een 
fundamenteel recht hadden om de belangen te behartigen van individuele 
arbeiders, die machteloos stonden tegenover een machtig, kapitalistisch systeem. 
Echter, deze erkenning van de noodzaak van afzonderlijke christelijke 
vakbonden betekende niet dat de christelijke arbeidersbeweging haar idealen 
van harmonieuze arbeid-kapitaalrelaties opgaf. De christelijke 
arbeidersbeweging zocht een alternatief in de oprichting van bedrijfsorganisaties 
binnen de zogenoemde Nederlandse overlegeconomie. Met name via deze 
bedrijfsorganisaties heeft de christelijke arbeidersbeweging sinds de oprichting 
van de afzonderlijke vakbonden haar ideeën kunnen realiseren over de op 
samenwerking gebaseerde werknemer-werkgeverrelaties. De eerste aanzet 
daartoe werd reeds in 1891 gegeven, toen men op de Christelijke Sociale 
Conferentie de aanbeveling aannam tot het vormen van bipartiete Kamers van 
Arbeid als een middel om arbeiders en werkgevers met elkaar te verzoenen. 
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Tevens was het CNV (Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond in Nederland, opgericht 
in 1909) in 1919 betrokken bij de oprichting van de tripartiete Hoge Raad van 
Arbeid, die als belangrijkste voorloper van de Sociaal-Economische Raad de 
Nederlandse overlegeconomie inluidde. Overleg van de drie nationale 
vakbonden (inclusief het CNV) met de werkgevers heeft geleid tot de oprichting 
van de Stichting van de Arbeid in mei 1945. Korte tijd fungeerde de Stichting 
van de Arbeid als het officiële adviesorgaan van het kabinet, hoewel ze eigenlijk 
een privaatrechtelijke bedrijfsorganisatie was. Uiteindelijk ontstond in februari 
1950 de Sociaal-Economische Raad, een publiekrechtelijke bedrijfsorganisatie. 
De Sociaal-Economische Raad ontwikkelde zich tot het belangrijkste 
adviesorgaan op sociaal en economisch gebied. Marinus Ruppert (1911-1992), 
sprong als leider van het CNV in christelijke kring in de bres voor de 
publiekrechtelijke bedrijfsorganisatie. Op grond van de „soevereiniteit in eigen 
kring‟ beweerde de conservatieve vleugel dat niet de bedrijfstakken 
bedrijfsgemeenschappen waren, maar de individuele bedrijven. Bedrijfstakken 
zouden daarom geen controlerende bevoegdheden moeten hebben. 
Privaatrechtelijke bedrijfsorganisaties waren wel toegestaan, maar 
publiekrechtelijke niet. Rupperts antwoord was dat bedrijfstakken wel degelijk 
bedrijfsgemeenschappen waren en dat dit nog door geen enkele protestantse 
leider van enig niveau was tegengesproken. Ook bestreed Ruppert het scherpe 
onderscheid tussen privaatrecht en publiekrecht, dat zijn basis vond in een 
ideologische interpretatie van de „soevereiniteit in eigen kring‟. Het CNV heeft 
deelgenomen in de bedrijfsorganisaties vanaf de eerste oprichting ervan tot na 
de tweede wereldoorlog, toen de Stichting van de Arbeid en de Sociaal-
Economische Raad opgericht werden. Daarbij heeft ze meegeholpen aan het tot 
stand komen van de Nederlandse overlegeconomie en vreedzame arbeidsrelaties. 
Tevens heeft het CNV bijgedragen aan het snelle herstel van Nederland na de 
tweede wereldoorlog en de totstandkoming van de verzorgingsstaat. Een recent 
voorbeeld was het bijna-akkoord in 1979 dat het CNV binnen de Stichting van 
de Arbeid initieerde. Dit effende de weg voor het Akkoord van Wassenaar, dat in 
1982 leidde tot het herstel van de overlegeconomie en de economische 
verbetering in de twee daaropvolgende decennia die bekend staat als het 
„poldermodel‟ en die ook internationaal lof geoogst heeft. 
We hebben ook het „publieke concept van onroerendgoed‟ besproken 
versus het „absolutisme van het recht op privé-eigendom‟, wat aan de basis lag 
van de groeiende ongelijkheid in het recht op onroerend goed door de 
neoliberale commodificatie ervan sinds de Koreaanse crisis. Henry George was 
het met Locke eens dat hetgeen een man door zijn arbeid produceert zijn 
eigendom is. Anders dan Locke was hij echter van mening dat dit principe ook 
van toepassing was op de ruige natuur of het land, de genadegave van God. Hij 
ontwikkelde het „publieke concept van land‟ of natuur. Door het bestuderen van 
de wetten van het Jubeljaar in Leviticus 25 en een aantal andere schriftdelen 
over „landsgrenzen‟ en „patrimonium‟ konden we bevestigen dat de Bijbel ons 
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onderrichtte over „Gods ultieme eigendom van het land‟ en het 
„gemeenschappelijk en tijdelijk menselijk eigendom van het land‟. In 
tegenstelling tot George stelden wij voor om het publieke concept niet alleen toe 
te passen op land, maar ook op huizen. In Leviticus 25:29-34 worden „huizen‟ in 
het algemeen niet beschouwd als privébezit, behalve die in ommuurde steden. 
Huizen in steden zijn uitzonderlijk; mogelijkerwijs zijn ze in agrarische tijden 
minder belangrijk voor het levensonderhoud, wat een interessante tegenstelling 
vormt met de situatie in moderne, industriële en commerciële tijden. Het aanbod 
van huizen is inelastisch, zelfs minder dan dat van land. Heden ten dage lijkt het 
probleem met de woningen urgenter en hopelozer dan het probleem met het land. 
Een van de manieren waarop het publieke concept van woningbezit in praktijk 
kan worden gebracht is door in steden op grote schaal aan gezinnen met lage 
inkomens huurhuizen te verstrekken die zowel betaalbaar zijn als van goede 
kwaliteit. 
Tot slot namen we een kritisch standpunt in ten opzichte van de 
waardenvrije economische methodologie van het neoliberalisme uit hoofdstuk 4. 
We deden dit vanuit het perspectief van de christelijke epistemologie. Tevens 
bespraken we de dichotomie tussen de economische wetenschap en het 
christelijk geloof, die hand in hand ging met de waardenvrije economische 
methodologie. Douglas Vickers bestrijdt de waardenvrije economie op grond 
van de „presuppositionele christelijke epistemologie‟. De presuppositionele 
epistemologie gaat ervan uit dat wij onze menselijke ervaringen niet zouden 
kunnen begrijpen zonder vooronderstellingen als bijvoorbeeld de Bijbelse 
openbaringen. Vickers beweert dat onze economische gedachten en 
voorschriften afhangen van de filosofische of religieuze wereld- en 
levensinzichten en pre-theoretische overtuigingen, welke eveneens morele 
implicaties hebben. Vickers omschrijft de presuppositionele christelijke 
epistemologie als een „transcendentale‟ epistemologie in tegenstelling tot de 
„immanente‟ epistemologieën. Hij verklaart het verschil ertussen door Abraham 
Kuypers „ontologische antithese‟ tussen de christen en de niet-christen te 
verbreden tot een „epistemologische antithese‟. 
De waardenvrije economische methodologie leidt tot het overheersende 
idee van de dichotomie tussen de economische wetenschap en het christelijk 
geloof omdat het post-Kantiaanse positivisme dat, zoals beschreven in 
hoofdstuk 4, de economische wetenschap beïnvloedde, de autonomie van de 
mens en de toereikendheid van het menselijk verstand vooronderstelt. Volgens 
de christelijke epistemologie is het christelijk geloof echter onscheidbaar van de 
economische wetenschap, net zoals het onscheidbaar is van elk ander 
kennisterrein. Christelijke economen moeten economische feiten beschouwen 
en interpreteren op basis van hun geloof in God de Schepper en Zijn Woord. 
Bovendien moeten christelijke wetenschappers de onscheidbare relatie tussen de 
economische wetenschap en het christelijk geloof verdedigen volgens het 
godsdienstige principe dat Christus Koning is over alle gebieden van ons leven. 
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